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This dissertation explores the commodification of the human body that emerges from 
the relationship between late capitalism and biomedical advances in transplant 
technology. A closer look at the circuits of organ trade shows that the trafficking of 
human organs perpetuates the structures of economic exploitation that characterised 
colonialism in its heyday: organs travel from formerly colonized nations to former 
metropoles, from black/brown bodies to white ones, from poor to rich. In the wake of 
biotechnology, I argue, the commodification of the human body is taking on new, 
predatory forms that can only be understood in the context of (de)colonization, 
globalization and late capitalism. 
I begin by examining organ commodification in relation to Karl Marx’s 
theorisation of the commodification of labour-power, and then proceed to examine 
organ harvesting, transplanting and trafficking as represented in three contemporary 
texts: Manjula Padmanabhan’s play Harvest (1996), Stephen Frears’s film Dirty Pretty 
Things (2003) and Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go (2005).  These texts 
grapple with contemporary debates around organ harvesting and stage the new ethical 
dilemmas to which the use and abuse of transplant technologies gives rise. They 
engage with this newly materialised way of commoditising the body in a way that 
allows us to think about organ exchange, not as a transaction forever trapped between 
the dynamic of altruistic donation and commoditised exchange, but as a site from 
which to examine the fraught relationship that exists between organ donors/sellers and 
organ receivers/buyers.   
A comparison of all three works reveals the need to understand transplant 
technologies and the commoditization of the human body that they permit as 
inextricable from the empowering yet disturbingly predatory effects that 
biotechnologies have on our understanding of death, where death is increasingly 
imagined as a fate that technology can endlessly keep at bay. Drawing attention to 
themselves as literary works, these texts dare to imagine and interrogate the future that 
biotechnology both promises and threatens us with. In my literary-critical readings, I 
make a claim for literature’s ability to stand as a constant counterpoint to the 
instrumental logic that characterises organ commodification, signalling instead, to a 
space beyond such instrumentality. 
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Introduction 
 
THE BIOTECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND ORGAN 
TRANSPLANTATION 
 
[T]he attempt to [...] save human affairs from their frailty by dealing with them as though they 
were or could become the planned products of human making has first of all resulted in 
channelling the human capacity for action, for beginning new and spontaneous processes 
which without men would never come into existence, into an attitude towards nature which up 
to the latest stage of the modern age had been one of exploring natural laws and fabricating 
objects out of natural material. [Now] [...] we have begun to act into nature [...] This started 
harmlessly enough with the experiment in which men were no longer content to observe, to 
register, and contemplate whatever nature was willing to yield in her own appearance, but 
began to prescribe conditions and to provoke natural processes. [...] [It] has finally ended in 
a veritable act of ‘making’ nature, that is, of creating ‘natural’ processes which without men 
would never exist and which earthly nature by herself seems incapable of accomplishing... 
 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
I Confounding Promises 
It was 1958, after the world had witnessed the first use of nuclear weapons, when 
Hannah Arendt urged us, in the pages of The Human Condition, to ask ourselves 
where the ethical, legal and ontological limits of scientific and medical progress 
should lie. Today, in the age of cloning, genetic modification of organisms, organ 
transplantation, new reproductive technologies and human genome mapping, this 
question is equally pressing. Our medical technologies are ripe with paradoxical 
possibilities that, on the one hand, invite us to marvel at its achievements and to hope 
for still more dazzling cures.1  On the other hand, we may recoil from the hubristic 
overtones of medicine’s promises, and fear the consequences of a looming society in 
which the naturally given is increasingly replaceable by the artificially engineered.  
                                                            
1 Taking my cue from Nikolas Rose, I want to qualify my use, throughout this section, of the first 
person plural, which deceptively implies universality. “Our” medical technologies are hardly distributed 
evenly. Rose cites a Médicins Sans Frontières document reporting that a mere 10 percent of the US’s 
total spending on health research is allocated for the treatment of 90 percent of the global disease 
burden (261, fn1). 
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Some twenty years after Arendt, in The History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault 
traced the process that landed us in the era of biopolitics, when political authority 
depends on the technologies of biopower, technologies through which the state aims to 
manage, know and intervene in the biological lives and capacities of its citizens, 
thereby “achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations” (140). If 
Foucault himself acknowledged that by the nineteenth century, biopower was 
increasingly exercised outside the state, “in a whole series of sub-State institutes such 
as medical institutions, welfare funds, insurance and so on,” then today’s medical 
technologies, as we shall see shortly, frequently entangle not only the state and sub-
State institutions, but the citizen-subject herself in the sticky business of deciding 
when an intervention in a given individual’s life is desirable and/or legitimate (Society 
Must be Defended, 145).  
Due perhaps to the dread-suffused wonder they arouse, a vast amount of 
critical literature has sprung up around biotechnological developments, and a large 
portion of this work  insists on the revolutionary, transformative and novel character 
of the questions and challenges with which biotechnology confronts us.2 The term 
‘biotechnology,’ that is, “any technological application that uses biological systems, 
living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for 
specific use,” may have originated in agriculture, but the current definition of the term 
by the Convention on Biological Diversity reflects the fact that the term now refers to 
the technological modification of all living organisms.3 While Arendt’s still-pertinent 
 
2 I cite a few examples from the thinkers whose work I find most insightful: Paul Rabinow argues that 
“[c]ontemporary technical capacities [...] now raise a range of possibilities for new practices, and hence 
new meaning, which overflow the older vessels” (148, emphasis added).  Nikolas Rose contends that 
we are faced with the task of making sense of “an emergent form of life” (3, emphasis added) and 
speaks of how biotechnology “transforms conceptions of human life” (153, emphasis added).  Paul 
Gilroy repeatedly uses the term “biotechnological revolution,” and his argument – which I discuss in 
more detail below – is heavily informed by “the scientific and technological changes that have followed 
the revolution in molecular biology” (43, emphasis added).  
3 See http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles.shtml?a=cbd-02 Last accessed 31 July 2008. 
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observations of half a century ago serve as a cautionary reminder not to indulge in a 
“breathless epochalization” of the twenty-first century as a sort of threshold in 
biotechnological developments (Rose, 252), it is important to note that biotechnology 
has made dramatic progress since the 1950s, reaching the stage where the everyday 
lives of a majority of first-world citizens, at least, are infused by it. It is the increasing 
ubiquity of biotechnology in day to day life and the extent to which biotechnology and 
the life sciences have become globally enmeshed in geographical, economic and 
interpersonal circuits (Rose, 15), that warrants speaking of this as a new 
enon.4  
The aim of this project is to interrogate the series of dichotomous pa
are invariably thrown up in scientific, cultural or bioethical discussions of 
biotechnology. Biotechnology, it would seem, forces us to choose: between the na
and the artificial, between the gift of life and the sale of life, between dignity and 
dehumanization, between mortality and immortality. My goal is to analyse the d
but inescapable choices that appear to await us in our biotechnological futures, 
choices, I suggest, that are inextricable from both the geo-political configurations 
the globe that result from colonization, globalization and late capitalism, and the 
empowering and disturbingly predatory effects that biotechnologies have on our 
understan
. 
If the use of biotechnology on us human beings is the source of much 
controversy, ultimately, the disagreements between the sceptics and the believers can 
 
4 Four of the key areas in which we see the impact of biotechnology in our daily lives, as Nikolas Rose 
points out, are the following: 1) reproduction and natality, given the advent of prenatal diagnosis and 
embryo selection; 2) superior performance in sport; 3) ageless bodies, given the wide range of 
technologies available for increasing the human lifespan, and 4) happy souls, due to the family of SSRI 
drugs which alter and improve moods (77).  
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be traced, as Paul Rabinow argues, to the tension that underlies Western conceptions 
of the body. Sketching a genealogy that takes us back to Christianity and the myth o
resurrection, Rabinow shows that there lurks in Western tradition “the still presen
sense that the body and its parts are always more than things” (146). In contrast, 
contemporary biotechnology and genetics view the body as something that can be 
divided “into a potentially discrete, knowable and exploitable reservoir of molecular 
and biochemical products and events. By reason of its commitment to fragmentation
there is literally no conception o
ogical practices” (149).  
Nikolas Rose’s argument develops along similar lines. Clinical medicine as it 
evolved during the nineteenth century, he explains, saw the body at the “mo
focusing on it “as a systemic whole” (11). Today’s medical gaze however, 
increasingly visualizes the body at the “molecular level.”5 What molecularization 
enables, crucially, is the disassociation of certain tissues, molecules and
their particular sources in a specific organ, individual or even species. 
Molecularization, in other words, allows tissues, cells and other biological material
be regarded, in many respects, as manipulable and transferrable elements or units, 
which can be delocalized – moved from place to place
from disease to disease, from person to person” (15). 
Taken together, Rabinow’s and Rose’s arguments provide the key to understanding 
the high level of interest that scholars of socie
th
 
5 Examples of this molecular medical view include the immediate search for the molecular structure of a 
causative agent whenever a new disease is encountered, the manufacture of organisms whose gene 
sequences have been modified in order to study the nature or treatment of certain conditions or even the 
treatment of certain forms of depression, for which there exist a series of “molecularly crafted 
antidepressants that claim to target specific sites in neurotransmissions” (14). See Rose, 12-14 for more 
examples. 
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biotechnological developments [are] disclos[ing] issues (such as the de
of ‘human being’ or the unequal distribution of resources) that have never b
resolved. With this resurfacing comes the opportunity to look anew at 
structural inequities: local, national and global. Biotechnology is revealing 
those inequities, and in some cases exacerbating them (222). 
In recent years, the humanities and social sciences have produced a number of 
projects that welcome biotechnological developments precisely because they provide 
the opportunity to challenge anew the continued and possibly irksome “endurance 
long-standing cultural formulations which still seem to have signifying potential” 
(Rabinow, 146). Ranging from the cautiously optimistic to the uninhibitedly animated,
these projects credit biotechnology with the potential for overcoming ingrained forms 
of social domination. Their claims are based on the developments that Rabinow and 
Rose signal to: the relative insignificance of the origins of biological material,
easily extractable from and transferrable between organisms, and the gradual 
breakdown of frontiers previously separating discrete bodies, species and ontological 
categories. Donna Haraway is perhaps the most unreserved in voicing her hopes that 
“the crucial boundary breakdowns” instigated by communications technologies and 
biotechnologies will allow an un-innocent yet utopian feminism to be born (151). H
“Cyborg Manifesto” embraces the cyborg, a hybrid creature whose very existen
embodies “liminal transformation,” defying simple categorisation as human or 
artefact, man or woman, individual or entity, and not easily recognisable as the 
member of any particular race (177). Like Rabinow, Haraway sees the Western
understanding of the body as rooted in conceptions of “organic wholism” and 
originary wholeness (178). Such conceptions, for Haraway, are invariably mirrored i
certain forms of radical social critique whose projects are undermined because they 
are “regularly constructed as totalities” rather than “embrac[ing] the status of partial
explanation” (160). Totalities are oppressive, argues Haraway; they give rise to the
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dualisms that structure practices of domination of “all those constituted as others” 
(177). In contrast, Haraway points us to the cyborg, who explores “the necessity of 
limitation [and] partiality,” refusing to be unde
rch “for innocent wholeness” (178-9). 
Although he voices his hopes in a tone more guarded than Haraway’s, Paul 
Gilroy sees in the “profound transformation” wrought by the DNA revolution the roots 
of a radical and liberating crisis in our understanding of race and racial difference 
The first chapter of Against Race welcomes recent developments in genetics and 
biotechnology, and sees these as the “cue to free ourselves from the bonds of all 
raciology in a novel and ambitious abolitionist project” (ibid). Gilroy draws our 
attention to the observation and visualization techniques commonly employed in 
contemporary biomedicine to argue that the former “representational economies
 
When the body becomes absolutely penetrable, and is refigured as the tran
epiphenomenon of coded invisible information, that aesthetic, that gaze, and 
that regime of power are irrecoverably over. [...] Today skin is no longer 
privileged as the threshold of either identity or particularity. The boundaries of 
molecular, not dermal (47) 
Furthermore, he notes, molecular biology and genetics instil in us the “awareness o
the indissoluble unity of all life at the level of genetic materials [which] leads to a 
stronger sense of the particularity of our species as a whole...” (20). We are dealing 
here with a new paradigm of life in which little importance is attached to the idea of 
specifically racial differences. Our anxieties today, Gilroy contends, concern not our 
individual race but our human specificity, our fate as a species whose particularities 
are being altered b
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A larger proportion of the literature that has emerged in the wake of 
biotechnological developments, however, examines not its potential, if rightly 
harnessed, to overthrow entrenched forms of social, cultural and epistemological 
hierarchies, but focuses, rather, on the shift in public expectations that biotechnology 
creates in the global North.6 This literature explores how biotechnology inaugurates a 
view of biology not as destiny but as a field of opportunity, a view of medicine not as 
a practice designed to restore the body back to normality, but as a promise of desirable 
enhancements and forestalled degeneration (Rose, 20 and 51; Waldby and Mitchell, 
179; Neilson, 181).7  
Nikolas Rose holds that we now relate to ourselves as “‘somatic’ individuals, 
that is to say, as beings whose individuality is, in part at least, grounded within our 
fleshly, corporeal existence” (26). This heightened sense of oneself as a corporeal 
being becomes the target of the many narratives of health promotion in the name of 
bodily and psychological fitness that proliferate in both official and popular 
discourse.8 Rose convincingly argues that biological conditions are no longer quietly 
accepted as innate and irremediable “in advanced liberal democracies, where 
individuals are enjoined to think of themselves as actively shaping their life course 
through acts of choice in the name of a better future,” and, I would add, in the name of 
healthier bodies and longer life-spans (ibid). Rather, he says, in these countries, 
 
6 See especially Paul Rabinow, Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell, and Nikolas Rose. 
7 Rose suggests that today, medicine’s goal is increasingly to transform human capacities altogether. He 
contrasts this with medicine’s previous objectives, when the body was understood to have its natural 
norms which were altered during illness and subsequently restored. Today, however, these very norms 
“appear in principle open to conscious manipulation” and biotechnology has created entirely new norms 
which we accept as everyday reality (81). Brett Neilson makes  much the same point when he observes 
that new drugs and treatments  (Viagra, hormone replacement treatment, contraceptive drugs, fertility 
treatments) have rewritten the norms of aging male and female sexuality as well as their “timetables of 
reproduction” (181). 
8 Rose’s argument finds echoes in Zygmunt Bauman’s observations in Life in Fragments. Bauman 
holds that contemporary existence in the first world is ruled by an emphasis on corporeality that sees 
“[b]odily fitness as the supreme goal,” and pursues this fitness through practices of “self-coercion” 
(119). 
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uneasiness about mortality is increasingly rearticulated within a rhetoric of hope, and 
characterised by an eager expectation for new medical developments.  
 Together with Brett Neilson, Catherine Waldby and Robert Mitchell focus on 
the other hope fuelled by biotechnology, and by the branch of regenerative medicine 
in particular: that of “perfecting the body and eliminating degeneration” (Waldby and 
Mitchell, 179).9 Neilson notes that the dream of a “completely regenerative biology” 
is fed by “the discovery that the body does not age homogenously, but unevenl
replenishes cells and tissues in certain sites”, which raises hopes that sites such as the 
brain, prone to earlier degeneration than other parts of the body, can be treated by 
“bringing them into line with self-renewing sites (like the bone marrow)” (181).   
It is in these narratives describing the shifting perceptions and heightened 
expectations of both medicine and our own bodies that the more troubling aspects of 
biotechnology invariably begin to creep in. When almost any of the capacities and 
characteristics of the human body seem potentially open to a perceived improvement 
by technological intervention, medicine’s purpose seems to be less about curing illness 
and more about catering to “our desires about the kinds of people we want ourselves 
and our children to be” (Rose, 4). Similarly, critics such as Adele Clark and Sarah 
Franklin worry that biotechnology and the desires it engenders have transformed what 
were hitherto seen as laws of organic life into issues of choice and consumer 
purchasing-power (Clark, Franklin 2006). We are moving, according to Clark, into a 
world where normalization is coming to be replaced by customization, a world of 
biological “design on demand” (cited in Rose, 21). 
 
9 Walby and Mitchell explain that regenerative medicine “enhances the body’s self-repair capacities” 
through various techniques, such as the use of growth factors that  improve the production of red blood 
cells; tissue engineering, and stem cell research, which can be used to induce the ‘growth’ of various 
types of tissues (126).  
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Other writers express the apprehension that the celebratory discourse lauding 
biotechnology and its myriad therapeutic possibilities is but a veil for a “backdoor to 
eugenics.”10  While biotechnology may inspire dreams of improving our quality of life 
by preventive medicine and the presymptomatic diagnosis of individuals perceived to 
be at risk, these writers claim, this rhetoric obscures a sinister underside: 
biotechnology could give rise to practices of control that will discriminate those who 
parents and/or doctors hold to be biologically inferior or defective. Such fears may 
smack of pulp fiction or conspiracy theories, true.11 Yet it is nevertheless undeniable 
that every new possibility conferred to us by biotechnology implicates us in the 
difficult process of determining the worth of different human lives. Prenatal scans 
detecting Down Syndrome are common practice in most Western countries, and in 
2005 the French biotech company Intragen announced the imminent launch of a 
genetic diagnostic of autism: both developments confront parents with the decision of 
whether or not to abort the foetus, and, implicitly, to make a judgement on whether or 
not a certain life is worthy of being lived. Giorgio Agamben has famously traced the 
complex and troubling histories informing the idea that doctors, parents and patients 
can, indeed, must, decide who should live or not, decide, in short, “what life deserves 
to be lived” (137). Every society, he argues, decides where its ‘unworthy’ lives lie. 
Every society engages in a “valorisation and [...] ‘politicisation’ of life [which] [...] 
necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases 
to be politically relevant, [...] and can as such be eliminated without punishment” 
 
10 See Troy Duster’s 1990 book of the same title. Nothing attests more to the transformative power that 
biotechnology allegedly possesses than the radically different futures that commentators predict for us 
in its wake: if Gilroy hopes for a raceless future to come, Duster warns against a return to oppressive 
regimes based on biological discrimination. 
11 It is worth noting, however, that sex-selective abortion is widely practiced in India, China and 
Pakistan, to cite but the most well known examples. 
10 
 
                                                           
(139).12 In the light of Agamben’s claim, then, we might suggest that biotechnology 
and its medical developments are rendering this “valorisation and politicisation of life” 
increasingly visible, and hence, increasingly controversial. 
Increasingly, biotechnology not only calls upon us to make decisions about the 
worthiness of a certain life; it creates liminal entities which defy our very definitions 
of life and death. Particularly visible in the field of new reproductive technologies, 
stem cell research and organ transplantation, these entities include fertilized and 
unfertilized ova, embryos at various stages of development, stem cell lines and the 
human being who is plugged into a life-support machine awaiting the harvesting of her 
organs. Sarah Franklin (2000) has shown that frozen embryos and stem cells have 
raised heated debates about their rights and the legitimacy of the practices used to 
create them as well as their potential destinies. Giorgio Agamben outlines the history 
of the new criteria for death that had to be outlined following the simultaneous 
developments in both life-support technology and transplant technology (160-5). For 
life support technology renders previous ways of determining death – cessation of 
breathing and of the heartbeat – obsolete; these functions continue to exist when a 
person is on a life-support machine even though they are otherwise irresponsive to all 
 
12 Citing one Hans Reiter, who contributed to a 1942 National Socialist pamphlet describing the 
eugenicist politics of the Reich, Agamben argues that this was a time of “radical transformation of the 
meaning and duties of medicine”, which now becomes a crucial ally of politics (145). Agamben further 
notes that the concept of ‘life unworthy of being lived’ finds its “first juridical articulation in a well-
intentioned pamphlet in favour of euthanasia” written by Karl Binding in 1920 (137). Agamben’s most 
radical argument, however, is that modernity is characterised by the fact that “the physician and the 
scientist move into the no-man’s land [of deciding what life is unworthy of living and hence can be 
killed without punishment] into which at one point the sovereign alone could penetrate” (159). 
Agamben claims, then, that our present political structures are related to the concept of sovereignty: life 
itself is constantly subjected to a judgement of worth made by oneself (suicide), or others (doctors, 
parents, spouses), and these decisions are sanctioned by the state (Rose, 57). As will shortly become 
clear, however, my study is not concerned with sovereignty and the idea of ‘bare-life’ and so I do not 
delve further into this controversial aspect of Agamben’s argument. I do want to note, once again, 
however, that the history Agamben outlines for us in Homo Sacer shows that heralding biotechnology 
as the harbinger of a radically new socio-political time is fallacious. 
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stimuli. Since 1968, this irreversible coma – or brain death – is now the criteria for 
establishing death, even though the patient continues to breathe, albeit through the 
help of a life-support technology (161-2).13 
 
II The “Bioeconomy” 
The most widely expressed reservations regarding biotechnological developments, 
however, concern the bodily commodification it permits. Catherine Waldby first 
deployed the term “biovalue” to refer to the ways in which cadavers and their tissues 
are reemployed to preserve and enhance the lives of the living. Writing only seven 
years later, Nikolas Rose proposes that we expand our use of the term to include 
biological matter obtained from the living, as well as from the dead: “we can use the 
term to refer to the plethora of ways in which vitality itself has become a potential 
source of value” (32). As we saw earlier, today’s medicine, informed as it is by the 
developments in biotechnology and genetics, fragments the human body into discrete 
and transferrable components. Biological tissue has thus begun to operate like any 
other commodity in late capitalist economies: it circulates locally and globally 
between different entities and individuals; it promotes public and private investment in 
its production and distribution and is even hailed as a new form of financial currency: 
“biocapital.”14 The controversy surrounding this state of affairs has led governments 
worldwide to pass legislation that draws the delicate lines, as Rose succinctly puts it, 
                                                            
13 See also Margaret Lock’s Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death. In a study 
that compares transplantation practices in the United States and Japan, Lock shows that in popular 
culture, death continues to be understood as occurring when the person ceases to breathe and their heart 
stops beating. This contrasts with the specialist’s more complex, medical understanding of brain death. 
Lock attempts to retain both these definitions with her use of the deliberately oxymoronic term “living 
cadaver.” 
14 “Biocapital, like any other form of circulation of capital,” says Kaushik Sunder Rajan in his 
Biocapital, “involves circulation and exchange of money and commodities […] but in addition, the 
circulations of new and particular forms of currency, such as biological material and information, 
emerge.” Sunder Rajan also provides a detailed analysis of the global and local flows of biological 
material and the capital invested in it by biotech firms in the USA and India. 
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demarcating “the permitted, the regulated and the forbidden” (2). As Rabinow 
explains, the need to implement regulations concerning what procedures can be legally 
carried out with human tissue arises from the disconcerting clash between traditional 
conceptions of the human body, which see the body as a sacred, inviolable and 
inalienable vessel, and the liberal view of the person, which sees the individual as a 
rational actor and contractual negotiator (130).15  
Crucial to range of state strategies and policies designed to regulate the 
circulation of biological material is the field of bioethics. Much like the contested field 
which it is called upon to mediate, bioethics itself inhabits both the discourse of 
commodification and of “market inalienability” (Radin, 1849).16  For, on the one 
hand, as Rose has argued, ethics plays a key role in market creation: products that d
not come with proper ethical guarantees will not easily make their way into the glob
market (30). On the other hand, however, as Waldby and Mitchell argue, “most [...] 
bioethical work enshrines the principle that the human body exists beyond relations of 
commerce, that its value is intrinsic and unquantifiable” (23). Bioethicists see the 
commodification of biological material as tantamount to the reification of human 
relations, and encourage instead the voluntary donation of tissue, which they hold to 
be inherently more ethical (24). Waldby and Mitchell warn us, however, that to rely on 
gifting as a way to preserve the human body from all trace of commodification is 
hopelessly naive:   
 
15 Dorothy Nelkin’s view aptly captures the tension between these two conceptions of the body. The 
extent to which biotechnology strips the body of its cultural meanings and reduces it to an object of 
utility, she argues, is evidenced in the language used by specialists. She warns that scientific and 
biomedical writing is “permeated with the commercial language of supply and demand. Body parts are 
extracted like a crop, or mined like a resource. Tissue is procured – a term more commonly used for 
land, goods and prostitutes” (cited in Rose, 39). Of course, extraction and mining also evoke farming, 
agriculture and other interactions with nature, a point I pursue in the next chapter. 
16 In her article of the same title, Margaret Jane Radin defines market-inalienability as follows: “Things 
that may be given away but not sold are market-inalienable” (1849). Radin’s definition implicitly sets 
up a distinction between the gift and the commodity, an opposition frequently encountered in the field 
of biotechnology, and which I examine in more detail below.  
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This laudable principle has become vexed in the area of tissue donation by the 
rapidly increasing commercial value of the tissue after it has been donated. [...] 
Donated tissue may be either sold by the receiving party (hospitals routinely 
sell tissues to pharmaceutical or cosmetics companies, for example) or 
transformed into cell lines or gene sequences and patented. [...] Effectively, 
[the] strategy to make the human body a bulwark against the commodification 
of social life, a strategy now institutionalized in bioethical procedure, has 
simply rendered the body an open source of free biological material for 
commercial use (23-4). 
Waldby and Mitchell’s point is perhaps best illustrated in what many critics have 
described as “biocolonialism”: the patenting and commercialization of the 
consensually donated genetic materials of indigenous peoples.17  
Biocolonialism. Biovalue. Biocapital. These neologisms attest to the 
undeniable fact that “[t]he two universalized productions of Western bourgeois culture 
– technoscience and modern rationalized capitalism – have entered into a new 
relationship with each other” (Rabinow, 136). It is my aim in this project to interrogate 
just this relationship, this “bioeconomy” (Rose, 6). I do so with the help of the ideas of 
Marx and Hannah Arendt and three core fictional texts, all of which remind us that at 
 
17 Debra Harry, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Aroha Te Pareake Mead, Deborah Halbert and Priscilla Wald all 
employ the term “biocolonialism”. An extended discussion falls outside the scope of this project, 
although I do return to the issue of patenting in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that two 
commonly cited examples of biocolonialism refer to the Guaymi people of Western Panama and the 
Hagahai people of Papua New Guinea, the blood of whom contains antibodies that are resistant to a 
certain kind of leukemia, and whose donated tissue – obtained on the grounds that it would be used to 
facilitate medical research – was subsequently developed into patented cell lines in the United States. 
The Gauymi and Hagahai can claim no property right or profit from these patents, although, following 
legal action on the part of the Guaymi people, the USA did withdraw its patent (see Halbert, 120-2 and 
130). Aroha Te Pareake Mead draws an explicit link with colonial practices in her exposition of the 
indigenous peoples’ position: “Human genes are being treated by science in the same way that 
indigenous ‘artifacts’ were gathered by museums; collected, stored, immortalized, reproduced, 
engineered – all for the sake of humanity and public education, or so we are asked to believe” (cited in 
Halbert, 130). Ironically, however, the spokespersons for the indigenous peoples whose genetic 
materials are being marketed by biotechnological companies in the West often resort to the very 
language and rhetoric that Waldby and Mitchell problematize above. As Debora J. Halbert explains, 
“Instead of allowing the human individual to be divided into parts that become easily commodified, the 
language of Indigenous rights advocates refuses to allow the individual, or communities of individuals, 
to be understood as anything less than a totality” (131). 
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stake in this new relationship is a humanist distinction which seems less and less 
straightforward:  the distinction between that which is not human – and therefore 
legitimately ownable, commodifiable and killable – and that which is human – and 
therefore spared of such treatment.18 I have chosen, however, to focus exclusively on 
the phenomenon of organ transplantation, a decision which warrants clarification. 
Biotechnology and the life sciences are increasingly entangled in financial, 
legal, interpersonal and global circuits, weighed down with aspirations and desires, 
anxieties and ethical qualms. I contend that the field of organ transplantation is where 
these social circuits and responses to the arcane are at their most visible. While the 
commodification of all manner of biological tissue is rife, it is the commodification of 
organs and their market-price that is most widely discussed and documented. 19 And as 
we shall see shortly, it is with specific reference to the transplantable organ that many 
scientists and bioethicists are now advocating the legalisation of the trade in body 
parts, thereby calling into question our post-Abolition definition of the human as a 
being who cannot be bought or sold, and severely angering those who insist that 
organs should always be donated as life-conferring gifts.  
Furthermore, the geographical flow of both illegally commodified and legally 
donated organs can be mapped to offer a clear example of the routes that body parts 
 
18 Nikolas Rose makes a very similar point. See The Politics of Life Itself, 39. I also want to clarify here, 
once again, that although I use the term ‘killable’ I am not concerned, as Giorgio Agamben is, with the 
problematic of sovereignty and the homo sacer who can be legitimately killed without punishment. 
Rather, I am referring to the liminal entities created by biotechnology that I mention above: embryos, 
brain-dead patients, etc. 
19 So pervasive is the notion that there is an expanding and lucrative market for healthy, transplantable 
organs that it has become commonplace for newspapers and entertainment websites to make this market 
into the target of both sensationalist stories and incisive black humour. Witness, for instance, the May 6 
2008 article in British tabloid The Daily Sport [sic!], whose headline proffers tongue-in-cheek advice on 
how to “beat the credit crunch.” The paper’s proposed solution is that you “flog your organ,” and 
reports that one can claim £25,000 for a kidney and £20,000 for a liver. In January 2007, a youtube.com 
user uploaded a cartoon telling the story of Charlie, a taciturn unicorn who is dragged by his two friends 
to “Candy Mountain.” Despite his reluctance, Charlie is pressured to enter Candy Mountain cave, and 
emerges alone, dazed, scarred and in pain to find that “they took [his] frigging kidney.” The video can 
still be viewed at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZdpEyX9mXFY (last accessed 1 August 2008). 
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travel, and the extent to which the success of transplant technology, where healthy 
organs must be delivered swiftly to the waiting patient, hinges on the “time-space 
compression” that is characteristic of globalization and late capitalism (Harvey). I 
propose, however, that this map of global organ flows also allows us to trace the 
outlines of a new relationship between first and third world bodies, one that is 
informed not just by the increasingly “somatic” ethic through which the first world 
citizen understands her body (Rose, 26), but by specific developments within the field 
of transplantation. Perhaps my most contentious claim, however, is that through a 
careful consideration of the organ-as-commodity we might begin to see that 
biotechnology has taken the commodification of the body to levels unchartered by 
materialist readings of the human body and the commodification of its inherent 
capacity to labour.20 I dedicate the entirety of my next chapter to this analysis. To 
pave the ground for it, however, let us first turn to two specific and pertinent 
developments in organ transplantation: the miraculous drugs that are respo
the transplantation boom and the urge to legalize the market in human organ
The innate and recurrent medical problem with transplantation, Renée Fox and 
Judith Swazey point out, is the “unrelenting intolerance of individuals to grafts of 
other people’s tissues and organs” (10). The problem, essentially, is immunological: 
the transplant patient’s immune system rejects ‘foreign’ tissue. In the early days of 
transplantation, therefore, successful transplants were only likely to ensue in the case 
of monozygotic twins. Following the subsequent biomedical development in tissue 
typing techniques designed to evaluate donor-patient compatibility, doctors could 
 
20 Given the specific nature of my concerns in this project, my focus throughout is on the live organ that 
is treated, procured, exchanged and used as though it were any other naturally occurring resource. For 
this reason, I do not concentrate on the kinship networks created by organ transplantation or on what 
anthropologists Renée Fox and Judith Swazey have called  “the tyranny of the gift” – a term they use to 
allude to the range of emotions surrounding the process of transplantation: relatives’ pressure to donate, 
patients’ guilt or debt towards the donor, or even patients’ aversion to the knowledge that their body is 
now prostheticized (39). See “Organ Exchange as Gift Exchange”, the second chapter of Spare Parts. 
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successfully transplant organs from related donors whose tissue matched that of the 
patient (Fox and Swazey, The Courage to Fail).21 In the early 1980s, however, 
cyclosporine erupted onto the transplant scene. Described as a “wonder drug” and 
hailed as the remarkable immunosuppressant that would revolutionize transplantation, 
by 1989, cyclosporine had become the drug that was “almost universally given to 
transplantation recipients” (cited in Fox and Swazey, 4).22 What began with the 
widespread use of cyclosporine now continues with subsequently developed 
immunosuppressive agents: as immunosuppressants increasingly “forestall the body’s 
immune system from defensively rejecting tissue and organ transplants as foreign” a 
growing number of medical practitioners and institutions have been “emboldened […] 
to enter the field, to transplant a wider spectrum of organs, […] and to perform a 
greater number of retransplants” ( Fox and Swazey, xvi). 
There is an aspect of post-cyclosporine transplantation that Fox and Swazey 
allude to here only implicitly. Lawrence Cohen, however, spells it out for us: 
“Cyclosporine globalizes” (11).  In other words: if cyclosporine allows for more 
transplants, this is because immunosuppressant agents create a far larger group of 
potential organ donors than ever existed before (ibid). In its infancy, Cohen observes, 
suitable organs were procured through techniques that relied on recognition: donor 
and patient tissues needed to be tested for “the recognition of molecular sameness and 
difference” (ibid). Today, however, transplantation relies on suppression: “[d]ifference 
is selectively suppressed” allowing for entire groups of unrelated individuals to 
become “same enough” for the purposes of transplantation (12). It is thanks to this 
 
21 All subsequent citations from Fox and Swazey refer to their second book, Spare Parts. 
22 Fox and Swazey observe that although by the late 1980s cyclosporine was discovered to have some 
serious side-effects, therefore requiring an ongoing quest for less toxic immunosuppressive agents, the 
predominant attitude of medical professionals was that of a dogged belief “in the existence of a utopian, 
magic-bullet kind of therapy” (5). The sobering discoveries about cyclosporine not withstanding, then, 
the 1990s saw the clinical trials of FK 506, another immunosuppressant, that was greeted, “like 
cyclosporine before it, as  transplantation’s ‘miracle drug’” (6). 
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technique of donor recruitment-through-suppression, he argues, that transplantation 
has become such a major industry (ibid).23 
Cyclosporine has transformed organs from “recalcitrant objects with nearly 
unique histio-profiles” into standardized, replaceable body parts (Waldby and 
Mitchell, 171). This has meant that since the 1980s, transplantation has become more 
“commonplace and routinized” resulting in a shift of outlook in the field: 
immunological rejection of the organ has ceased to be a primary concern (Fox and 
Swazey, 44). Much more worrying is the chronic shortage of transplantable organs for 
the ever-increasing number of people whose physical condition could be improved 
with a ‘foreign’ organ that is ever less likely to be immunologically rejected. The field 
of modern medicine that was perhaps the most laden with the intimate, complex and 
symbolic associations of altruistic gifting and miraculous resurrection is viewed today 
as a field in crisis, burdened by the problem of scarce supply and exorbitant demand. 
Fox and Swazey claim that the most profound change emerging from and 
complementing this language of supply and demand is the serious consideration that 
transplant specialists have now begun to give to the commodification and 
marketization of organs, a practice that most national governments explicitly forbid.24 
While most advocates of commodification focus on cadaveric rather than live organ 
 
23 Lesley Sharp, too, observes that “transplantation is as lucrative as it is medically miraculous” (12). 
Her study documents how organ transplantation has shifted to the corporate model as medical 
institutions and transplant surgeons are under increasing pressure for a higher number of successful 
transplants in order to draw in major investments and funds (25). 
24 Perhaps the most notable exception is Iran, where the sale of organs is legally sanctioned by the 
government. The three nation-states that I will allude to in the course of this dissertation, however, are 
the United States, the United Kingdom and India, all of which have legislation in place forbidding the 
sale and purchase of human organs. See the US government’s 1984 National Organ Transplantation Act 
(<http://history.nih.gov/01Docs/historical/documents/PL98-507.pdf>); the UK’s 1989 Human Organs 
Transplant Act 
(<https://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/about_transplants/legislation/human_organ_transplants_act/hum
an_organ_transplants_act.jsp>) and Part 9 (1) and (3) of India’s 1994 Transplantation of Human Organs 
Act (<http://www.medindia.net/indian_health_act/the-transplantation-of-human-organs-act-1994-
authority-for-removal-of-human-organs.htm>). Last accessed on August 1 2008. 
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sales, the rhetoric used by proponents of either strategy is similar: virtually all of these 
propositions, as Waldby and Mitchell note, begin with a “ritual recitation of the 
statistics of waiting list deaths” in order to mark current donation systems as 
inadequate and inefficient (Joralemon, cited in Waldby and Mitchell, 170).25 
Secondly, however, most proponents share a conviction that an individual’s body is 
her personal property, to be disposed of as she wishes. Fox and Swazey cite a common 
conviction shared by supporters of commodification which I will explore at length in 
the following chapter: “I am advocating not that people be treated by others as 
property, but only that they have the autonomy to treat their own parts as property, 
particularly their regenerative parts. Such an approach is helpful, rather than harmful, 
to people’s well-being” (71, emphasis added).  
In the now well-known conclusion to their second book on the subject, Fox 
and Swazey themselves announced their decision to abandon their research in the field 
of transplantation citing their uneasiness with this market rhetoric and the excessive 
fervour with which organs were pursued. Critical of the “pervasive reluctance to 
accept the biological and human condition limits imposed by the aging process” that 
they gleaned during their research, they believed that “the missionary-like ardour 
about organ replacement that now exists […] and the seemingly limitless attempts to 
procure and implant organs that are currently taking place [had] got out of hand” 
(204). Their conclusion sought both to clarify and to caution: 
 
25 Most proposals in favour of live organs markets focus on the kidney, which is the easiest organ to 
surrender ‘live’ given that the body has a second kidney to rely on. Whether cadaveric organs are 
purchased directly from their consenting owner at the time she was still alive, or whether they are paid 
for in the form of monetary compensation for surviving kin, payment for cadaveric organs remains 
mired in the same controversy that surrounds all cadaveric organ transplants. As Sharp points out in her 
study, one of transplantation’s defining ideological underpinnings “involves the necessity of embracing 
brain death criteria as evidence of absolute death” (27). Characteristically, Agamben makes a much 
more radical argument: citing one transplant surgeon, Dr Shumway’s comment that “I’m saying anyone 
whose brain is dead is dead. It is the one determinant that would be universally applicable, because the 
brain is the one organ that can’t be transplanted,” Agamben claims that death has now become “the 
epiphenomenon of transplant technology” (163). If we follow this logic, Agamben argues, the day that 
brains can be transplanted, we will have to come up with yet another criterion for death.  
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By our leave-taking, we are intentionally separating ourselves from what we 
believe has become an overly zealous medical and societal commitment to the 
endless perpetuation of life and to repairing and rebuilding people through 
organ replacement (210).  
Equipped with a drug that suppresses immunological difference and thus multiplies 
the number of potentially available organ donors, this “zealous societal commitment” 
to the perpetuation of life through biotechnology has resulted in increased calls for 
legalized markets in human organs that are seen as regenerative components rather 
than as “living parts of a person” (207).  Fox and Swazey, then, perceive the drive to 
procure as many organs as possible, albeit through monetary incentives, as “leading us 
to unreflectively disassemble and dehumanize the body” (208).  
My own opinion, however, is that there is a change much more profound than 
the increased number of proposals for the legally sanctioned market-alienability of 
organs: the growth of a real and global black market for kidneys and corneas from live 
donors hailing mostly from the global South. Many, of course, have cited this 
phenomenon in order to echo Fox and Swazey’s discomfort with the dehumanizing 
exploitation that it entails and read it as an epiphenomenon of globalization and the 
economic disparities it creates. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes has noted, the trafficked 
human organs in this illicit but blooming trade travel a route that mirrors the circuit of 
capital in the era of globalization: “from South to North, from Third to First World, 
from poor to rich, from black and brown to white” (197). Waldby and Mitchell 
observe that the global nature of tissue exchange results from the ‘compressed’ world 
created by globalization, with its challenge to transactions once “characterized by 
national citizenship and the body of law and governance that regulates national space” 
(23).   
If my own work sympathises with and participates in these efforts to highlight 
that the combined effects of globalization and transplant biotechnology can reduce the 
20 
 
                                                           
global poor to organ providers for the rich, I believe that it is equally important to 
insist on the fact that this illegal trade is the place from which we can most clearly see 
the desires that citizens of North and South have invested in biotechnology, 
globalization and late capitalism. I contend that texts such as Harvest and Dirty Pretty 
Things illustrate this, as I argue in chapters 3 and 4 respectively, but I want to stress 
that these same desires – often expressed as productive counsel – are also powerfully 
at work in the scholarly projects I have examined here. Thus, Lawrence Cohen, for 
instance, holds the development of cyclosporine and the shortage of human organs that 
it has helped to create accountable for the fact that entire subpopulations of those who 
are “unlike oneself, not kin, not cared for, far away in structural and spatial terms” 
have now become ‘same enough’ to be “surgically disagreggated and their parts 
reincorporated” (12, 23). Yet if Cohen denounces difference-curbing cyclosporine for 
the global predatory networks it engenders, Paul Gilroy implicitly seizes on the very 
same globalizing properties of immunosuppressant drugs to underscore that the 
international trade in human organs is “therefore necessarily ‘transracial’” (20). And 
rightly so. In a project like Gilroy’s, which that biotechnology’s demand that we 
reconceptualize our very idea of life no longer allows for an enabling and productive 
understanding of racial difference, the illegal trade in organs is a powerful case in 
point: what could illustrate the obsoleteness of race and the vogue of genetically 
codified information more vividly than the unproblematic incorporation of an organ 
purchased from the radically other?26 
“Health,” wrote René Leriche, “is life lived in the silence of the organs” (cited 
in Canguilhem, 46). If this definition of health is still pertinent today, we might argue, 
 
26 “Messages, information, programs, codes, instructions, decoding: these are the new concepts of the 
life sciences.” So wrote Georges Canguilhem in 1966, following Watson and Crick’s article on the 
double-helix structure of DNA. (Cited in Rose, 44) 
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it is only because transplant technology suppresses organs into re-silence. Thanks to 
transplant technology, organs are no longer “silent” even for those who are healthy: 
extractable, reusable and much-coveted, they mobilize economies both licit and illicit, 
generating, in the wake of their travels, hopes and misgivings as to “what we might 
legitimately desire, and what desires might legitimately be denied” (Rose, 104). In this 
project, I reflect on how that which lay silently dormant in the human body has now 
been awoken to a contested territory inhabited by science, technology, commerce, 
mores of great cultural significance and, crucially, a global community of citizens both 
healthy and ill. Some final words, then, on the set of texts I have chosen to carry out 
this task.  
 
III. The organ in labour and fiction 
The organ is trapped in myriad contradictory discourses that interrogate our definitions 
of the human. Biotechnology, I contend, challenges some of the key ideas that have 
contributed to our understanding of what exactly constitutes the human and how the 
human should be treated. The two fields that I am most concerned with in this project 
are Marxism, with its denouncement of the dehumanization of the worker through the 
exploitative extraction of her surplus labour, and postcolonial studies, with its 
demonstration that the universalist aspirations of Western ideals of morality and ethics 
were severely compromised by their inability to encompass the humanity of racialized, 
colonized subjects. 
Chapter 2 compares the alienation of the organ with Marx’s views on the 
alienation of labour-power. Arising innately from the body, both the organ and labour-
power are alienated in ways considered by many to be inhuman and exploitative. 
Labour-power, Marx held, is a special kind of commodity. And the organ? Is it 
biocapital, generated by a new mode of production? Is it a ‘fabricated’ product? Does 
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it fall, in other words, under the category of what Arendt terms the “artificial world of 
things”? (7) Is the organ produced through labour? If so, then surely we can extend 
this definition to human cells? And it cells are produced through labour, then why 
does the law grant patents to inventors of new cell lines and not to the people from 
whom the cells were originally extracted? Perhaps the organ is a special kind of 
natural resource? Might this explain why bioethics condemns the sale of organs, while 
the donation of an organ is hailed as an act of supreme altruism? What is clear, 
however, is that the organ, thanks to advances in transplant technology, as we have 
seen, has become a valuable commodity. I read the commodification of the organ 
together with Hannah Arendt’s critique of Marx and Marx’s own writings on the 
commodity, on labour-power and on the role of land, to argue that the 
commoditization of the organ is the result of two related phenomena: 1) the perception 
of one’s body parts as a naturally occurring surplus, and 2) the appeal to the idea of 
property in the human body and the concomitant right to freely dispose of this 
property as one sees fit.  
The remaining chapters focus on fictional texts that stage the discursive, 
geographical and corporeal boundaries through which the organ moves. All the texts I 
examine here stage this trajectory in fictional representations that speculate on both 
the realities and the possibilities of contemporary transplant technology and bodily 
commodification. Sociologically inclined critics often deride cultural texts that address 
biotechnological developments for their sensationalist predictions and ill-researched 
alarmism. My own belief, however, is that my chosen texts do not draw on this topic 
as a convenient back-drop against which to unravel a thriller or horror plot. Rather, 
transplantation is at the forefront of these texts as they both articulate and enjoin us to 
critically examine the human relationships, economic conditions and social dynamics 
that transplantation both generates and relies upon. These fictional texts confirm my 
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own belief that the most controversial debate in the field of transplantation – whether 
or not to legally commercialise human organs – is, in a sense, irrelevant. The scenarios 
envisaged in these texts alert us to the pressing fact that legalizing organs markets will 
neither eradicate exploitation, not circumvent the profound moral questions raised by 
the promise of organ transplants to indefinitely prolong one’s life thanks to the body 
of another.  
Chapter 3 explores organ sales as they occur across the geopolitical frontiers 
separating the first and third world. Indian writer Manjula Padmanabhan’s play 
Harvest locates the scene of organ transplantation in a futuristic postcolonial Bombay 
in which organ trade is no longer a criminalised activity. The Indian protagonist is 
“recruited” by a transnational corporation to sell the rights to his entire body to an 
anonymous white American buyer. My reading examines the writer’s use of science-
fiction, suggesting that the organ transplant enables and requires Padmanabhan to 
displace the dominant literary genres of postcolonial literature. I further argue that the 
play’s attentiveness to biotechnology reconfigures the dominant concerns of 
postcolonial studies: in 2010, if the slum-dwellers of 2010 Bombay do meet the white, 
wealthy dwellers of North America this encounter is no longer informed by the 
colonial strategies of settlement and territorial expansion, for the new imperialists, the 
Americans of 2010, choose not to set foot in what they see as the disease-infested 
third-world and interact with Indians solely through technological gadgets. The 
chapter explores how Harvest suggests that Americans’ unfettered access to 
biotechnology and telecommunications reconfigures the relationship between first and 
third world bodies familiar to us from colonialism’s heyday: while the third- world 
citizen in Harvest is still perceived by her first-world counterpart as simultaneously 
desirable and threatening, this is not because of her colour and her customs but 
because of her ability to remain healthy in spite of her dismal living conditions.  
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Chapter 4 sees us back in Old Europe, the former metropole that is no longer 
struggling with the burden of empire but is concerned instead to curb the 
uncontrollable wave of immigrants hailing from less prosperous regions. My argument 
here centres on the notion of commodified hospitality and on Stephen Frears’s film 
Dirty Pretty Things.  The film is unusual: the organ-sellers it represents are 
undocumented immigrants who sell their body-parts not for cash, but for fake EU 
passports that will allow them to remain in London. The forged passports can be 
bought in exchange for a kidney, and what they sell is not citizenship, but the right to 
hospitality in the UK. The film permanently signals to the commodification of 
hospitality in this, its political sense, by locating the illegal extraction of kidneys in a 
hotel, a sphere of legitimate commodified hospitality. I challenge existing readings of 
Dirty Pretty Things which view it as a metaphor for the UK’s exploitation of 
immigrant labour, arguing that the film’s narrative operates according to the same 
discursive structures that characterise contemporary capitalism and its accompanying 
biotechnologies.  
  In my fifth and final chapter, my investigation veers away from concerns 
about racial difference and economic inequality and become geographically more 
unmoored, to focus instead on one of the key issues in bioethics today:  our struggle to 
accommodate the new beings and “life-forms” which biotechnology now has the 
power to create.27 The chapter discusses Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel Never Let Me 
Go. Ishiguro’s narrative transpires in Hailsham, a boarding school in an unnamed 
location in rural England of the late 1990s. Its students, we discover, are clones, 
special “citizens” whose role in society is to provide organs for the ill. Hailsham 
students do this not because they are willing donors, or even poor organ sellers: this is, 
 
27 I will discuss the term “life-forms” in the next chapter. 
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quite simply, their reason for existing. Products of human ingenuity and of new 
medical technologies, Hailsham’s clones, however, emerge not as robotic quasi-
humans, but as young adults who, thanks to the humanist liberal arts education 
provided for them at Hailsham, are avid critics and creators of art and literature. 
Focusing on the novel’s representation of the donor-clones as doubly produced 
through medical technology and a humanist education, I examine the ways in which 
Hailsham students emerge as exceptional subjects who inhabit the interstitial space 
between humanity and instrumentality. My concern in this chapter is to interrogate the 
relationship between literary narration and its recipient, the addressee. I argue that the 
transplant as represented in this novel enjoins us, through a narrator who addresses her 
interlocutors as fellow-clones, to rethink our understanding of the human and its 
relationship to what Hannah Arendt terms “the human artifice.”  
 Two final citations before I move on to what I promise here. Both ask us to 
be attentive to our human commonality and our human diversity, a request that the 
field of organ transplantation, perhaps more than any other biotechnological 
development, is immersed in by definition, as we have seen. Both are crucial to bear in 
mind in order to understand my concerns in this dissertation. The first of these remarks 
is made by Paul Gilroy. Thanks to biotechnology, he says, “we have been made more 
sceptical than ever about the status of easily visible differences and are now obliged to 
ask on what scale human sameness and human diversity are to be calibrated” (47). 
This dissertation is the response I have derived to this obligatory interrogation by 
paying particular attention to the commodified human organ and the biological human 
sameness and economic diversity it reveals along its travels. The second remark is 
made by Hannah Arendt. “Political equality,” she says, “is the very opposite of our 
equality before death” (215). In a sense, this dissertation asks whether Arendt’s 
observation still holds in the wake of biotechnological developments in the field of 
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transplantation. What if, I want to ask, political inequality becomes the very same 
thing as our inequality before death?  
Chapter 1 
 
SPECIAL COMMODITIES: NATURE, LABOUR-POWER AND THE LIVE 
HUMAN ORGAN 
 
I Three concepts 
 
Marxists and post-Marxists may disagree about whether ‘biocapitalism’ is a novel 
‘mode of production,’ but the existence and significance of biocapital, as a way of 
thinking and acting, cannot be disputed. 
 
Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself 
 
This chapter intervenes in the Marxist and post-Marxist disagreements that Rose 
alludes to above. Rose, in fact, does not clarify what Marxists and post-Marxists he 
has in mind. My own argument engages with Marx’s own writings, and with Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Multitude, perhaps the most influential of post-Marxist 
texts to have discussed the commodification of biological material.1 Does the 
commodification of biological material arise from a new mode of production? 
Moreover, can we even refer to biological material as emerging from a process of 
production? As I examine their responses to these questions, what will become clear is 
that the commodified live organ possesses certain particularities which unsettle Hardt 
and Negri’s general attempts to locate commodified biological material within a novel 
mode of production. It is my contention here that it is in fact the work of Karl Marx 
and Hannah Arendt that is most helpful in explicating what kind of social product the 
organ is, and in unpacking the conception of the human that organ commodification 
proposals are predicated upon.   
As we saw in the previous chapter, if organs can today be extracted from 
human beings while they are still alive, this is because of remarkable biotechnological 
                                                 
1 Although they do not devote an entire book-length study to this issue, Hardt and Negri do dedicate a 
section of Multitude to it. See section 2.2, De Corpore. 
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developments in the fields of both transplantation surgery and immunology. These 
very developments, of course, allow for the emergence of the global black market in 
human organs, and the call from some to legalise organ markets in the hope of making 
the allocation of this biological material more effective and equitable, as well as 
regulating and curbing the current illegal trade in organs.2  
Regardless, however, of where one stands on the legalization debate, the 
commodification of the organ, legally sanctioned or otherwise, results in a situation 
whereby one can “regard one’s own body as a property relation” (Scheper-Hughes, 
51, emphasis added). Implicitly at work in the case of a person who decides to sell 
their organ, this reasoning is very explicitly stated in the case of market proponents. 
Indeed, as one vocal advocate of legalising the sale and purchase of organs stated 
when presenting his case to Scheper-Hughes: “The bottom line is that the body 
belongs to the individual” (42). And so, the logic goes, like any commodity owner, the 
individual is free to dispose of her possession as she pleases; it is her inalienable right 
to sell her body parts if she so wishes. More nuanced, and infinitely more suggestive, 
however, is the argument of the unnamed supporter of organs markets that Fox and 
Swazey cite: “I am advocating not that people be treated by others as property, but 
only that they have the autonomy to treat their own parts as property, particularly 
their regenerative parts” (71, emphasis added).  
The word that interests me here is “regenerative.” Evoking as it does “images 
of renewal and rebirth, rather than extraction […] and decay,” the term confirms 
Lesley Sharp’s observation that the language of transplantation is steeped in analogies 
                                                 
2  While, as I clarified earlier, I do not engage here in the debate over whether or not the organ trade 
should be legalised, it is important to note, as Waldby and Mitchell do, that legalisation will not 
necessarily eradicate the black market as there will always be a waiting list for organs, and hence, a 
market for ‘jumping the queue’, as it were: “for the wealthy on organ waiting lists, a kidney is literally 
priceless” (177). 
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designed to elicit a comparison of the human body with nature (15). The field, she 
notes, abounds in rhetorical moves and naturalistic metaphors: thus, just as nature 
renews itself, so does the human body thanks to transplantation; just as crops are 
harvested to fulfill our basic need for sustenance, so organs are harvested as a way of 
reaping and providing life (ibid). Similarly, Waldby and Mitchell remark that 
proponents of market solutions for the shortage in transplantable organs often refer to 
them as “resources,” a term that evokes visions of a natural reserve of supplies waiting 
to be drawn upon and used (170).    
But there is more to be said here. As a transitive verb, the OED tells us, ‘to 
regenerate’ has the meaning of “to bring into renewed existence” (emphasis added). 
This, we might assume, is the sense in which Fox and Swazey’s prototypical market 
advocate uses the term: the functional organ sold by one person will be brought to its 
purchaser to replace her own dysfunctional organ. In its intransitive sense, however, 
‘to regenerate’ means “to come into renewed existence” (emphasis added). This 
second definition, admittedly somewhat elided in the adjective ‘regenerative,’ points 
to a crucial particularity of the organ: unlike hair or semen, the organ is not 
regenerative: it cannot come into renewed existence for the body does not produce it 
anew.  
Private property, nature and the different degrees of self-renewal that the 
human body is capable of. We now have in place the constellation of concepts with 
which to explore the peculiar commodity that, thanks to biotechnology, the organ has 
now become.  
 
II Conceptualizing the Organ as Commodity 
I should warn my readers that the argument in this section rests on a paradox. The 
organ-as-commodity, I contend, needs to be understood in terms of the two Marxian 
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concepts that it most resembles and most radically departs from: land (as described by 
Marx) and labour-power. That the organ has become a form of private property under 
today’s late capitalism is, in the light of the flourishing black market and the market 
proposals we have already examined, undeniable. Especially relevant to my purposes, 
then, is Karl Marx’s argument that capitalism and its mode of production become 
possible only when land and labour-power become a special form of private property.  
In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, Marx clarifies his ideas on 
the notion of private property, that is, on how objects produced through a worker’s 
labour are distributed in the world.  The key to understanding private property, Marx 
argues, lies in: 
 
transforming the question of the origin of private property into the 
question of alienated labour to the course of human development. For 
in speaking of private property one imagines that one is dealing with 
something external to man. In speaking of labour one is dealing 
immediately with man himself. This new way of formulating the 
problem already contains its solution (Early Writings, 333). 
For Marx, capitalism is characterized by the fact that products of labour are 
appropriated to become the private property of the capitalist, who possesses both the 
means of production and the ability to pay the labourer wages in exchange for his 
labour. For this reason, Marx can confidently proclaim in the Manuscripts that “wages 
and private property are identical” (332). It is with these same arguments in mind that 
Hannah Arendt can describe Marx’s ideas as “the most revolutionary contribution to 
the concept of property” which is the case, she argues, because Marx conceives of 
property not as “a fixed and firmly located part of the world acquired by its owner in 
one way or another but, on the contrary [as having] its source in man himself, in his 
possession of a body and his indisputable ownership of the strength of his body, which 
Marx called labour-power” (70, emphasis added). Friedrich Engels, too, insisted that 
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labour-power was the most original element in Marx’s understanding of political 
economy, for it is from labour-power’s special characteristics as a commodifiable 
possession that all other commodities originate. Before we explore this further, 
however, a brief look at how Marx defines the commodity is in order.  
First of all, says Marx, “the commodity is an external object, a thing which 
through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind.  The nature of these 
needs,” he adds, “whether they arise, for example, from the stomach, or the 
imagination, makes no difference” (Capital I, 125, emphasis added). A commodity, 
moreover, has both a qualitative and a quantitative aspect.  In the commodity’s 
qualitative aspect, resides its use-value: “The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-
value.  But this usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical 
properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter.  […] Use-
values are only realised in use or consumption. […] In the form of society to be 
considered here [read, the capitalist mode of production] they [use-values] are also the 
material bearers of … exchange-value” (126). Exchange-value, says Marx, is the 
quantitative dimension of the commodity; it is “the proportion in which use-values of 
one kind exchange for use-values of another kind” (ibid). However, Marx argues, the 
property that renders two commodities commensurable is the fact that they both 
contain a common element. This common element is value, or the quantity of abstract 
human labour objectified within a given commodity.3 Exchange-value is hence “the 
necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value” and emerges as such 
under the conditions of capitalism (128)  
                                                 
3 Duncan Foley cogently summarises what Marx means by “abstract labour.” “[I]n a commodity-
producing society,” says Foley, “all types of concrete labour have the capacity to produce value.  When 
we abstract from the concrete peculiarities of specific types of labour, we are left with the common 
character of production of value,” [Understanding Capital, 16].  This common character of all labour, 
then, is abstract labour. 
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Engels further clarifies, in a parenthetical comment inserted to prevent the 
misconception that every product consumed by someone other than its producer is a 
commodity, that “in order to become a commodity, the product must be transferred to 
the other person, for whom it serves as a use-value, through the medium of exchange” 
(Capital I, 131, emphasis added). Marx’s explanations, his insistence that the 
commodity is an external object and Engels’s elucidating comment suggest that all 
commodities possess the following characteristics: they are tangible, material objects 
with both a use and an exchange-value; they result from the process of production, and 
they must be produced specifically in order to be exchanged, which can only occur if 
the commodity has been previously appropriated as one’s own private property.  
Two notable exceptions to these stipulations are immediately apparent, 
especially given my concerns in this chapter. The above list seems to leave room for 
neither naturally occurring products which do not result from the production process, 
nor for labour-power, which hardly seems to be an external object.4 Marx is aware of 
this, however, and dedicates separate sections of Capital to account for these special 
cases. I propose that we turn, first, to naturally occurring products in order to further 
explore the parallels between nature and the human organ that are evidenced in the 
language of transplantation. As we shall see, Marx’s comments about nature also offer 
clues about labour-power, that other ‘special’ case which the organ also closely 
resembles. 
                                                 
4 I am reminded here of the argument through which Hegel tries to explain why wage-labour is justified, 
while slavery is not: “Single products of my particular physical and mental skill and of my power to act 
I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities for a restricted period, because 
on the strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation to the totality and universality 
of my being” (Cited in Radin, 1894, emphasis added). As Margaret Radin explains, Hegel, held that 
“(t)he reason I can alienate my property is that it is mine only insofar as I put my will into it.” However, 
as Radin takes care to point out, Hegel lays down a crucial condition: one can alienate one’s property 
“provided always that the thing in question is a thing external by nature.” His attempt to justify wage-
labour, as Radin rightly argues, signals to “the practical problems” presented by the attempt to 
determine what things are “external by nature” and which are not. See Radin, “Market-Inalienability,” 
1892-4.  
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Marx singles out nature as an exception in the very first section of the first 
volume of Capital. “A thing can be a use-value without being a value. This is the 
case,” he adds, “whenever its utility to man is not mediated through labour. Air, virgin 
soil, natural meadows, unplanted forests, etc, fall into this category” (131, emphasis 
added). Not until the third volume of Capital, however, does he explore these 
particular use-values in detail. Here, he discusses the question of ground rent, the 
fixed, monthly sum of money that a tenant pays the owner of land in order to purchase 
the right to use it. He alludes, as does the transplantation rhetoric with which I am 
concerned, to the activities of agriculture and mining, thereby allowing for a pertinent 
comparison between the two: just as use-values can be extracted from nature in the 
form of minerals and crops, so can they be extracted from the body in the form of 
organs and other tissue. 
More important for my purposes here, however, is the way in which Marx 
proceeds to distinguish between value and price. Though the existence of ground rent 
might suggest that land has a value, he says, the “value of the land [is] a category that 
is prima facie irrational, in the same way that the price of labour-power is irrational, 
since the earth is not a product of labour, and thus does not have a value” (Capital III, 
760). What I want to dwell on here is the question of why something with no value 
can still generate a price, a money-sum for which it can be exchanged. To this, Marx 
provides a very definitive answer: 
 
[T]he prices of things that have no value in and of themselves – either 
not being products of labour, like land, or which cannot be reproduced 
by labour, such as antiques, works of art by certain masters, etc. – may 
be determined by quite fortuitous combinations of circumstances. For a 
thing to be sold, it simply has to be capable of being monopolised and 
alienated (772, emphasis added). 
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The interesting case of non-reproducible products of labour and works of art, I 
will return to in Chapter 5. For now, let us consider only land and the process through 
which it became possible to fetch money for it. The fixed, agreed-upon money-sum 
that land commands, in the form of rent if it is leased, in the form of price if it is sold, 
results from the phenomenon of landed property. “Landed property,” says Marx, 
“presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of particular 
portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all 
others” (752).5 Landed property is “a historical precondition for the capitalist mode of 
production” (754) and exists in a legal form that alienates certain portions of land and 
decrees them as the exclusive possession of a given individual. What this means in 
practice, says Marx, is that “the landowner can behave in relation to the land just as 
any commodity owner can with his commodities” (753). Effectively then, the 
capitalist mode of production is a social development built upon its ability to harness, 
monopolise and alienate into private property the very “nature [that] provides the 
necessary means of subsistence – whether in products of the land, animal or vegetable, 
or in fisheries, etc” (770).  
Initially, then, an interrogation of organ commodification might lead us to 
place the human body firmly within the same category as Marx’s irrationally priced 
“use-values without value.” The field of transplantation certainly invites us to do so, 
not just in its naturalistic rhetoric, but also in its call for legalizing bodily 
commodification by advocating that we treat our bodies as our own private property. 
The comparison finds still further support when we factor in the biotechnological 
developments discussed in the previous chapter: if something need only be alienated 
and monopolised in order to be rendered saleable, then the advent of extremely 
                                                 
5 Marx adds a footnote here in which he criticizes Hegel’s notion of private property in land, for as he 
says, the individual person can hardly maintain himself as proprietor by his ‘will’ alone. Furthermore, 
he asks, where does the person set limits for the realization of his will? See Capital III, 752-3, fn26. 
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efficient immunosuppressant drugs has very effectively achieved this for the organ. 
Crucially, however, the comparison shows the extent to which biotechnology has 
generated a conception of the body which sees it as endowed with a range of naturally 
occurring resources which we should not squander. As Fox and Swazey have shown 
us, doctors and their transplant-awaiting patients express this view of the human body 
in their “zealous medical and societal commitment to the endless perpetuation of life 
and to repairing and rebuilding people” through the organ-cum-natural-resource (204). 
But the organ-seller, too, has begun to view her body in terms of resources which 
should not be wasted. This is largely why live organ sales are possible in the first 
place: the organ-seller typically parts with the organ that the human body has a natural 
‘spare’ of, such as the kidney or the cornea.  
But there are limits to the parallels. Firstly, land is from the outset an external 
object; unlike the organ or labour-power, it does not arise from man’s body nor from 
its components and capacities. Furthermore, we need to consider again the phrase 
“use-value without value” and its relevance to describe the organ. Land, we recall, 
abounds in use-value. Appropriated as private property, it fetches a price. Yet it 
contains no value, because it is not mediated through labour. And it is by no means 
certain, I contend, that we can make this claim for the organ. I clarify my 
apprehensions, then, by turning to Marx’s second special case: labour-power. 
“The capitalist epoch,” clarifies Marx in a footnote, “is [...] characterised by 
the fact that labour-power, in the eyes of the worker himself, takes on the form of a 
commodity which is his property” (Capital I, 274, fn 4, emphasis added). And now, 
let us revisit the terms in which our unnamed organs market advocate defends his 
position: “I am advocating not that people be treated by others as property, but only 
that they have the autonomy to treat their own parts as property, particularly their 
regenerative parts” (emphasis added). The extreme poverty of the seller, the critical 
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health of the buyer and the biomedical technologies that bring them together 
notwithstanding, the commodification of the organ cannot be complete without the 
same operative logic that goes into enabling wage-labour: each individual seller must 
learn to regard something internal to herself as a commodity.  
Now, for labour-power to appear on the market as a commodity, says Marx, 
certain conditions had to be met. Under the capitalist mode of production, labour-
power must be for sale. It cannot be coercively extracted from the labourer. On the 
contrary: under capitalism, labourers must become free sellers of their labour-power 
(Capital I, 875). Labour-power only appears as a freely sold commodity thanks to the 
end of feudalism, a historical phenomenon that Marx terms primitive accumulation. 
Once “he had ceased to be bound to the soil, and ceased to be the slave or serf of 
another person,” the labourer could dispose of his own person (ibid). But the labourer 
is hardly free to do with his person what he chooses, for, expelled from the land on 
which he worked, he has been deprived of his means of existence. Robbed of the 
means of production, the labourer can sell merely his capacity to labour, the only thing 
he possesses. Marx’s terminology to describe this transformation illustrates parallels 
between labour-power and the organ insofar as both commodities originate from a 
common human capacity or corporeality and are ‘freely’ made available only because 
there are scant alternatives. “These newly freed men,” he says, “be[come] sellers of 
themselves” (ibid, emphasis added).   
This last phrase invites us to criticise Marx on the grounds that he reduced man 
to labour-power: in the above citation, he effectively equates the sale of labour-power 
with the sale of oneself, suggesting that man is defined by his capacity to labour. This, 
in a sense, is the starting point of the criticism levelled at him by Hannah Arendt, as 
we shall see below. But it is also the source from which Hardt and Negri derive their 
vision of the multitude, to which I now turn.  
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“What we humans are at base,” say Hardt and Negri in a claim that evidently 
draws on Marx, “is general possibility or general productive capacity” (153). It is on 
the basis of this conception of labour that they theorise the revolution to come, a 
revolution bred in and led by the multitude. Developed in response to Marx’s notion of 
the working class, multitude refers to “all those who work under the rule of capital,” 
granting “no political privilege to one kind of labour over another (106-7). Multitude 
differs from Marx’s concept of the class struggle in that it is based “not so much on 
the current empirical existence of the [working] class, but rather on the conditions of 
its possibility. The question to ask, in other words, is not ‘What is the multitude?’ but 
rather ‘What can the multitude become?’” (105). What this labouring multitude shows 
us, they claim, is that their labour is always in excess of capital’s domain: “Living 
labour can be corralled by capital and pared down to the labour-power that is bought 
and sold and that produces commodities and capital, but living labour always exceeds 
that” (146, emphasis added).6 It is in this double characteristic of labour, they claim, 
that we must seek the possibility of radical change. Labour creates value in the form 
commodities, they argue, but this value is taken away, appropriated. Herein lies the 
source of the labourer’s antagonism. And yet, despite this exploitation, labour “retains 
its capacity to produce wealth, and this is its power” (153). For labour will always 
renew the conditions for its existence, and resurface. 
Marx, too, remarked on the two-fold capacity of labour. In fact, Hardt and 
Negri’s arguments, as they themselves declare, are based on his. Being the commodity 
from which all other commodities originate, Marx argued, labour-power possesses a 
special characteristic: [its] use-value possesses the peculiar property of being a source 
of value, whose actual consumption is [...] hence a creation of value” (Capital I, 270). 
But labour-power is also a peculiar commodity in that it “exists only as a capacity of 
                                                 
6 The term “living labour” is especially suggestive here, given that I am dealing with live donations. 
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the living individual. Its production consequently posits [the individual’s] existence” 
(Capital I, 274). Like the organ then, labour-power is something which can be 
obtained only from a living individual.7 Due to these peculiarities, then, the value of 
labour-power, too, is determined in an unconventional way: “Given the existence of 
the individual, the production of labour-power consists in his reproduction of himself 
or his maintenance. [...] In other words, the value of labour-power is the value of the 
means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner” (ibid).8 We note that 
labour-power, unlike land, is produced: the production of labour-power effectively 
takes place with the re-production of the individual who labours to perpetuate his 
existence. It is in this strict sense, I submit, that the organ, too, is produced: unlike 
land, it requires the existence of a living being, whose labour it both maintains and is 
maintained by. 
Marx’s fundamental insight, however, is that labour-power “is not exhausted 
when its own reproduction has been secured” (Arendt, 88).9 This is what permits the 
production – and subsequent appropriation – of surplus-value. For the labourer to 
produce surplus-value, he explains, an initial, objective condition must be met: “that 
[the labourer] can perform surplus labour: that natural conditions are such that a part 
of their labour-power is sufficient to reproduce and maintain them as producers; that 
the production of their necessary means of subsistence does not consume their entire 
                                                 
7 This holds true even of cadaveric organs, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, must be procured 
from a person who is declared brain-dead, but considered alive insofar as life-support technology means 
that such an individual’s heart continues to beat. 
8 It is for this reason that Marx speaks of land and labour-power in similar terms, declaring their price to 
be “irrational” (Capital III, 760). Unlike land, then, labour-power possesses value insofar as it is 
mediated by labour – labour-power cannot be (re)produced unless the wage-labourer labours in order to 
perpetuate his existence – but the wage he receives for this labour, or the price of his labour-power, is 
irrational insofar as it is overdetermined by a range of external factors. It is for this reason that Marx 
draws a parallel between land and labour-power while also underscoring the differences between the 
two: “[The price of land] is a category that is prima facie irrational, in the same way that the price of 
labour-power is irrational, since the earth is not a product of labour, and thus does not have a value” 
(ibid, emphasis added).  
9 Spivak’s refers to this characteristic of the labouring subject as that which makes the subject “super-
adequate to itself” (109). 
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labour-time” (Capital III, 773). The second, subjective condition, is that this potential 
be realised; thus, the labourer must actually be made to work for more time than is 
required to reproduce her own labour-power. 
We recall that Hardt and Negri base their entire argument about the 
revolutionary potential of labour-power on just these two aspects of labour – the 
antagonistic and the inexhaustible – which Marx chooses to name subjective and 
objective. Unlike Hardt and Negri, however, Marx hardly attempts to theorise the 
possibilities of a revolution from this two-fold property of labour. He does not idealise 
labour as that which can never be exhausted by capital; rather, he makes the sobering 
point that it is due to this very objective property that exploitation is possible at all.10 
Nor does he enthuse about the fact that the capacity to labour is the one thing we 
possess in common, for he underscores, rather, how this capacity exists only insofar as 
the labourer continually struggles to retain ownership of it: “He must constantly treat 
his labour-power as his own property, his own commodity, and he can do this only by 
placing it at the disposal of the buyer, i.e., handing it over to the buyer for him to 
consume, for a definite period of time, temporarily. In this way he manages to avoid 
renouncing his rights of ownership over it” (271, emphasis added). 
Here, the parallels between the organ and labour-power, too, cease. The organ, 
once parted with, is irredeemable. Unlike labour-power, it cannot be temporarily 
leased out and then re-claimed; its sale, once completed, must necessarily be a one-
time sale. The figure who sells her organ, then, parts with something that is non-
renewable, non-regenerative and decidedly exhaustible. It is at this point, then, that I 
see the need to depart from Marx. The organ-as-commodity requires us to understand 
humanity not, as Marx would have it, as that which is defined by its capacity to labour, 
                                                 
10 To witness: “In political economy, labour appears only in the form of wage-earning activity” 
(Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in Early Writings, 289, emphasis added). 
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but as something which both includes this capacity, and, at the same time, precedes it. 
Labour-power might well exceed the predatory tendencies of capital. But, and here is 
the crucial difference, the organ does not. It is for this reason that Waldby and 
Mitchell suggest that:  
 
a kidney seems to embody use-value itself: if, as Marx noted in The 
German Ideology, use-values and exchange-values can only be 
produced when humans are ‘in a position to live,’ living itself requires 
the functioning body that supports this labour (174, emphasis added). 
 
III Labour, again 
I am hardly the first to suggest that we need to learn from Marx’s method before 
parting ways with him insofar as capitalist society exists in a different form today. Of 
the many post-Marxists who advocate this strategy, I want to stay with Hardt and 
Negri, given that they specifically address the commodification of biological material. 
Hardt and Negri’s own departure from Marx rests on their argument that, as of the late 
twentieth century, we live under the hegemony not of the industrial labour that Marx 
so cogently described, but of “immaterial labour” (108).11 Immaterial labour can be 
described as such because, although the labour that goes into it remains material, as 
Hardt and Negri take pains to point out, what is immaterial is its product (109). 
Knowledge, information, communication, emotional responses and ideas are some of 
its most characteristically intangible products. Insofar as immaterial labour creates 
“relationships and ultimately social life itself,” they argue, we can conceive of it as a 
form of “biopolitical labour” (ibid).  
                                                 
11 Hardt and Negri clarify that immaterial labour is by no means hegemonic in quantitative terms; on the 
contrary, it “constitutes a minority of global labour” (109). Rather, immaterial labour is hegemonic in 
qualitative terms, imposing its tendency on all other forms of labour. They claim that immaterial labour 
occupies the same position today as did industrial labour 150 years ago, when it accounted only for a 
fraction of global production, but exerted its hegemony over all other forms of production (ibid). 
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Immaterial labour imposes a different mode of exploitation from the one Marx 
proposed; Hardt and Negri revise Marx’s notion of exploitation which, as we saw 
above, is predicated upon the wage-labourer’s sale of his labour-power for a specific 
length of time. Under the hegemony of immaterial labour, claim Hardt and Negri, such 
a calculation is impossible: “When production is aimed at solving a problem [...] or 
creating an idea or a relationship, work time tends to expand to the entire time of life” 
(111). One of the key aims of immaterial production is to produce cooperation and 
communication, to produce value in common. Thus, they argue, exploitation must be 
conceived as “the private appropriation of that which has been produced as common” 
(150). What does it mean to produce “in common,” we might well ask? Significantly 
enough for my purposes here, Hardt and Negri choose to illustrate the paradigm of 
immaterial production with a specific example: the commercialisation of biological 
and natural material. To do this, they turn to a now canonical legal case in the history 
of biocapitalism: 1984’s Moore v. Regents of the University of California.12  
1976. John Moore, who suffers from hairy-cell leukemia, seeks treatment from 
Dr. Golde, a medical specialist at UCLA. Golde persuades Moore to allow him to 
surgically extract his spleen, which he does, as Moore’s lawyers subsequently 
discovered, fully aware of the fact that Moore’s spleen produced uncommonly large 
amounts of lymphokines. Lymphokines are proteins used by our immune system, of 
great use and interest to researchers, but extremely difficult to produce in large 
quantities. Golde proceeds to develop an immortal cell-line from Moore’s spleen, 
effectively creating “a biological factory” for the production of lymphokines (Waldby 
and Mitchell, 88). In 1981, Moore’s doctors establish a patent on the cell-line, listing 
                                                 
12 This case has been examined by all thinkers with an interest in biotechnology. For a comprehensive 
bibliography see Priscilla Wald’s “What’s in a Cell?” New Literary History, Spring 2005. My own 
description of the case derives from Waldby and Mitchell’s succinct account in Tissue Economies, 88-
89. 
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Golde and his assistant as inventors. The cell-line is licensed to be used and re-
produced by two pharmaceutical companies in exchange for stocks and cash valued at 
approximately three billion dollars (Hardt and Negri, 182). In 1984, Moore sues the 
University of California for ownership of the cell-line, but the California Supreme 
Court rules against him, on the grounds that the University of California rightfully 
owns the cell because lymphokites are a naturally occurring organism, and therefore 
not patentable (read ownable). The lymphokites, they reason, underwent human 
intervention before being developed into a cell-line; they were therefore transformed 
into a patentable product that was the result of human labour and ingenuity. Moore, 
therefore, cannot claim to own the cell-line developed from his own biological tissue. 
Canonical as the Moore case is for exploring how the claim of property rights 
in one’s own body can rapidly lead to the commodification of biological material for 
personal gain, this is not what interests Hardt and Negri.13 Their concern is, firstly, to 
show that legal decisions such as the California Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Moore case, “rest on a recognition of immaterial labour” (182), and thus provide 
further evidence of its hegemony. Secondly, they argue that the reign of immaterial 
labour results in a situation whereby “nature is ceasing to be common, [and] is 
becoming private property [...] exclusively controlled by its owners” (184). We might 
well observe that Marx already theorised such a transformation when he spoke of 
landed property and primitive accumulation. More misleading, however, is the referent 
behind that which Hardt and Negri somewhat confusingly call ‘nature.’ The term, as 
                                                 
13 The conflicting opinion of the panel of judges shows that, for some of them, this was precisely what 
was at issue in Moore’s claim. Drawing on the very narratives proclaiming the sanctity of the vessel 
that is the human body that I examined in chapter 1, one justice rationalised his decision to rule against 
Moore as follows: “Plaintiff has asked us to recognise and enforce a right to sell one’s own body tissue 
for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel – the single most venerated and protected subject in 
any civilised society – as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to commingle the 
sacred with the profane. He asks much” (cited in Wald, 210). This same reasoning, of course, is also 
used to argue against organ commodification. 
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they employ it, refers to biological material that has been manipulated by labour.14 
Common labour, we recall. And so, under today’s new mode of production, ‘nature’ is 
produced in common, to be privately appropriated. To summarise: 
 
In this entire field of immaterial production [...] the right or title to 
property is undercut by the same logic that supports it because the 
labour that creates property cannot be identified with any one 
individual or even group of individuals. Immaterial labour is 
increasingly a common activity characterised by continuous 
cooperation among innumerable individual producers. Who, for 
example, produces the information of genetic code? [...] [T]he 
information and knowledge is produced by human labour, experience 
and ingenuity, but in [no] case can that labour be isolated to an 
individual (187). 
Concerned as I am with the case of the organ as commodity, I remain unconvinced by 
this argument. Granted, the labour of Golde and his assistants in creating a cell line 
from Moore’s tissue may have been cooperative and common. But Hardt and Negri do 
not address what, to my mind, is the crucial question: are John Moore’s lymphokites 
the product of common labour?  
The concept of immaterial production, whether or not we believe in its 
analytical potential, is useful to my own purposes only insofar as it further underscores 
the particularities of the organ. The biological tissue that is the organ might well be 
produced and mediated by labour insofar as it both (re-)results from and (re-)enables 
labour. But this labour is hardly common in the sense that Hardt and Negri suggest. 
Moreover, the organ is not a new product; it is not, in brief, a newly created object that 
only exists in the world thanks to the intervention of human ingenuity and design, 
whether in common or individually. Nor, I would argue, are Moore’s spleen and its 
lymphokites before they were developed into a cell-line. Exactly the opposite is true, 
                                                 
14 Hardt and Negri place other immaterial products under this same category of ‘nature’, such 
knowledge about the medicinal properties of certain plants, or naturally occurring properties in certain 
plant varieties. As they point out, these properties and knowledges often occur in the global South, and 
are privately appropriated by pharmaceuticals in the North. 
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in fact. Both the organ and the lymphokites precede this capacity for human activity; 
this is precisely why the organ is so coveted by those who no longer possess a healthy 
one, and why Moore’s rapidly-reproducing lymphokites proved so attractive to Golde. 
 
My grounds for distinguishing between the human organ and the privately 
owned “life-forms” that Hardt and Negri discuss are, in effect, the same ones that 
Hannah Arendt uses to differentiate between earthly nature and the human world, or, 
between labour and work.15 On her own admission, the distinction that Arendt 
proposes between labour and work is “unusual” (79). And yet, as I shall argue, when 
we consider Arendt’s observations with biotechnological progress in mind, the 
distinction is well worth attending to. To understand Arendt’s argument, we must shift 
our focus away from the idea of private property, and turn instead to properties, in the 
plural. Or to put it another way, to that which Hardt and Negri overlook: the particular 
properties of a given produced object.  
Derived partly from Locke’s differentiation between “the labour of our bodies 
and the work of our hands,” Arendt’s categories allow her both to ascribe a different 
sphere to each separate activity and to concentrate on the specific properties its final 
product (103-4). For, says Arendt, “the distinction between work and labour [...] 
indeed becomes a difference in degree if the worldly character of the produced thing – 
its location, function and length of stay in the world – is not taken into account” (94). 
It is just this “worldly character” of the organ that we must take into account. 
                                                 
15 By life-forms, Hardt and Negri mean those biological beings which it is now possible to engineer. A 
case in point is OncoMouse, the mouse created by transplanting a human cancer-gene into it. Owned by 
DuPont laboratories, OncoMouse is owned not as an individual mourse but as a type of mouse. These 
newly created life-forms, produced in common, become private property precisely because of their 
newness. Although Hardt and Negri do not explicitly state this, their differentiation between 
OncoMouse and Holstein cow, an already-existing breed of cow which cannot be owned as a life-form, 
supports my claim (181). 
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“Labour,” argues Arendt, “is the activity which corresponds to the biological 
process of the human body” (7). As such, it is associated not with the human world but 
with earthly nature. The crucial feature of labour, as Margaret Canovan points out, is 
that “it is the least free aspect of human activity” (74). Strictly speaking, Arendt 
defines labour as reproduction, both in the sense of procreation through the parturition 
with which it shares a name, and in the sense of perpetuating one’s own existence. It is 
an activity dictated by our biological needs, for labour, claims Arendt, “produces 
objects only incidentally, and is primarily concerned with the means of its own 
reproduction” (88, emphasis added). Labour is a cyclical activity, insofar as it is 
condemned to be repeated, producing only perishable objects meant for immediate 
consumption (ibid). Labouring forces each individual to concentrate only upon her 
own physical needs, leaving her “alone with [her] body, facing the naked necessity to 
keep [her]self alive” (212), and yet labour “assures not only  individual survival but 
the survival of the species” (9). Labour, in other words, is that which brings humans 
together as a biological species. It is thus not concerned with human individuality and 
plurality: “as far as our bodily needs go, men [sic] are just interchangeable members of 
another animal species” (Canovan, 74). Labouring, in fact, is our link to the animal 
kingdom, insofar as animals, too, are compelled to satisfy their physical needs. It is for 
this reason, then, that throughout The Human Condition, Arendt refers to the labourer 
as the animal laborans. 
Work, by contrast, “is the activity which corresponds to the unnaturalness of 
human existence, which is not imbedded in [...] the species’ ever-recurring life-cycle” 
(Arendt, 7). It produces “an ‘artificial’ world of things, distinctly different from all 
natural surroundings” and is therefore associated not with nature but with the 
exclusively human world (ibid). Unlike the labourer, the worker constantly adds new 
objects to the human artifice with the aim of “bestow[ing] a measure of permanence 
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and durability upon the futility of mortal life” (Arendt, 8). Work corresponds to the 
activity of fabrication, creating a uniquely human world, a world of things “that are 
not consumed but used” (94, emphasis added). Work is the activity that provides 
stability for humans, sheltering us from a natural environment that is ever-changing.16 
It produces a world that is both “artificial and durable” and the objects it creates are 
“produced by transforming natural material” into that which can outlive us individual 
humans (Canovan, 108).17 Given the uniquely human character of this activity of 
fabrication, Arendt refers to the worker as homo faber. 
As Arendt takes care to point out, these two different activities result in 
products with differing phenomenological properties. “That is, the difference between 
work and labour is objective, rather than subjective” (Ring, 435). The products of 
labour, in contrast to those produced by work, are products needed for “the life 
process itself” (96). As such, they are products which, upon consumption, result only 
in the ability to keep producing: “Whatever labour produces is meant to be fed into the 
human life process almost immediately, and this consumption, regenerating the life 
process, produces – or rather, reproduces – new ‘labour-power,’ needed for the further 
sustenance of the body” (Arendt, 99). Ultimately, as Arendt says, regardless of the fact 
that it is not exhausted once it has secured its own reproduction, “labour never 
‘produces’ anything but life” (88). The products of labour, furthermore, never quite 
lose their naturalness. Thus, “the grain never quite disappears in the bread as the tree 
has disappeared in the table” (103), and the bread is likely to decay and perish if left 
                                                 
16 As Canovan explains, Arendt’s view of nature owes little to Romanticism, which sees nature as far 
more stable and comforting than the artificiality and menace of urban settings. Rather, Arendt is 
indebted to the ancient Greeks, who saw nature as an endless cycle of life and death (107). For men to 
be properly human, then, they need a world, built to protect them from the “sublime indifference of an 
untouched nature, whose overwhelming elemental force [...] will compel them to swing relentlessly in 
the circle of their own biological movement” (Arendt, 137, cited in Canovan, 107). 
17 The culmination of work as an activity is the creation of works of art. I return to Arendt’s comments 
on the work of art in chapter 5. 
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unconsumed for too long. In contrast, the table, the product of work, of the activity 
that introduces a new and durable object into the world, will endure in the world 
regardless of whether or not it is used. 
It is because she is attentive to this objective difference between different 
products, and to the importance that the reproduction of biological, physical life has in 
the human condition, I contend, that Arendt is able to provide us with the tools to 
distinguish between the organ and the new life-forms discussed by Hardt and Negri. 
Granted, the language and examples that Arendt repeatedly uses to characterise the 
promptly consumed products of labour refer us back to one image: the consumption of 
food. Then why place the organ together with these other products of labour, in this, 
its Arendtian sense? Would we not thereby reproduce the troubling naturalistic 
rhetoric of transplantation surgeons? We can easily counter this objection by repeating 
Waldby and Mitchell’s attempt to signal to the very process that Arendt alludes to: 
healthy organs seem to “embody use-value itself.” With Arendt’s terminology, 
however, we might rearticulate their observation differently: organs are the product of 
labour and not work because they (re)produce life itself. And the new life forms and 
cell lines analysed by Hardt and Negri? These, Arendt’s categories show, are the 
products of work, specifically designed with the aim of bringing a new object into the 
world, and meant not to be consumed but to further our understanding of natural 
processes, a point I return to below.  
It is also on the basis of the distinction between work and labour that Arendt 
launches her now (in)famous critique of Marx. I do not wish to become entangled in 
the heated debates as to whether or not her critique is justified. If I briefly summarise 
the kernel of Arendt’s objections to Marx here, this is because the same logic informs 
her critique of the achievements, goals and methodologies of science and technology, 
a topic much more relevant to my own concerns. Indeed, Margaret Canovan, perhaps 
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the most well-known of Arendt scholars, goes as far as to speculate that “[i]f Arendt 
had lived to see the development of biotechnology, it would have no doubt confirmed 
her fears” (84, fn 78).  
While much admiring Marx’s observation that labour-power’s productivity is 
the very thing that caused the alienation of the labourer, whose generative, productive 
capacity was privately appropriated by the capitalist, Arendt takes issue with his 
failure to attend to what she perceives to be crucial: the phenomenological difference 
between the different products humans can create. Eliding the difference between 
products for mere consumption and those “durable enough to be accumulated”, she 
claims, effectively means that “all things [are] understood, not in their worldly, 
objective quality, but as results of living labour-power and functions of the life-
process” (89). This, says Arendt, culminates in our alienation from the human world, 
and subordinates all humans to processes of merely biological and animal necessity, 
tying them to the endless cycle of production and consumption that she calls the “life 
process” (116). Marx’s belief that humans are defined by their capacity to labour, and 
his subsequent inability to distinguish between work and labour, then, mean that he 
privileges productivity over durability, and labour over work. In other words, Marx 
glorifies the activity that “progress[es] automatically in accordance with life itself and 
outside the range of wilful decisions or humanly meaningful purposes” (106).18 If this 
glorification of labour is where she locates the totalitarian elements in Marx, it is in his 
attempt to imagine an unalienated labour that would be productive beyond the realm of 
necessity that she locates his utopian elements: 
                                                 
18 Arendt also claims that in the contemporary world, the production process has become fully 
permeated by the character of labour. Thus, work still produces use-objects, but it does so in such large 
quantities that they begin to operate as objects of consumption: “or [...], to put it another way, the rate 
of use is so tremendously accelerated that the objective difference between use and consumption, 
between the relative durability of use objects and the swift coming and going of consumer goods, 
dwindles to insignificance” (125). 
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The hope that inspired Marx and the best men of the various workers’ 
movements – that free time will emancipate men from necessity and 
make the animal laborans productive – rests on the illusion of a 
mechanistic philosophy which assumes that labour power, like any 
other energy, can never be lost, so that if it is not spent and exhausted 
in the drudgery of life, it will automatically nourish other, ‘higher’ 
activities. [...] A hundred years after Marx we know the fallacy of this 
reasoning; the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in 
anything but consumption, and the more time left to him, the greedier 
and more craving his appetites. That these appetites become more 
sophisticated, so that consumption is no longer restricted to necessities, 
but on the contrary, concentrates on the superfluities of life, does not 
change the character of this society, but harbours the grave danger that 
eventually no object of the world will be safe from consumption and 
annihilation through consumption (133).19 
We can now examine how Arendt wields these same categories in order to 
analyse modern society and the growing role that science and technology play in it. 
Writing as she was in the wake of nuclear technology, Arendt notes that the 
“enormously increased human power of destruction” is no less overwhelming than a 
corresponding growth in the “new creative power” that science has awakened, a power 
that allows us “to produce new elements never found in nature” (269). Her focus, 
however, is not on the private expropriation of what Hardt and Negri hold to be 
commonly produced “new life forms.” Neither private appropriation nor production-
in-common are at issue here. Rather, Arendt is concerned to show how technological 
developments have resulted in a process whereby sheer biological life has become the 
highest good, the goal for which to strive. Once again, in other words, the sphere of 
labour has triumphed over that of work. 
In the early days of empirical science, Arendt argues, work gained 
considerable standing. “It was an instrument, the telescope, a work of man’s hands, 
                                                 
19 This citation also shows, as Canovan puts it, that Arendt uses the category of labour to refer both to 
the biological necessities imposed by nature, and to the “pseudo-natural processes of society within 
which we are all engaged in making a living” (127). 
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which finally forced nature, or rather, the universe to yield its secrets,” she observes 
(290). Work continued to be ever more valorised due to the high degree of “making 
and fabricating present in the experiment itself” (295). The experiment, however, was 
increasingly used to repeat natural processes, rather than to merely observe them. The 
emphasis that work places on the durability of its product, was thus increasingly 
eroded, as scientific enquiry became increasingly concerned with “the question of how 
and through which means and processes [a given natural process or natural product] 
had come into being and could be reproduced” (304, emphasis added).   
The dwindling importance of work, says Arendt, means that science has begun 
acting into nature, “creating ‘natural’ processes which without men would never exist, 
and which earthly nature by herself seems incapable of accomplishing” (231). And 
this newfound ability to reproduce nature brings us back to the sphere of labour, 
which, we recall, has reproduction as its sole aim. For science may well make use of 
the instruments of homo faber in order to achieve its task; it may even create new 
products in the process of acting into nature, but should this happen, it is as incidental 
as is labour’s ability to produce more than it strictly requires. Incidental, because 
labour is concerned only with reproducing itself and the conditions of its possibility, 
its ability to produce more than what is strictly necessary for this notwithstanding.  
These same patterns, Arendt claims, are at work in modern science. More 
important than the incidental production of a new object, Arendt argues, is the ability 
to produce knowledge as to the process through which a natural process can be created 
anew, reproduced. While this position might find echoes in Hardt and Negri’s concept 
of immaterial labour, I believe it is more instructive to read Arendt’s comments as a 
diagnosis of how work is increasingly replaced by a process that conceives of 
humanity only in terms of its biological species-being. In view of her comments, we 
can interpret the creation of the Moore cell-line as an intervention into nature that 
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ensured the creation of a cell-line that was infinitely reproducible. If the California 
Supreme Court rewarded Moore’s doctors with a patent for their work, for the 
ingenuity of their fabrication, this is only because the legal sphere adheres to the 
“current prejudice which ascribes the development of modern science, because of its 
applicability, to a pragmatic desire to improve conditions and better human life on 
earth” (Arendt, 289). This legal precedent and this prejudice, Arendt might argue, 
testify to the victory of the animal laborans over the homo faber, and show that the 
sheer preservation of biological life now becomes our supreme goal: “the interests of 
the individual as well as the interests of mankind are always equated with individual 
life or the life of the species as though it were a matter of course that life is the highest 
good” (312, emphasis added). 
Similarly, the process thanks to which the organ is increasingly commodifiable 
emerges as a triumph of our ability to act into nature. Immunosuppressant drugs have 
effectively designed a way in which to reproduce the natural process of 
immunological tolerance, even as this means, as Lawrence Cohen puts it, that 
biological difference is actively suppressed. In fact, Cohen’s reading of 
immunosuppression ties directly into Arendt’s argument, for it is a technique 
designed, she might argue, to suppress human plurality and bring out our biological 
commonality. And what logic other than the one which sees “life as the highest good” 
is at work in those calls for organ markets, which begin their appeals with figures of 
death tolls in organ waiting lists, and claim, as does Fox and Swazey’s anonymous 
advocate whose pithy words I find myself forced to return to time and again, that 
commercialisation “is helpful, rather than harmful, to people’s well-being” (71, 
emphasis added). 
I am not, of course, suggesting that the life of those who die waiting for a 
transplant is unimportant. However, I wish to underscore here that the cultivation of 
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life that Arendt signals to can only be an obsession with those who can, quite literally, 
afford the biotechnologies that enable it. To this political and economical problem I 
shall turn in subsequent chapters. Nor do I wish to imply that we should adopt 
Arendt’s sombre outlook and view the perpetuation of biological life as a goal that is 
as arrogant and hubris-ridden as it is oblivious to our human capabilities. Rather, I 
contend that just as Marx sheds light on just what kind of product the organ-as-
commodity is, Arendt allows us to grasp why biotechnology’s products, both potential 
and actual, provoke such heated debates, and such contrasting reactions. For, is not the 
fear that biotechnology might inaugurate a new form of eugenics, or that the legal 
commercialisation of organs will legitimise the consumption of humans really a fear 
that human beings will be increasingly treated as though they were no more than 
animals? And, is not the hope that biotechnology will save ever more lives, or the 
celebration of the fact that organ transplants can now occur across immunological and 
racial lines an attempt to help us see that we are all animals-in-common?  
“The point, in our context,” as Arendt announced fifty years ago, “is that both 
despair and triumph are inherent in the same event” (262). It is to these two emotions 
as articulated in different geopolitical, economic and, indeed, textual contexts that I 
shall now turn. 
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Chapter 2 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND DANGEROUS FANTASIES: MANJULA 
PADMANABHAN’S HARVEST  
I. Alchemic dreams in the new millennium 
In June of 1995, Indian writer Manjula Padmanabhan decided to write a play in 
response to an announcement advertising the Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit 
Foundation International Competition. The evaluating committee was looking for “a 
new, original, unproduced, unpublished play” dealing with “the problems facing Man 
on the threshold of the 21st century” (Padmanabhan 1998, 105). The ensuing play, a 
futuristic dystopia set in Bombay, was completed and submitted one year later. 
Entitled Harvest (1996), the piece went on to win first prize and subsequently 
premiered, in Greek, at the Karolous Koun Theatre, Athens in 1999.  
Knowing that Padmanabhan won a competition with such a weighty and 
daunting rubric, makes it hard not to approach Harvest with, at best, keen curiosity, or, 
at worst, high expectations of Padmanabhan’s personal diagnosis of where Man’s 
most urgent difficulties lie in this century. The postcolonially minded, however, will 
no doubt be heartened to discover that Padmanabhan won the Onassis International 
Competition with a play offering a staunch critique of the effects that globalisation and 
its concomitant new biomedical and digital technologies have on the third world. And 
yet, they might well stall at the fact that Padmanabhan should choose to launch her 
postcolonial critique through a genre rarely employed in drama, let alone in 
postcolonial studies: science-fiction.1 The goal of this chapter is to provide a reading 
                                                            
1 There is one anthology of postcolonial science fiction, So Long Being Dreaming, but no substantial 
critical studies of the genre. The little scholarship that does exist has been dedicated to Amitav Ghosh’s 
The Calcutta Chromosome. Studies of science fiction, especially those with a historical approach to the 
genre, increasingly pay attention to both race and empire. For the former concern, however, they read 
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of Harvest that neither diminishes the play’s contribution to postcolonial studies in 
this, the era of globalization, nor overlooks Padmanabhan’s critical use of the 
conventions of drama and science-fiction within which she has deliberately chosen to 
work. 
Bombay, 2010. Om, an unemployed Indian man comes back home to his wife 
Jaya, and his mother, Ma. Om announces to them that he has been selected for a “job” 
with Interplanta Services, a multinational corporation which buys the rights to third-
world citizens’ body parts in exchange for a radical improvement in the seller’s living 
conditions. Om’s family soon learns that the purchaser of the rights to Om’s body 
parts is Ginni, an American woman who repeatedly appears in their house thanks to 
what Padmanabhan calls a “Contact-Module,” a high-tech gadget placed in Om’s 
house ostensibly to enable communication between the third-world organ donor and 
the first-world organ recipient. The Contact-Module, however, serves simultaneously 
as a screen, communication device and monitoring system that allows Ginni to police 
Om and his family without requiring her physical presence in their home. Her 
frequent, unannounced “visits” to Om’s house allow her to observe his family’s diet 
and toilet habits, and she wastes no time in policing their daily routine to ensure it 
conforms to her personal standards of hygiene. When the fateful day of Om’s 
transplant operation(s) finally arrives, he cowers in fright, and allows Interplanta’s 
employees to take away his brother Jeetu – a male prostitute who is secretly Jaya’s 
lover – instead.  This supposed accident, however, is actually part of a larger scheme. 
Ginni, in fact, was never a real person, but a computer-generated image created by 
Virgil, the real, male receiver who uses Jeetu’s body parts in order to rebuild his own 
 
the contemporary works of African-American writers such as Butler and Delany. For the latter, they 
discuss authors writing during imperialism’s heydey (Verne, Wells, Haggard). 
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deteriorated body. All along, it transpires, Virgil’s plan has been to use Jeetu’s body to 
seduce Jaya into contracting out her own body. Virgil wants to artificially inseminate 
Jaya and keep the baby as his own. 
As this brief plot summary makes clear, Harvest identifies the illegal trade in 
human organs as one of many forms of exploitation that arise with the proliferation of 
new digital and biomedical technologies under late capitalism. Like other prominent 
works of its genre, Harvest seems to suggest that “progress is indissoluble from 
catastrophe” (Suvin, cited in Roberts, 44).2 Yet the polarized world that Harvest 
envisions, a world divided into third-world Donors and first-world Receivers, tailors 
this characteristic trope of the genre to locate the “catastrophe of progress” in the 
third-world. Through its resolutely postcolonial setting, the play explores how the 
promises of improved communication, ameliorated health and increased lifestyle 
choices contained in these new technologies undergo a sinister transformation in the 
third-world, where “access to these technologies does not [necessarily] correspond 
with access to the knowledge that produces or controls them” (Mathur, 2004, 128).  
The author’s note with which the playscript opens sets the tone for what 
follows: a work of science-fiction with a dogged focus on the third-world subject’s 
relationship to scientific and technological advances. 
  
The year is 2010. There are significant technical advances, but the 
clothes and habits of ordinary people in the ‘Donor’ World are no 
different to those of Third World citizens today. Except for the 
obviously exotic gadgets described in the action, household objects 
look reasonably familiar (217) 
 
2 Suvin makes this observation of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, which according to some, inaugurated 
the genre of science-fiction (Alkon, 1994). Others, however, view Shelley’s gothic novel as belonging 
to a tradition of “anti-science-fiction” (Stableford, 2003). 
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The “significant technical advances” of 2010 serve to situate Harvest within the 
constraints of science-fiction and create the “cognitive estrangement” that Darko 
Suvin has argued is the defining characteristic of genre.3 Yet, as Suchitra Mathur 
points out, the process of cognitive estrangement is somewhat curbed with a 
qualifying “but” that informs us that people of the Donor World look no different from 
what we know them to look like today. No such qualification is made for people of the 
Receiver World, however. We can thereby anticipate that if we are to be cognitively 
estranged, it will be, like the Donor characters themselves, from the Receivers of the 
first-world. As Mathur notes, “foregrounding the similarity between the present and 
future third-world,” allows Padmanabhan to “reduc[e] the science-fictional cognitive 
distance for a specific part of the globe” (Mathur, 127). Thus, before the action of the 
play even commences, Padmanabhan establishes that the “technical advances” we are 
about to witness are not global, but confined to first-world locations. Regardless of our 
own location then, Padmanabhan forges, from the play’s outset, a bond between us 
and the Donors, uniting us in our cognitive estrangement from the Receivers’ world. 
As she tells us in her essay “The Story of Harvest”, Padmanabhan first 
conceived of the idea for the play during a visit to her sister in Madras in early 1995. 
On a morning walk around the town, she saw several men “wearing pajamas, dressing 
gowns and sterile gauze mouth-masks.” Upon make enquiries, she was told that the 
 
3 Suvin has famously defined science-fiction as “a literary genre or verbal construct whose necessary 
and sufficient conditions are the presence and interaction of estrangement and cognition and whose 
main device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author’s empirical environment” (Suvin, 
1988, 37). As Roberts explains, the rational and logical implications of the term “cognition” allow 
Suvin to refer to those aspects of science-fiction which invite us to try and grasp the unfamiliar 
environment of a given text of science-fiction. “Estrangement” is a term Suvin derives from Brecht in 
order to allude to the elements of science-fiction that alienate us from the familiar and the everyday 
(Roberts, 8) 
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men were “clients of the flourishing trade [in human organs] whose source was the 
poor villagers of Tamil Nadu” recovering from kidney-transplant surgery (106). “The 
germ of the idea,” Padmanabhan continues, “was that of the poor becoming donors to 
the rich, into which I found I could insert the classic theme of age cannibalizing youth 
in quest of longevity” (ibid).4  
I choose to dwell on Padmanabhan’s creative thought-process here because I 
find it suggestive that she should make sense of the sinister image of the Indian 
kidney-sellers she encountered in Madras by not only aligning it to humanity’s 
mythical, legendary and age-old search for immortality, but by introducing a predatory 
dimension into this quest. More suggestive still is the fact that the play that ensued 
from this thought-process locates the classic theme of the pursuit of immortality in a 
first-world whose inhabitants are sick but technologically resourceful, dying but 
refusing to let go of life, willing victims all of “the hubris of medicine and medical 
technology in the face of mortality” (Scheper-Hughes, 2000, 198).   
Padmanabhan is hardly alone in associating the trade in live human organs 
with the predatory drive to infinitely prolong one’s own life with the organs of others. 
Medical anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes has not only described the global 
black market in human organs as a form of “new cannibalism” (1998, 14-17) but has 
argued that advances in transplant surgery create “an artificial need, one that can never 
be satisfied”, to cater for “the age-old denial and refusal of death” (2000, 198). Several 
 
4 I contend that these remarks should serve as a salutary reminder against reading Harvest as a metaphor 
for neocolonialism. This, for instance, is Ayesha Ramachandran’s reading. The abstract for her article 
on Harvest describes the play as “explor[ing] the extreme outcome of the international trade in human 
organs as a metaphor for neocolonialism” (161). Seeing Harvest as a metaphor for the evils of 
neocolonialism ignores the fact that the idea for the play sprang from Padmanabhan’s encounter with 
the harsh realities of the illegal traffic in human organs. More problematically, this interpretation 
subsumes the target of Padmanabhan’s  critical gaze under the broad rubric of “neocolonialism”,  
reducing the specificity of Padmanabhan’s critique, while simultaneously giving the erroneous 
impression that neocolonialism itself is a monolithic process. 
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sociologists of medicine and historians of science point to the dream of an endlessly 
regenerative body to which advances in biotechnology have given rise: 
 
Biotechnology promises the greatest profits and the greatest potential 
for the extension of life […] feed[ing] the dream of a completely 
regenerative biology. By this fantasy, the aging body could partake of 
the embryonic vitality of the very young body, indefinitely reproducing 
itself, even if only in a state of suspended animation (Nielson, 181) 
Such a view, Robbie Davis-Floyd points out, relies on an increasingly pervasive, 
technocratic view of medicine, which not only defines the body as a machine whose 
malfunctioning parts can be replaced with used “spare” ones, but feeds the fantasy of a 
“technological progress that will culminate in [the] transcendence of all natural 
bounds” (260). 
As mentioned, Padmanabhan situates this technocratic society fantasizing with 
endless regeneration in the first-world, and epitomizes it in the character of Virgil, 
who, by the end of the play, proudly proclaims that this is “his fourth body in fifty 
years” (246). The action of the play, however, occurs entirely in a third-world whose 
inhabitants are figured as the preyed-upon owners of the spare body parts so coveted 
by their first-world counterparts. My contention is that this deliberate move on 
Padmanabhan’s part forces us to view biotechnological advances from the point of 
view of those third-world inhabitants who cannot buy into the technocratic dream of 
life-prolongation because they lack the wealth to do so. Harvest thereby places the 
dreams generated by biotechnology on a continuum with global capitalism: it is 
economic necessity that drives the impoverished third-world Donors to quasi-literally 
feed the technocratic dream that only the first-world Receiver can afford to dream.5 
 
5 It is hardly an accident, moreover, that Harvest represents the organs trade as a fully institutionalised 
service industry which, like any other, smoothly operates under the control of an entity that embodies 
all the rapacious forces of global capitalism: the transnational corporation. 
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This last claim is slightly misleading, however. I do not mean to suggest that 
Harvest reduces its third-world Donors to the passive victims of first-world capital. 
What makes the play so compelling, in fact, is its simultaneous attentiveness to the 
futures that the third-world Donors dream of: with the notable exception of Om’s wife, 
Jaya, all members of the Donor family view Om’s contract as an opportunity to 
actively harness the forces of a capitalism that lures them with seductive promises of 
unprecedented wealth and unheard-of comforts. The plays thus invites us to examine 
not just the material economic inequalities created by global capitalism but also the 
transformations in the social imaginaries of those third-world inhabitants whom 
economic prosperity continues to elude.  
Let me explain this transformation by turning to Jean and John Comaroff. 
Global capitalism today, the Comaroffs argue, presents itself to the labouring poor in a 
millennial, messianic form. Advertising itself as a “gospel of salvation; [as] a 
capitalism that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform 
the universe of the marginalised and the disempowered” (292), millennial capitalism 
lures its targets with business proposals whose “alchemic techniques defy reason in 
promising unnaturally large profits” (313).6 
Harvest situates Om’s decision to embark on the sale of his body parts within 
this millennial context. Organ trade is no longer a criminalised activity in the futuristic 
Bombay he inhabits, but this only makes the promises of millennial capitalism seem 
all the more alluring. “We’ll have more money than you and I have names for! Who’d 
believe there’s so much money in the world?” he says to his mother ecstatically (219). 
 
6 The analogy with alchemy is particularly suggestive in the framework created by Harvest. The two 
most noteworthy pursuits of medieval alchemy – the search for immortality and the drive to transmute 
common metals into gold or silver – mirror Virgil’s dream of acquiring an endlessly regenerative body 
through biotechnology and the Donor family’s dream of accruing endless wealth through selling body-
parts, respectively. 
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Om’s decision is brought on by that set of contradictory emotions, hope and despair, 
that millennial capitalism and its predatory economies unleash upon its targets. His 
defensive retort to Jaya when she expresses her reservations for what he has done is 
plagued by these conflicting emotions: 
 
You think I did it lightly. But […] we’ll be rich! Very rich! Insanely 
rich! But you’d rather live in this one small room, I suppose! Think it’s 
such a fine thing – living day in, day out, like monkeys in a hot-case – 
lulled to sleep by our neighbours’ rhythmic farting! […] And starving. 
(223). 
Immiserated, poor and hopelessly excluded from capitalism’s promise of global 
prosperity, why, Om reasons, should he not cash in on his healthy body? Herein lies 
the hope extended by this new economy: a quick fix to his condition by presenting a 
new, quasi-magical means of making undreamt of amounts of money.  
Making money. This is the promise that the occult economy of organ trade 
extends to its objects: sell your organ and you will make more money than you will 
ever earn through years of toil and labour. Padmanabhan uses Ma to depict the extent 
to which the organs economy presents itself as a miraculous option. Puzzled by her 
son’s promises of unimaginable riches, Ma probes Om to understand just what kind of 
contract he has entered into with Interplanta: “What kind of job pays a man to sit at 
home?” she asks, quite sensibly (220). By scene two of the play, however, Ma has 
grasped what Om’s new “job” entails and her queries are no longer anxious, but 
incredulous, as though  she cannot believe their good fortune: “Tell me again: all you 
have to do is sit at home and stay healthy? […] And they’ll pay you? […] Even if you 
do nothing but sit at home and pick your nose all day?” (222). 
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II. Buying donors 
By Act II of the play, Ma has abandoned all apprehension and become completely 
captivated by their new life of opulence. When the curtain rises for the second act, 
Padmanabhan’s stage directions tell us, two months have elapsed, and the main room 
of the family household is littered with an array of high-tech, if recognisable, gadgets 
that Ginni has provided them with in order to entertain them and keep them 
comfortable: “TV set, computer terminal, mini-gym, an air-conditioner, the works,” 
(227). Designed to pamper the body, and provide it with entertainment and comfort, 
these devices lure Ma into recklessly enjoying a lifestyle that was hitherto unavailable 
to them: the life of unrestrained consumption that late capitalism advertises. Addicted 
to the endless soap operas and commercials now available to her via cable television, 
Ma is the perfect recipient of Ginni’s gifts, completely surrendered as she is to the joys 
of technologically-induced bliss and thrilled that, for literally performing no labour at 
all, “they will be rich forever and ever” (235).  
Ma’s unresisting acceptance of the sudden transformation in her living 
conditions serves to underscore how the pull that millennial capitalism exerts on the 
third-world citizen is exacerbated when it pairs up with new technologies. As Suchitra 
Mathur points out, Harvest accurately depicts the ability that first-world technology 
has to “arouse desire in the Other” (126, emphasis added).7 In the case of Ma, desire is 
figured in escapist terms. Using her unlimited access to Interplanta’s bank account to 
purchase a futuristic device Padmanabhan calls a VideoCouch, by the end of the play 
                                                            
7 Mathur’s article is concerned mainly with science and technology as they are represented in South 
Asian science-fiction. The literary texts he analyses together with Harvest – Rokeya Sakhawat 
Hossain’s  feminist utopia “Sultana’s Dream” and Amitav Ghosh’s novel The Calcutta Chromosome – 
are all meditations on the role of science and technology in the colonial or postcolonial world. Thus, 
while I cite Mathur’s comment in general agreement, I contend that in the case of Harvest, technology 
must be understood as indissociable from global capitalism in its millennial form.  
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Ma is locked away in a capsule into which she can plug in and uninterruptedly watch 
one of 150 television channels without getting up to eat, drink or go to the toilet 
because, as the agent who comes to install it tells us, “the unit is fully self-sufficient” 
(244). Ma thus opts to use her new-found wealth to purchase a one-way ticket to 
armchair travel and virtual transportation: having transcended the physical limitations 
imposed by her aged body and its material needs, she can now be a cyborg TV-tourist, 
globe-trotting for ever. 
Much has been written about the cyborg in the last decade, but Donna 
Haraway’s influential “Cyborg Manifesto” (1991) remains the most celebratory 
account of the liberational potential of the cybernetically enhanced organism. Half 
human and half machine, the cyborg, as we saw in chapter 1, poses a much-needed 
challenge to the dualisms that Western discourses persistently use to further 
domination over “women, people of colour, nature, workers [and] animals” (177). The 
cyborg exposes not only the permeability of these categories but serves as an existing 
example that such dualisms are constructions that can be destabilised.  
Utopian postmodernism at its best maybe, but postcolonial criticism “The 
Cyborg Manifesto” is not. Haraway’s exhilaration with the cyborg remains 
circumscribed within a privileged first-world vantage point that overlooks the 
predicament of those with limited access to new technologies. To her credit, Haraway 
is not entirely blind to her privileged position. She recognises that her gesture to 
reclaim the cyborg as a being that promises to forge new relationships between 
humanity, technology and nature (Graham, 309) is ironic given that “the cyborg is also 
the awful apocalyptic telos of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract 
individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency” (151). Yet her 
manifesto remains resolutely utopian, and she does little to unpack the liberational 
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potential, if any, that the cyborg offers to those who have no say in the uses to which 
technology is put.  
Which brings us back to Harvest, and our venture into the murky postcolonial 
territory that Haraway manages to dodge. Underscoring the sinister underside of the 
cyborg that Haraway herself acknowledges, Harvest warns us that the cyborg needs to 
be critically examined before we universally acclaim its revolutionary potential. 
Padmanabhan thus stages a third-world space in which the only person to actively seek 
out a cyborg existence is the first-world inhabitant who visits it. The Donors, on the 
other hand, bow to technology and cyborg existence not because they exert any 
control on its implementation but because they are conscripted to do so. If Ma does 
not fit into this paradigm, this hardly suggests any wavering on Padmanabhan’s part. 
Ma willingly chooses her cyborg fate, yes, but this only allows Padmanabhan to show 
that technology can also lead to disempowerment: the VideoCouch  effectively 
transforms Ma into an unquestioning, docile and submissive being who has lost all 
critical capacity for interrogating the price that her two sons have had to pay to enable 
the purchase of her gadget. 
While Ma lies oblivious in her VideoCouch, both her sons abandon Jaya, 
seeking out the sensual treats that Receiver Ginni tempts them with through the 
Contact Module. Ironic this, given that Jaya has hitherto been the primary cause of 
sibling rivalry, with Jeetu winning out as the illicit recipient of his sister-in-law’s 
affections. The siblings now vie for the attentions of Ginni, caring little that the carnal 
pleasures she promises can only be enjoyed by willingly embracing a cyborg 
existence. If Om and Jeetu depart for their cyborg fates, as they do, voluntarily, surely 
we are hardly justified in accusing Ginni of coercion? This, however, is precisely what 
I intend to do.  
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I base my claim, for now, not on the fact that Ginni is actually a computer-
generated image – a point I discuss at length below – but on Padmanabhan’s repeated 
and astute references to the thorny question of choice, an issue which persists despite 
the fact that the play is set in a world where all judicial, moral and bioethical debates 
generated by biomedical technologies have been overcome. In this future, the 
utilitarian and neo-liberal principles espoused by advocates of a free market in human 
tissue have triumphed, and the human body is accordingly viewed as a form of 
property like any other, fit for disposal as its free and autonomous owner deems 
suitable. The futuristic setting allows for a plot that centres around a freely-entered, 
legal contractual agreement between a first and third-world citizen. Yet Harvest 
propounds this victorious logic while simultaneously offering it up for interrogation.  
Act II, scene iv. Jaya accuses her husband of making the wrong decision by 
selling the rights to his body to Interplanta. Om, however, is adamant that, though 
voluntary, the decision was not made of his own free will: 
 
Om: Wanting – not wanting – what meaning do these words have? Was 
it my choice that I signed up for this program? 
Jaya: Who forced you? You went of your own accord! 
Om: I went because I lost my job at the company. And why did I lose 
it? Because I am a clerk and nobody needs clerks anymore! There are 
no new jobs now – there’s nothing left for people like us! Don’t you 
know that? 
Jaya: You’re wrong, there are choices – there must be choices – 
Om: Huh! I didn’t choose. I stood in queue and was chosen! And if not 
this queue, there would have been other queues – […]. (238) 
The world Harvest conjures is not so transformed as to have overcome the profound 
economic inequalities created by global capitalism. A world of transformed ethical 
values this may indeed be, but – we do well to recall the unchanged physical 
appearance and living conditions of the third-world citizens of the future here – the 
economic structures of late capitalism remain much the same as they are today. By 
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underscoring the precarious conditions under which the Donors live, the desperate 
measures Om takes in order to secure an income emerge as all but free and 
autonomous choices.8  
“There are no new jobs now,” claims the unemployed Om. Indeed not. His 
comment unwittingly pinpoints to the ominous lack of terms available to describe the 
contract he has signed with Interplanta. Whatever else it may be, Om’s is certainly no 
conventional employment contract. And it is certainly no coincidence that Jeetu, the 
prostitute, is the only one to realise this. He attempts to convey it to Jaya in a scene 
that sees the only private encounter between the two lovers. As a prostitute, Jeetu is 
accustomed to providing sexual pleasure for those “with money to spare on services 
such as [his]” (226). What right does Om have, he asks, to shun him for his 
supposedly seedy profession? “At least when I sell my body, I decide which part of 
me goes into where and whom,” he tells Jaya (227). Not only does Jeetu retain some 
degree of choice in his job; he is actually justified in describing it as such: “I don’t 
mind being bought – but I won’t be owned!” he claims (ibid). Jeetu succinctly 
expresses a materialist understanding of the subtle but crucial difference between the 
two distinct commodities being considered here: Jeetu’s clients buy from him the 
sexual favours that Jeetu chooses to place at their disposal in the form of a temporary, 
alienable service that he performs; his brother’s client, by contrast, permanently owns 
the entirety of Om’s physical body along with Om’s rights over it. Om’s is no 
employment contract; it is a contract whose terms transform his whole body, along 
with the labour and services it is capable of performing, into a commodity that is now 
 
8 Nancy Scheper-Hughes makes a similar point about the idea of free choice: “Bioethical arguments 
about the right to sell [one’s organs] are based on Euro-American notions of contract and individual 
‘choice.’ But social and economic contexts make the ‘choice’ to sell a kidney in an urban slum anything 
but a ‘free’ and ‘autonomous’ one” (2001 n.p.). 
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owned by someone else.9 Nor, we might add, is Om’s a typical contract of the sort we 
might encounter on the black market for organs. This latter kind of sale, even 
according to legalisation advocates, we recall from the previous chapter, is explicitly 
predicated upon our not conceiving of another’s body as property, and upon one’s own 
entitlement to see only parts of one’s own body as property.  
Om, not Jeetu, then, is the man to make a “profession” out of selling his own 
body. Selling, we note. Why then, we are now forced to ask ourselves, does 
Padmanabhan insist on referring to all her third-world characters as donors? Whether 
potential “employees” of Interplanta, like the rest of Om’s family and the competitors 
he encounters during the selection process, or actual contract holders, like Om, 
Harvest’s third-world protagonists can hardly be described as altruistic donors who 
willingly give up their bodies to save the lives of the sick. Not donors then but sellers, 
a sinister group of new merchants who seek remuneration for the act of turning their 
bodies into purchasable commodities. 
And yet I argue that Padmanabhan’s signifier is astutely and aptly chosen. I 
should like to refer my reader back, here, to the deliberately oxymoronic heading of 
this section: “buying donors.” Sellers maybe, but donors cannot surely, by definition, 
be bought? But contemporary definitions are no longer valid in Harvest’s futuristic 
world. The new technologies that only Harvest’s first-world Receivers can afford are 
used to transform the third-world citizen, once an apprehensive seller, into a willing 
donor. We must read Padmanabhan’s use of the term “donor”, I contend, as alluding to 
just this process of transformation-through-technology. By the end of the play, we 
 
9 The difference between Om and Jeetu’s contracts is also articulated in Marx’s explanation of the 
employment contract. “[T]he proprietor of labour-power must always sell it for a limited period only, 
for if he were to sell it in a lump, once and for all, he would be selling himself, converting himself from 
a free man into a slave, from an owner of a commodity into a commodity” (Capital I, 271). 
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recall, Om and Jeetu insist on leaving their house to find Ginni and compete for the 
honour of gifting their bodies to her so she can ply them for all her needs. All their 
initial misgivings forgotten, they become consummate donors, both of them 
responding to Ginni’s call to undergo an act for which, she insists, one would “have to 
be really willing...” (240, emphasis added). If I insist on inserting an economic 
dimension into the brothers’ change of heart, it is because the polarised framework of 
Harvest urges us to do so. In this play where new technologies are repeatedly shown 
to be wielded and controlled by the first-world Receiver, we cannot forget that Ginni 
creates a donor mentality in Om and Jeetu only because she is first able to purchase 
the technologies that will allow her to do so.  
Ginni, of course, is actually Virgil in disguise. In all the initial contacts that he 
makes with Om’s family, the true Receiver, Virgil, appears to them as Ginni, “the 
blonde and white-skinned epitome of an American-style youth goddess” (217). The 
gender-bending that Virgil’s technological prowess permits, however, emerges here 
not as a celebration of cyberspace for its potential to release us all from the binding 
markers that confine us to one rigid identity, but as a sobering warning of the coercive 
uses to which such identity-bending can be put. We are far removed from extolments 
of the cyborg here. Harvest’s cyborg is manipulative, duplicitous. Disguised as Ginni, 
the cyborg seduces Om and Jeetu into becoming donors, deceives them into thinking 
that she will bestow countless sexual favours upon them in her infinite gratitude. 
Let us recall, once more, Suchitra Mathur’s observation that Harvest depicts 
first-world technology’s ability to “arouse desire in the Other.” Nowhere is the crucial 
role that the arousal of desire plays in the creation of a willing donor more vividly 
illustrated than in the transformation undergone by Jeetu. Claiming that he much 
prefers to continue earning his own living as a prostitute rather than partake of his 
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family’s newfound fortunes, Jeetu initially chooses to dwell in the street, away from 
the household comforts which the rest of the family now enjoys. Jeetu is nevertheless 
forced to seek out his family’s help when he falls ill. Lice-infested and clothed in rags, 
he swallows his pride and knocks on their door. He is cared for by Jaya, who tends to 
him despite Om and Ma’s displeasure. Jeetu is still in the house on the fateful day that 
Ginni sends the guards of Interplanta Services to fetch Om for his first transplant. 
While Om hides in their new toilet cubicle in fright, the guards seize Jeetu, inject him 
with a numbing anaesthetic so he will stop resisting them and take him away for 
surgery. The man who showed such contempt for his brother’s actions thus becomes a 
participant in Virgil’s plan, albeit through an act of invasive technological violence.  
Jeetu returns that very night, changed. In the place where his eyes used to be, 
sit two “enormous goggles, created to look like a pair of imitation eyes” (238). 
Miserable and humiliated, Jeetu curses Ginni: “A rich woman who plucks a poor 
man’s eyes out of his body – huh! That’s not a woman, it’s a demon!” (239). Hitting 
his replacement eyes with his fists, he shudders in fright at what the visions they 
afford: bright white shapes and confused outlines that he cannot even turn off. “I can’t 
sleep, I can’t dream, I can’t even cry” he tells his family, who want him to accept his 
accidental cyborg fate for the sake of the comforts they are receiving in return. “Is it 
selfish to want to end this?” he asks (239). 
As soon as the Contact Module next flickers to life, however, Jeetu radically 
changes his tune.  Circling round the room looking at something that none of his 
family can see, he speaks only to Ginni, awed by her beauty and the lushness of her 
surroundings. His new eyes allow him to access an image that Ginni beams “straight 
into [his] mind” so that he can now see her in a full-bodied form that appears to be 
standing right next to him (240). As Helen Glibert points out, the Receiver’s 
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technology fools Jeetu “into thinking that the normal practices of social (and sexual) 
interaction can operate in this virtual world” (2006 129). Now moving his own body 
as seductively as he can, Jeetu promises Ginni that he will do whatever she wants of 
him. Repeatedly and flirtatiously referring to him as Auwm – Ginni’s warped 
pronunciation of his brother’s name Om – Ginni lures Jeetu into agreeing to the next 
phase of transplants. She terminates contact promising that her guards will come for 
him soon, but Jeetu can hardly contain his impatience to go to her. “She’s a goddess 
and she exists. I would do anything for her – anything!” (241). Such is his fascination 
that Om is roused into furious jealousy: “But it’s mine, what he’s seeing – MINE!” he 
screams (240).  
Once Jeetu is taken away for what is later revealed to be a transplant of his 
entire body, Om follows, determined to put right the mistake that has deprived him of 
the fate that is rightfully his. The Contact Module thus permits Ginni to weave a 
seduction fame so enticing that, by the end of it, she has procured herself not one, but 
two willing donors.  
 
III. A postcolonial novum 
It is no coincidence that the Contact Module is the first thing that Virgil commissions 
Interplanta Services to install in the Donors’ household: the entirety of Virgil’s plan 
rests on his ability to purchase this technological gadget and manipulate it for the 
purposes of procuring agreeable donors rather than begrudging sellers. Yet 
Padmanabhan’s Contact Module is much more than a mere plot device allowing Virgil 
to get what he wants. It is also the generic contrivance that situates the play within the 
domain of science-fiction. I propose, therefore, that we dwell on it at length. 
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In his extensive treatment of the genre, Darko Suvin has argued that science-
fiction creates a concrete “point of difference” between the world represented by the 
science-fiction text and the world that we see and recognise around us. This point of 
difference, or novum, argues Suvin, is the hallmark of all science-fiction, and is 
characteristically grounded in a discourse of rational possibility. Thus, the novum is 
usually a scientific or technological device, creating a realm of material rather than 
merely conceptual or imaginative difference.10 The novum puts the science-fictional 
plot into motion, a plot which typically examines the consequences and effects of the 
novum on the people who inhabit the different world imagined by the science-fiction 
writer. So far, so clear then. True to the conventions of the genre, Harvest contains a 
novum, the Contact Module, whose purpose is to mediate and enable all interactions 
between Donors and Receivers so that we, as readers, can meditate upon the effects of 
such technological “progress” upon first and third-world inhabitants alike. What is 
significant about Padmanabhan’s deployment of her chosen novum, however, is that 
she tailors it in decidedly postcolonial fashion. And in doing so, she alters several 
science-fictional conventions. 
Take, for instance, Scott McCracken’s proposition that “at the root of all 
science-fiction lies the fantasy of the alien encounter.” While I do not doubt that many 
would choose to take issue with McCracken’s generalisation, I propose, for the sake of 
my own argument, to take McCracken at his word. Regardless of whether or not it 
encompasses the totality of the genre, McCracken’s claim certainly applies to a great 
majority of science-fictional texts, in which humans embark on lengthy travels to 
encounter not just alien species from distant galaxies and planets, but also alien 
 
10 Suvin insists that though the novum need not be a piece of technology, it cannot be anything 
pertaining to the realm of the magical, or the supernatural. These latter devices are within the purview 
of fantastic literature. 
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humans whose alterity resides in their capacity for non-sexual reproduction, or their 
machine-human hybridity. Just who operates as “the alien” in Harvest is not so easy to 
determine. But this thorny question is better tackled once we hone in on the last word 
in McCracken’s suggestion: “encounter.” Ginni, we must remember, communicates 
with the Donor family only through the Contact Module. In no moment of the play do 
we witness an actual, physical encounter between Donors and Receivers. 
Padmanabhan’s novum, the Contact Module, thus emerges as an ironic set of 
signifiers, for its actual purpose is to guarantee that no physical contact whatsoever 
occurs between first and third world environments. What kind of alien encounter, then, 
is this? 
One, I contend, which responds to the concerns of a postcolonial science-
fiction. Ginni is adamant that she will not set foot in Indian soil because she dreads 
contamination from those unhealthy surroundings. The Bombayites of 2010 need no 
longer fear the journeys of exploration and conquest that gave rise to the alien 
encounters of the colonial period. In the era of globalisation and biotechnology, the 
third-world citizen as envisaged in Harvest is a menacing, incomprehensible and 
fascinating alien not because of her colour, her customs and her remoteness, but 
because of the freakish ability she has to remain healthy in spite of her unhygienic 
dwellings. It is this constantly-threatened healthiness that Ginni anxiously seeks to 
acquire before it is too late. For like the Receiver’s own body, the Donor’s body too is 
vulnerable to the encroachment of disease and degeneration that must be kept at bay at 
all costs. Thanks to the Contact Module, Padmanabhan is able to show that while the 
biotechnologies of global capitalism do indeed fuel fantasies of “a regenerative body, 
whose every loss can be repaired” (Waldby and Mitchell 30), this fantasy threatens to 
be destroyed at every turn. As Zygmunt Bauman notes: “the search for the ‘truly fit’ 
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body is plagued by anxieties which are unlikely ever to be quelled or dispelled. […] 
[N]o amount of care or drilling of the body is likely ever to put paid to the gnawing 
suspicion of malfunctioning” (227). 
Yet Ginni never gives up trying. The Contact Module effectively enables her to 
intervene in the Donor world without having to set foot in the geographical location 
that they inhabit. She has purchased the rights to Om’s organs in order to fend off 
disease and death and intends to make the most of her investment. Safely ensconced in 
her sanitised first-world home, Ginni is able to use the Contact Module to police the 
daily habits of Om’s family in order to ensure that the organs that will one day be hers 
remain healthy too.  Thus, realising, after her first “visit”, that Om’s family shares a 
toilet with forty other families, Ginni reacts with horror, not because of the precarious 
economic predicament this state of affairs testifies to, but because it is distinctly 
unhygienic. “It’s wrong”, she exclaims. “It’s disgusting! And I – well, I’m going to 
change that. I can’t accept that. I mean, it’s unsanitary!” (225). Accordingly, 
Interplanta is commissioned to install a toilet in their home that very same day. 
The regular monitoring that the Contact Module permits is rendered even more 
effective given that only Ginni is able to operate it at will. Om’s family never knows 
when Ginni will “visit” them next. By the opening of Act II of the play, we see how 
well her strategy is working. Two months have elapsed, and Om is panicking because 
they are late for lunch. (Lunch, of course, consists of the multi-coloured nutritional 
pellets provided for them by Interplanta Services.) “You know how [Ginni] hates it 
when we’re late to eat” Om says, worriedly (228). The Contact Module thus allows 
the receiver to establish a permanent structure of surveillance in Om’s home. Fearing 
Ginni’s rebuke, or worse, a revoking of his contract, Om urges his entire family to 
police their own behaviour. The Contact Module inculcates self-discipline, rendering 
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the third-world bodies into perfect sites of “docility-utility”, optimal sites, in other 
words, from which to extract the healthiest possible organ (Foucault 135-169). 
By keeping Ginni’s body remote, the Contact Module signals to the 
reconfigured circumstances under which third and first world citizens now make 
contact. Yet the novum also ensures that the Receiver’s body is never physically 
present on stage, for the action of the play transpires entirely in the Donor household. 
Throughout the play, Ginni is only every visible in two dimensions, on the screen of 
the Contact Module, a fact that is highly significant given that Padmanabhan’s 
medium – theatre – is explicitly concerned with tangible, embodied and physical 
presence on stage. The only embodied and easily recognisable actors on this stage, 
however, are the racially and visually distinct bodies of the third-world Donors. And 
their juxtaposition with the Receivers serves to turn the reigning paradigm of 
colonialism’s heyday on its head: the former subjects of empire, technologically 
challenged, racialised and unhygienic though they may be, now become the yardstick 
for humanity, confronted as they are with first-world Receivers who, though white, are 
“anatomised as talking heads or offstage voices, digitalised as virtual phantasms of an 
increasingly sterile world” and thus rendered irremediably and menacingly alien 
(Gilbert 2006 129).  
With no choice but to gaze on a racialised body whose sheer presence on stage 
challenges the supposed remoteness of the labouring body, the audience now faces the 
very body that capitalist production in the era of globalisation has displaced into the 
distant third-world.11 Whether they like it or not, then, the Contact Module, puts the 
 
11 Many theorists writing about global capitalism today point out that first world economies are 
increasingly reliant not on production but on consumption (Harvey, Bauman, Hardt and Negri). The 
workforce of the first-world is ever more disengaged from industrial labour and manufacture either 
because, in the wake of technological advances, such labour is carried out by non-human  means, or 
alternatively, because human labour is obtained elsewhere. In their drive to multiply profits, first-world 
economies rely on production sites where “labour is cheaper, less assertive, less taxed, more feminized 
[and] less protected by states and unions” (Comaroff and Comaroff  295). Typically located in the third-
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audience on a par with the Receiver who, like them, gazes at the only physical bodies 
on stage: the Donors’. The Contact Module thus pushes the play’s audience into an 
uncomfortable identification with the very entity who is responsible for the 
cannibalisation of third-world bodies that the play so overtly criticises.12 
I use the word cannibalisation advisedly in order to allude to the postcolonial 
rewriting of the term that I see Padmanabhan performing. Using, once more, the 
Contact Module as her tool, Padmanabhan shows how Ginni is able to quarantine 
Om’s family into one room, ascertain that they eat only the processed food-pellets she 
provides them with and monitor them until she deems that their organs are fit for 
consumption. Administering the same treatment to the Donors as one would to a pig 
being fattened for slaughter, the Receiver emerges as a figure with cannibalistic 
appetites. As Helen Gilbert observes, Padmanabhan thus “neatly refigures the 
connotative reach of cannibalism so that it points to characteristics of developed rather 
than ‘primitive’ societies” (2006 127). 
 
IV. Generating Life 
Irrespective of whether they are designed to monitor or pamper, the digital 
technologies that Ginni has access to effectively reduce Om and his family to little 
                                                                                                                                                                           
world, such production sites displace human labour to remote geographical locations, making industrial 
production increasingly less visible in the first-world. The first-world, on the other hand, sees a 
proliferation of service economies, economies which rely on consumers to purchase increasingly non-
material commodities. 
12 Admittedly, this situation would be considerably different if the play were performed in a third-world 
country. The third-world bodies on stage would be more familiar to the audience, whereas the first-
world American character would be visible in the same way as the majority of third-world audiences 
are already accustomed to from television, cinema and magazines: in two dimensions. However, 
Padmanabhan has herself admitted that her frustration with the lack of opportunities for English-
language playwrights in India led her to enter the Onassis competition and write Harvest specifically for 
production in the first-world (Gilbert 2001 214). 
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more than sites of investment for first-world capital. As Ginni says to the family, 
warping the pronunciation of Om’s name: 
 
The Most Important Thing is to keep Auwm smiling. Coz if Auwm’s 
smiling, it means his body is smiling and if his body is smiling it means 
his organs are smiling. And that’s the kind of organs that’ll survive a 
transplant best, smiling organs… (229) 
Reading Ginni’s actions as an investment signals to the parallels between the human 
body and land that the play’s title, Harvest, alludes to. The play, of course, takes its 
title from the term “organ harvesting”, steeped in connotations that need unpacking 
further than I have done in the preceding chapters. If the term “harvest” refers to the 
process of gathering crops, then “organ harvesting” effectively assimilates the whole 
human body, from which a part is extracted, to a crop-producing piece of land, and 
thus, by extension, to the possibility that land harbours of generating life. The 
extractable human body part is accordingly assimilated to the yield or crop; this is the 
commodity with genuine use-value, the part that it is profitable to detach from the 
whole. In order to obtain the best possible harvest, as Ginni is well aware, one must 
not only select the best possible site in which to invest: one must maintain a continued 
investment in this site. Quality input will produce quality output: namely, a healthy 
harvest.  
But the analogy between the human body and land is pushed still further in 
Padmanabhan’s play. We recall that Harvest concludes with an unexpected plot twist. 
Interplanta Services has taken away both Jeetu and Om, and Ma, locked away in her 
Video Couch, is oblivious to the world. Jaya, now alone in the house, watches as the 
Contact Module springs to life and listens as the real purchaser of Om’s body parts, a 
“red-blooded all-American man” (247) named Virgil, reveals to her that Ginni is 
literally “a nobody. A computer-generated wet dream” (246). Aware of the illicit 
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relationship between Jaya and Jeetu, Virgil has appropriated himself of Jeetu’s body 
which he intends to use to impregnate Jaya. His intentions when securing a contract 
with Om were simple: “We look for young men’s bodies to live in and young 
women’s bodies in which to sow their children” (246, emphasis added). 
Padmanabhan’s carefully chosen words reveal that the association of the body to the 
life-generating earth lends itself to a fruitful reading of the maternal body in relation to 
the dynamics of production. As Helen Gilbert points out, “with this bizarre final twist 
to the story, Padmanabhan puts organ transplantation and reproductive science […] on 
a continuum that suggests ways in which interested capital penetrates the very corpus 
of its multiple and diverse subjects” (2006 125). We must note, however, that 
Padmanabhan shows this continuum to be profoundly gendered: thus, “while the men 
as donors are used as consumable products, the women function more as machines, as 
productive instruments rather than as products” (Mathur 130). And yet, we might add, 
equipped as we are with the Arendtian observations to which Mathur unwittingly 
alludes, Virgil strips down both men and women, reducing them to their functions as 
mere labourers: thus, women are only required to perform the labour of procreation, 
while men’s bodies are literally consumed, used up, in order to feed the life-process of 
Virgil and others like him.13 
In his part of the world, Virgil explains, they have begun to live longer and 
longer at the cost of no longer being able to reproduce. The solution to this problem 
lies in a program which allows first-world citizens to purchase third-world bodies, thus 
profiting from their lack of economic resources: “We support poorer sections of the 
world, while gaining fresh bodies for ourselves” (246). Padmanabhan thus imagines a 
 
13 Arendt is also aware of the ties between the labour of (re)production and the labour of procreation: 
hence her deliberate use of the word labour, intended to capture the parallels between the two 
processes. 
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dystopian world in which first-world citizens are so alienated from the dynamics of 
production, and so dependent on the third-world labouring body that they even rely on 
this body to obtain the products-infants with which to perpetuate the existence of their 
own people. 
Given the nature of Padmanabhan’s critique of global capitalism, it is hardly 
surprising that the ultimate aim of first-world body buyers is to acquire control over 
the third-world woman. As Gayatri Spivak points out, “the possession of a tangible 
place of production, the womb, situates women as agents in any theory of production” 
(57). Virgil, it would seem, acknowledges this. While he treats Om and Jeetu as mere 
products for consumption, Jaya is valuable as a site of production.  And yet, as he also 
knows, the female body is not only the site from which new labouring, productive and 
consuming bodies are produced but simultaneously the site responsible for the 
insertion of the body into materiality and hence the very mortality that Virgil is 
compulsively trying to delay (Braidotti, 65).  
Virgil’s fear of death, the arrival of which he has invested so much in delaying, 
colours the strategy he uses to seduce Jaya. Typically, impregnation requires that two 
bodies, one male, one female, engage in physical contact and have unprotected sexual 
intercourse. But Virgil is paranoid about the threat of disease that this act entails; even 
the environment that Jaya lives in is “too polluted” for him to travel there and 
physically be with her (247). Once more, he resorts to biotechnology to avoid any 
exposure to germs, viruses and disease that material bodily practices might entail: 
 
Virgil: The guards will make the child possible Zhaya. It’s just a 
formality, a device –  
Jaya: Device? 
Virgil: You know, an implant. Something I sent, which they’re ready to 
deliver. And you can take your time. About three days are still within 
your fertile cycle. 
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Jaya: What are you talking about? 
Virgil: Zhaya, I’d love to travel to be with you, but I can’t – 
Jaya: Then do it! You who are so powerful – you who can travel from 
body to body – (247) 
Despite all his technological prowess, then, Virgil can do little to change the biological 
given that the survival of the human species depends upon “a method of reproduction 
that involves the introduction into the female of genetically alien spermatozoa cells” 
(Billington, 132). Having undergone all the necessary transplants himself, Virgil must 
now try to persuade Jaya to undergo a transplant of her own, to become a receiver 
herself of Virgil’s impregnating semen. 
Yet Jaya refuses Virgil’s proposal outright. She does not want simulated sex or 
a baby that has been artificially inseminated inside her; she wants “real hands” to 
touch her, a “real weight” upon her body (247). Rejecting the utilitarian framework 
that Virgil proposes to her, where the maternal-productive aspect of her body is 
extrapolated and privileged over her physical desire, Jaya responds to Virgil’s 
advances with an ultimatum: “If you want me, you must risk your skin for me” (248). 
Bragging that she cannot win against him, Virgil sends his Interplanta 
employees to break down Jaya’s door. But Jaya has discovered “a new definition for 
winning. Winning by losing” (248, emphasis added). She announces to Virgil that she 
plans to reclaim the “only thing [she] ha[s] which is still [her] own: [her] death” (248). 
Thus, Jaya resists Virgil’s advances and retains her bodily integrity in one swift 
stroke: she embraces the very mortality that Virgil and his fellow receivers seek to 
eradicate from their own bodies. “I’m holding a piece of glass against my throat”, she 
warns an increasingly frustrated Virgil (248). The play concludes on this unresolved 
note. While Virgil weighs his options, Jaya threatens (promises?) to reclaim her own 
body through suicide. Padmanabhan thus leaves us to ponder a sobering question: is a 
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victory that requires the death of the exploited target of global capitalism really worthy 
of being termed an act of resistance? 
Harvest uses science-fiction to pose a potent critique of the invasive and 
predatory technologies that capitalism uses to exploit and cannibalise third-world 
bodies. Should third-world individuals resist such commodification? Indeed, can they? 
A first step towards resisting the rampant technologies that seek to harness third-world 
bodies, Padmanabhan seems to suggest, is to refuse, like Jaya, to be reduced to a body-
part and embrace the material limitations of the corporeality that digital and 
biomedical technologies seek to override. And yet, under the harsh economic realities 
of late-capitalism, selling the body’s ‘spare’ parts continues to be the only solution for 
those who have no other assets to sell. In this context, Padmanabhan’s notion of 
“winning by losing” seems a disturbingly apt way to define the predicament of the 
third-world individual who has exhausted all other options: lose your own body part to 
win the cash.  
Chapter 3 
HOSPITALITY FOR SALE,OR DIRTY PRETTY  THINGS  
 
I. “Britain is a sovereign nation, not a hotel.” 
Directed by Stephen Frears and scripted by Stephen Knight, Dirty Pretty Things 
opened in British cinemas in December 2002. The film was received with largely 
sympathetic reviews which commended Frears for his unflinching look at the 
underbelly of contemporary London in order to produce a work “in that tradition of 
gritty urban narrative allied to perceptive social commentary,”1 a work whose aim is 
to expose that the city’s claim to multiculturalism resides “chiefly in exploitin
immigrant labour for the service economy.”
g 
                                                
2 More importantly, critics applauded 
Frears for daring to make a film that challenged the terms in which immigrants and 
asylum seekers were being represented in the British media. “Rather than repeating the 
image of these figures as parasites upon Britain and its welfare state,” writes Sarah 
Gibson, “Frears instead represents their exploitation by Britain.”3   
 I begin by citing some prominent reviews of Dirty Pretty Things not only to 
signal to the predominant mode in which the film has been read – that is, as a welcome 
critique of the virulent anti-immigrant tirade launched by British tabloids such as the 
Daily Mail, The Sun and The Express in the 1990s4 – but also to point to what I see as 
a mystifying lack of attention, in these reviews, to the major plotline around which the 
film’s narrative revolves. I venture the following plot summary, then, in order to 
 
1 Neil Smith, “The Sum of all Frears.” 
2 Peter Bradshaw, “Dirty Pretty Things: Review.” 
3 Sarah Gibson, “The Hotel Business is About Strangers,” 698. The (anonymous) reviewer for The 
Telegraph makes a similar point, claiming that Dirty Pretty Things “reverses the perspective that TV 
news footage gives us on asylum seekers.”  
4 For an analysis of the press-campaigns against asylum seekers in the 1990s see Ron Kaye, 
“Redefining the refugee: the UK media portrayal of asylum seekers” in Khalid Koser and Helma Lutz 
(eds) The New Migration in Europe: Social Constructions and Social Realities. For an analysis of more 
recent press-campaigns see Arun Kundnani, “In a Foreign Land: the New Popular Racism” in Race and 
Class, 2001 and Article 19 ‘What’s the story? Sangatte: a case study of media coverage of asylum and 
refugee issues,” 15 May 2003.   
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highlight the issue that the film’s reviewers gloss over, the very issue that my own 
reading will bring to the fore. 
 Set in a contemporary London stripped of all its glamour and tourist 
attractions, Dirty Pretty Things (2002) depicts a grey, shabby and run-down city. This 
is the London inhabited by the undocumented immigrants, asylum-seekers and 
refugees whose lives the film portrays. The film’s three main characters work in the 
Baltic Hotel. Senay (Audrey Tatou) is from Turkey. For reasons undisclosed in the 
film, she has applied for asylum in Britain. She works illegally as a maid, cleaning up 
after the guests who stay at the Baltic. There, she meets and falls in love with Okwe 
(Chiwetel Ejiofor), the night-time receptionist at the Baltic. A Nigerian doctor who is 
fleeing persecution in his own country and has illegally entered Britain, Okwe 
accidentally discovers that some of the hotel rooms are used as makeshift operation 
theatres where London’s undocumented immigrants have their kidneys extracted in 
exchange for fake European passports. The procurer of both the willing kidney-sellers 
and the fake passports is his Spanish boss, Señor Juan (Sergi Lopez). Appropriately 
nicknamed Sneaky by his employees, Sr. Juan manages the hotel, but this job is a 
mere cover for his involvement in the international ring of illegal organ trafficking that 
the film’s narrative uses to bring all its main characters together. This happens when, 
discouraged by the multiple forms of exploitation she undergoes in London, Senay 
agrees to sell one of her kidneys to Sr. Juan in exchange for a fake Italian passport that 
will allow her to head for New York. But Okwe, who has begun to reciprocate Senay’s 
feelings towards him, devises a plan that enables them to use the organ trade to their 
advantage, allowing them to flee London for their respective destinations without 
giving up their body parts in the process. At the film’s conclusion, we see Senay 
embarking on a flight to New York; Okwe speaks to his daughter on the phone to 
announce that he is coming home to Nigeria.   
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 Let me not mislead my reader into thinking that the film’s reviews entirely 
ignore the phenomenon of organ trafficking that is so crucial to the film’s plot: they do 
not. Rather, they read the plying of the human body for its organs, figured in Dirty 
Pretty Things as a predicament reserved exclusively for Britain’s undocumented 
immigrants, as a vivid metaphor with which to critique Britain’s silent exploitation of 
immigrant labour.5 Two corrective comments are in order here. Firstly, the studies of 
medical anthropologists, the writings of biomedical ethicists and the increasing 
number of media stories about people who have opted to sell their organs out of 
economic despair show that the international black market in human organs is 
frighteningly literal. Secondly, even if we do accept that Dirty Pretty Things uses the 
trade in human organs as a metaphor for the exploitation of immigrant labour, we must 
do so with the reservation that this supposed metaphor elides a crucial theoretical 
difference between the two forms of exploitation being equated: the immigrant whose 
organ is extracted is being compensated for her organ, not for her labour.  
 I read the opinions expressed in these reviews symptomatically: the desire to 
reduce the organ trade represented in Dirty Pretty Things to a metaphor for the 
exploitative relationship between Britain’s service economy and the immigrants it 
employs is a consequence of left-leaning critics’ discomfort with New Labour’s 
immigration policies and the continued demonisation of immigrants in the British 
tabloid press. Frears’s film thus becomes a platform through which the socially-
                                                 
5 Witness Philip French’s comment in his review for The Observer: “Sneaky, a confident exploiter of 
anyone’s predicament, is involved in the purchase of body parts, kidneys mainly, from the desperately 
poor to the ailing rich. Is this an urban myth? Who knows? It is certainly a metaphor.” Emily S. Davis, 
writing for Camera Obscura, states that Dirty Pretty Things is one of several texts which “uses bodily 
intimacy as a metaphorical language through which to represent contestations of national and 
ideological borders […]” (34, emphasis added). Sarah Gibson’s Third Text article on Dirty Pretty 
Things is noteworthy in that she does manage to read the film without once referring to the organ trade. 
Instead, she continually insists that the film depicts the illegal underworld of the British service 
industry, showing that the British economy is dependent upon the grubby work of invisible, 
undocumented and exploited immigrants. 
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conscious critic can express her views about “essentially domestic political, social and 
cultural concerns (Foster 688, emphasis added). 6   
 Yet there is nothing misplaced in left-wing misgivings about the treatment that 
the British government and the tabloid press reserve for its immigrants: 
 
In Britain at the start of the twenty-first century, the government, state, 
media and public have intertwined in a mutually reinforcing and 
reassuring process to problematise and often stigmatise asylum-seekers. 
It is through [sic] this combination of anti-asylum sentiment finding 
legitimacy from the top down, alongside the sustenance provided by the 
daily press campaign and the encouragement of ordinary people from 
the bottom up, that enabled a poll carried out in 2003 for The Times to 
suggest that the number of asylum-seekers was ‘the most serious 
problem in Britain at present’ (Kushner 261).7 
Following the attack on the World Trade Centre in 2001, the government introduced a 
series of measures to counter the threat of terrorism in Britain. The initiatives, which 
were designed both to deter the entry of new asylum-seekers and to speed up the 
deportation of failed asylum-seekers already in the country, effectively served to 
associate the issue of asylum to that of terrorism (Sales 448). More importantly 
however, the perceived threat of future terrorist attacks in Britain provided a suitable 
political climate in which to introduce legislation that merged discourses of homeland 
security with discourses linking immigration control to welfare control. Thus, amid 
much speculation and controversy that the British government would tighten home 
security by introducing national identity cards to thwart the threat of terrorism, the 
then home secretary David Blunkett announced that while the British government 
                                                 
6 While I cite Kevin Foster in order to make sense of the film’s reviews, Foster makes this comment 
about Dirty Pretty Things itself: “The new migrants, like their Commonwealth forebears, are of interest 
to British filmmakers in so far as they provide a focus for the analysis of essentially domestic political, 
social and cultural concerns” (688). My own view is that Foster’s observation is more productively 
directed to the reviewers of Frears’s film. 
7 Ann Treneman, writing for The Times on November 7 2002, offers similar evidence of the British 
public’s misinformation. Treneman cites a MORI poll which reveals that the surveyed “young people” 
believed that the UK received 31% of the world’s refugees, when the real figure is in fact 1.98%. See 
Anne Treneman, “Promises, promises – why I can’t go home”, Times 2, Nov 7, 2002. 
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would indeed issue identity cards in order to “help the fight against terrorism,” the 
scheme was mainly intended to tackle “illegal immigration, illegal working and 
benefit fraud” (Daily Mail, Sept 25, 2001). Although widespread public protests have 
led to the indefinite postponement of the plan to introduce national identity cards, by 
January 31, 2002, all immigrants planning to claim asylum in Britain were being 
issued with Applicant Registration Cards which the Home Office described as “the 
next stage in our battle to cut down on fraud [read: benefit fraud] and illegal working” 
(“Prejudice feared as asylum-seekers receive ID cards,” The Independent, Feb 1, 
2002). First introduced under a climate of political unease and fear, these government 
measures tied immigration issues to the problems of an overburdened welfare system, 
thereby creating what has now become the dominant framework under which 
immigration and asylum-seeking are discussed in the British public sphere. 
 “Scrounger, sponger, fraudster, robbing the system, burden/strain on resources, 
illegal working, cheap labour, cash in hand, black economy…” These are just some of 
the examples of the venomous language regularly used in the British press to describe 
immigrants and asylum-seekers, according to a 2004 report of the Information Centre 
about Asylum and Refugees in the UK (47). New Labour government ministers hardly 
provide an alternative worth emulating: in November 2002, The Sunday Times 
approvingly cited the home secretary as saying that it was “absolutely crazy that the 
message has got out that if you get here and claim asylum we will support you” (“Its 
easy: a few forms, a tired nod and you beat the asylum barrier,” Sunday Times, Nov 3, 
2002). In 2005, the new Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, stated that “the fairness and 
hospitality of the British people ha[d] been tested” by the influx of immigrants and 
asylum-seekers (cited in Gibson 694, emphasis added). 
 Hospitality. It is around this enigmatic term that the reception of immigrants 
into Britain is increasingly discussed by the press and politicians alike. Can Britain 
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afford to be hospitable to immigrants? Can it afford to provide them with 
accommodation, clothing and money for food? With welfare benefits such as access to 
healthcare and education? Do immigrants have the right to claim a hospitable 
reception in Britain? Does Britain have a duty to hospitably receive immigrants? After 
all, as Conservative MP Kenneth Baker stated in 1995, preempting his New Labour 
counterparts by almost a decade, “The first right of any country is [deciding] who 
should, and should not, have the privilege of living in that country. Britain is a 
sovereign nation, not a hotel” (cited in Gibson 694, emphasis added).   
 Let us give Mr. Baker’s fascinating analogy the attention it deserves. While 
Mr. Baker specifies that the primary right of a sovereign nation is that of extending 
hospitality to those whom it deems appropriate, he makes no such stipulation for the 
rights of the hotel industry. Indeed, he seems to suggest that Britain possesses this 
right to deny hospitality precisely because it is not a hotel. The hotel, unlike a 
sovereign nation, would thus seem not to possess such a right. Mr. Baker is not wrong: 
the space of the hotel provides hospitality under the condition and assumption that the 
guest pays for her accommodation. If this condition is met, he seems to imply, the 
hotel does not have the right to deny the guest its hospitality. The hotel thus differs 
from the nation because the hospitality that it offers is conditional and commodified. 
 Mr. Baker’s comments effectively serve to open up one of the questions with 
which this chapter is primarily preoccupied: commodified hospitality. This is one of 
the rubrics under which I propose that we read Dirty Pretty Things. Given its 
representation of immigrant labour, of sweatshops, of prostitution, and of the 
extraction of human organs in exchange for some form of payment, Dirty Pretty 
Things is rife with examples of the commodification of the human body for its labour, 
services and body parts. However, unlike the reviewers who critique British policies 
on immigration by reading the film’s portrayal of the trafficking in human organs as a 
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metaphorical allusion to the exploitation of immigrant labour, my first claim is that 
understanding the film’s relationship to British debates on asylum and immigration 
requires that we engage with its organ trafficking plot not as a metaphor, but as a 
literal transaction that permits the commodification both of human organs and of 
hospitality.  
 What is so unusual about Dirty Pretty Things is that, unlike most accounts that 
we encounter of the trafficking in human organs, the organ-sellers represented in the 
film exchange their body parts not for cash, but for forged European passports. The 
forgeries are on sale: they can be bought in exchange for a kidney. While swapping a 
kidney for a fake EU passport does not permit the illegal immigrant in Frear’s film to 
become a fully-fledged, legal citizen of the European Union, it does permit the 
immigrant to live in the EU as if she were just such a citizen. What the forged EU 
passports sell, then, is not citizenship, but that which citizenship entitles one to: the 
right to hospitality in the EU. The commodification of organs thus mobilises and is in 
turn mobilised by the commodification of hospitality in, this, its political sense. It is 
hardly an accident, then, that the film’s action transpires primarily in a hotel, that other 
sphere of legitimate commodified hospitality that Mr. Baker so correctly differentiates 
from the nation. 
 Reading the representation of organ trafficking in the film solely as that which 
allows us to explore the commodification of hospitality, however, risks producing an 
interpretation of the film that highlights, once again, only those aspects of the film that 
pertain to “essentially domestic political, social and cultural concerns.” Concerns, that 
is, that seek mainly to situate the film within first-world debates about immigration 
into the first world. Hence my second claim: the focus on the trade in human organs is 
also what moves Dirty Pretty Things to explore capitalism in its current manifestations 
by interrogating its exploitation of the human body not only for its labour-power but 
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also for its body parts, that is, for products which that, in a sense, both precede and 
enable the capacity to labour. 
 
II. “The hotel business is about strangers.” 
When asked to comment on the elusive title of his film, director Stephen Frears  
responded that he did not know what it meant (Frears, Director’s Commentary).  
Disappointing as Frears’s refusal to be more forthcoming may be, I propose, 
nevertheless, to begin my reading of Dirty Pretty Things by focusing on its intriguing, 
even oxymoronic, title.   
 Only at one point in the film are the title’s three signifiers deliberately offered 
up for unpacking. The scene is worth examining in some detail.  It involves an 
interaction between Señor Juan, the manager of London’s Baltic Hotel, and his 
employee Okwe, a man whom we know little about at this point in the film, except 
that he is from somewhere in Africa, and works two jobs: he drives a mini-cab during 
the day, and is the night-time receptionist at the Baltic. Okwe has been informed, by 
Juliette, a prostitute who regularly meets her clients at the Baltic, that there is a 
plumbing problem in room 510. The improbable object blocking the overflowing toilet 
in room 510, Okwe discovers, is a “perfectly healthy” human heart.8 He proceeds to 
seek out his boss and asks him to call the police. If the sight of Okwe standing before 
his employer carrying a human heart in a white plastic bag soiled with blood seems 
fantastic and grotesque, Sr. Juan’s cavalier handling of the situation merely heightens 
our sense of unease: “Police? You think I should call the police?” (DPT, Sr Juan). 
 His tone then changes to a menacing one. “OK. You speak to them. You found 
it; you do the talking. I’ll introduce you.”  As he dials, he proceeds to question Okwe.  
                                                 
8 Okwe, Dirty Pretty Things.  All quotations from Dirty Pretty Things, hereafter abbreviated to DPT, 
will be attributed to the corresponding character.  
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“What is your full name, Okwe? And… you never told me where you are from. Or 
even why you are here, in this beautiful country” (DPT, Sr. Juan). Sensing Okwe’s 
growing discomfort and fear, he hangs up the phone. His smile is triumphant, 
patronising. Taking the bloodied bag from Okwe and dropping it nonchalantly into the 
bin, he now proffers some advice: “You will learn Okwe. The hotel business is about 
strangers. And strangers will always surprise you, you know? They come to hotels at 
night to do dirty things. And in the morning, it is our job to make things look pretty 
again” (DPT, Sr. Juan). 
  It is all too tempting to conclude from Sr. Juan’s words that the film’s title 
alludes to the shady events and undercover dealings – the dirty things – that occur in 
the sordid but immaculate Baltic Hotel, things which most of us will never see because 
those who run the business inevitably make sure that the dirty things are revamped to 
make them look pretty. I want to argue, instead, that Sr. Juan’s words provide a 
hermeneutical device with which to read the film because they frame the title’s three 
signifiers as a problem of transformation. Dirty things, Sr. Juan tells Okwe, must be 
changed to look pretty. This change, moreover, is indispensable: upon it hinges the 
success of the entire hospitality industry. The film, as we shall see, is rife with 
examples of the kind of productive transformations that Sr. Juan advocates. 
 But we are not done with this scene just yet. While it is only Sr. Juan’s final 
words of advice to Okwe that allude directly to the dirty pretty things of the film’s 
title, the covert threats latent in his questions to Okwe contain an implicit reference to 
other dirty pretty things that we must be attentive to.  How come Okwe is in this 
“beautiful country?” Sr. Juan wonders (DPT, emphasis added).  The semantic parallel 
between Sr. Juan’s chosen word and the second signifier of the title is far from 
coincidental. Through it re-emerges Mr. Baker’s attempt to differentiate between the 
sovereign nation and the hotel business. Once more, then, we witness an intriguing 
88 
 
link between the hospitality industry – whose task Sr. Juan claims is to make dirty 
things look pretty again – and the British nation, which, as Sr. Juan’s comment would 
have it, is always and already beautiful, requiring no cleaning up after its guests. Yet 
Okwe’s response of agitated, guilty silence to Sr. Juan’s query serves to call his boss’s 
assumption about “this beautiful country” into question. Okwe’s unease underscores 
our sense that, like the guests visiting the Baltic, his reasons for visiting this beautiful 
country can hardly be ‘clean.’ Indeed, Sr. Juan implies as much when, at he end of 
their encounter, he attempts to bribe Okwe “for his troubles” and is met with rebuff. 
He sneers. “You think if you don’t take the money you are innocent?” (DPT, Sr. Juan). 
 Sr. Juan’s intimidating questions to Okwe thus serve to place the words of the 
film’s title in a different light. The one time that the words of the film’s title occur in 
the screenplay, they do so only after we realise that if Okwe is now in the “beautiful” 
U.K., it is only due to shady, suspect methods that can hardly claim a moral 
superiority over Sr. Juan’s tactics in the hotel business. Strongly hinted at here is what 
we later confirm: Okwe lives in Britain as an undocumented immigrant. And no, he is 
not innocent, even if he refuses Sr. Juan’s money. This scene shows us the first of Sr. 
Juan’s attempts to educate Okwe into the way things work in both the hospitality 
industry and the “beautiful country” they have both chosen to come to. And as we 
shall see, Okwe learns his lesson well. But let me briefly hold off from a detailed 
examination of the thorny question of hospitality in order to take a closer look at the 
equally troubled issue of contemporary capitalism as it is represented in Dirty Pretty 
Things. In order to do this I turn to the film’s proud capitalist, the master of profitable 
makeovers: Sr. Juan.   
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III. “My whole business is based on happiness.” 
Sr. Juan belongs to the new class of entrepreneurs made possible by late capitalism. 
The commodity he proffers to deal in? Happiness. The enterprise? To procure healthy 
kidneys for the ailing wealthy from those desperate enough to “swap their insides for a 
passport” (DPT, Okwe). Not exactly a pretty business. Yet Sr. Juan insists that his 
actions are not predatory, but laudable. After all, he argues, he provides happiness: 
“They sell the kidney for ten grand so I am happy. The person who needs the kidney 
gets cured, so he is happy. The person who sold his kidney gets to stay in this 
beautiful country, so he is happy. My whole business is based on happiness” (DPT, Sr. 
Juan).  Sr. Juan thus emerges as the god-like figure who can provide hope to those 
who have lost it, the man you can trust to make the impossible possible, the man who 
can both prolong your life and provide a passport to happiness. Literally.   
Sr. Juan is the ideologue for a new brand of capitalism, a “millennial 
capitalism” which, as we saw in Chapter 3, “presents itself as a gospel of salvation, 
[that], if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the 
universe of the marginalised and the disenfranchised” (292, emphasis added). The key 
to understanding millennial capitalism lies in the particular brand of seduction upon 
which it operates. According to the Comaroffs this seductiveness is most visibly 
manifested in the unprecedented, global proliferation of what they term “occult 
economies” (310). Occult economies, the Comaroffs claim, are characterised by the 
fact that they all respond to the particular allure of “accruing wealth from nothing” 
(313).9 In other words, occult economies are animated by the same tendency that 
                                                 
9 The Comaroffs cite the trade in live human organs as one example of what they mean by occult 
economies (311).  One could well raise the objection that the decision to sell one’s organ does not 
neatly fall under the label of “accruing wealth from nothing.” However, as I hope will become clearer 
below, this description does apply to organ sales insofar as the Comaroffs are discussing wealth 
accruing actions that do not, strictly speaking, involve the expenditure (or exploitation) of labour-
power. 
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motivates wealth-accruing actions like speculation in stocks and gambling. All these 
acts seek to harness a force which promises to yield huge profits, yet generates 
“wealth without production, value without effort” (313-4). 
Sr. Juan’s lucrative business positions him as the arbiter of one of the many 
burgeoning occult economies rife in capitalism’s millennial moment, an economy 
whose profits arise from a newly emerged commodity: human organs. To Okwe’s 
moral qualms about his dirty dealings, he retorts with his own version of the salvation 
gospel. “So I am an evil man, right? But I am only trying to save her life.” Sr. Juan’s 
claim refers to his next client, an eight-year old girl whose parents have brought her 
from Saudi Arabia to London “hoping for a miracle” (DPT, Sr. Juan). A miracle Sr. 
Juan is more than willing to perform… for a profit.    
 When recast in the light of his cleansing rhetoric, Sr. Juan’s dirty, illicit 
dealings in the trade of organs for fake EU passports emerge as a polished, pretty 
combination of profitable altruism and a miraculous remedy for illness and illicitness 
alike. But to stop at this neat equation would be to ignore that Sr. Juan’s dirty trade, is 
precisely that, a trade. And like any tradesman, he deals in those “very strange things” 
also known as commodities (Marx 163, emphasis added).  Which brings us to the 
signifier in the film’s title that I have hitherto paid little attention to, the one, I 
contend, that allows us to read the commodification of human bodies permitted by late 
capitalism together with the commodification of hospitality that the Baltic Hotel 
repeatedly points us to. First, however, let us try to trace a relationship between the 
dirty pretty things in the film’s title and the “things” that Sr. Juan trades in.   
 
IV. “Because you are poor you will be gutted like an animal.” 
The commodity, Marx has taught us, insists upon some form of objectification. In the 
commodity, people and their labour are transformed into “an object of economic 
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desire,” (Sharp 293). An object of desire, because, if exchanged, the commodity will 
satisfy a particular human need. An object of economic desire, because the need can 
only be met through an exchange of money, the universal equivalent with which all 
commodities can be acquired. So, what exactly is it about the kidney that makes it a 
viable candidate for commodity status, a coveted object of economic desire? As the 
work of anthropologists Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Lawrence Cohen has shown, the 
transaction in human organs transforms the kidney into a life-saving commodity. For 
both the buyer and the seller, the kidney-as-commodity harbours the possibility of 
satisfying what Nancy Scheper-Hughes terms “the most basic of human desires: the 
desire for life” (Scheper-Hughes 51).10 
It is precisely the fulfilment of this “desire for life,” claims Sr. Juan, that his 
business is designed to enable. Yet the self-aggrandising portrayal he offers of his 
dealings simultaneously recognises that the “life” he metes out to his kidney-buying-
clients is by no means equivalent to the “life” he offers to his kidney-selling-clients. 
The former, he says, “get cured” (DPT, Sr. Juan). They live; they are saved from 
death. The latter, on the other hand, “get to stay in this beautiful country,” [ibid]. They 
gain a passport which confers the right to live…in the EU.   
The distinction made by Sr. Juan corresponds to Giorgio Agamben’s 
distinction in his work Homo Sacer, between zoē, the simple fact of living common to 
all living beings, and bios, a form of living proper to an individual who legitimately 
                                                 
10 I have opted, for the purposes of my argument, not to quote Scheper-Hughes in full here.  The full 
quote, which reads, “the desire for life, vitality and élan,” refers principally to the desires of the ailing 
kidney-buyer rather than to the principally economic concerns of the kidney-seller. As such, it unsettles 
the idea, fallacious though it may indeed be, that I wish to present above: namely, that the transaction 
serves equally to satisfy the needs of both kidney-buyer and kidney-seller. I pursue this point at length 
below. 
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inhabits a given sphere of political governance or polis. Zoē thus refers to the sheer 
fact of being alive; bios to the right of living within a given political order.11   
The secret to the kidney’s commodity status resides in both the co-existence of 
zoē and bios and the disjunction between them. The same applies to Sr. Juan business. 
Indeed, we can locate its rentability in the fact that Sr. Juan appears to have discovered 
that he can make a hefty profit while catering to the needs of two very different groups 
of people, people whose economic circumstances may vary, yet who are nevertheless 
united in the fact that they are “bioavailable.”  
Bioavailablity, Lawrence Cohen has argued in the context of his work on 
kidney transplants, is an ontological condition made possible both by technical 
progress in the medical field, and the advent of late capitalism. Cohen develops his 
notion of bioavailability with reference primarily to the kidney-seller, who “is hailed 
through nephrectomy – the extraction of a kidney – as a bioavailable source of newly 
scarce tissue for the often financially better-off but dying” (Cohen, “Operability” 171). 
While acknowledging my debt to this concept, I contend that when considering the 
commodity status of the kidney, as I am attempting to do here, the concept of 
bioavailability must be extended to include the kidney-buyer, precisely because she is 
financially better off but dying. 12 Once exchanged, then, the kidney extends the zoē of 
its bioavailable-because-ailing buyer, and ascribes bios to its bioavailable-because-
disenfranchised seller.   
                                                 
11 Agamben himself ascribes these terms to zoē and bios respectively. Witness his claim that in modern 
politics, read, politics after the Holocaust, “bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone of irreducible 
distinction” (8, emphasis added).   
12 The same can be said of Agamben’s point on the signifier ‘people.’ “What we call ‘people,’” he says, 
“[is] in reality not a unitary subject, but a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one 
hand, the set of People as a whole political body, and on the other, the subset of the people as a 
fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies” (177).  My point, again, is that when 
considering the kidney-as-commodity, the second group of people (small p) that Agamben alludes to, 
the people comprised by a group of “needy and excluded bodies,” comes to include both the wealthy 
and the poor, thus creating what Agamben himself has termed, “a zone of irreducible indistinction” (9).  
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Paradoxically, the mobilisation of “life” in these two senses that the exchange 
of the kidney permits is precisely what calls the “thing” status of the kidney into 
question. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes has suggested, there is something profoundly 
problematic about reducing “a living and strangely animate kidney” to a mere object 
(52). Marx’s discourse on the nature of commodities allows us to establish that the 
kidney is a commodity: like other commodities, its exchange serves to satisfy certain 
needs. However, in this age of millennial capitalism where “there is no limit to the 
commodity candidacy of things” (Appadurai 2) his discourse sheds little light on the 
peculiar transformations that the exchange of this particular commodity enables. 
Transformations, these, that occur precisely because the kidney-as-commodity is no 
ordinary, lifeless object.   
Sr. Juan’s enterprise shows that the kidney’s indistinctive status as not-quite-a-
thing is what lends it its literally life-transforming quality. Within the plot of the film, 
I want to argue, the secret to the kidney’s commodity status resides in its ability to 
mobilise both zoē and bios. Thanks to the organ transaction, the undocumented 
immigrant acquires the possibility of transcending that condition because she obtains a 
literal passport into the sphere of bios. And she acquires that possibility because the 
new owner of her extracted kidney is able to extend her own zoē and transcend her 
infirm condition. 
  
V. “He is English now.” 
When Okwe asks the wife of a Somali kidney-seller what he obtained in return for his 
organ, she replies simply, “He is English now” (DPT, emphasis added). The third 
world individual who resorts to selling her organ is represented in Dirty Pretty Things 
as a person who is lured not by millennial capitalism’s promise of sudden wealth, but 
by the millennial promise of undergoing an overnight transformation that will change 
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her from an undesirable, undocumented immigrant in an otherwise “beautiful country” 
into a person welcomed into the first-world thanks to her rights-conferring passport.13 
The film thus confronts us with a chilling solution to the calamity of being 
deprived of the rights of citizenship that Hannah Arendt discusses in her essay “The 
Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.” “The conception of 
human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such,” Arendt 
states, “broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it 
were for the first time confronted with people who had lost all other qualities and 
specific relationships – except that they were still human” (Arendt, 179). Arendt 
argues that in a world comprised of sovereign nation-states, the so-called inalienable 
rights of man reveal themselves to lack any reality if they do not take the form of 
rights belonging to the citizen of a state. The people who have lost their place within a 
given political community are left with nothing except “the abstract nakedness of 
being human” (ibid). “[Their] general human condition […] [is that] they have lost all 
those parts of the world and all those aspects of human existence which are the result 
of our common labour, the outcome of the human artifice” (180).14 “[T]hese rightless 
people,” Arendt concludes, “are indeed thrown back into a peculiar state of nature.”  
 If Dirty Pretty Things offers a different perspective on the organ trade from the 
one that we are accustomed to, it is because it confronts us with the possibility that 
even the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human, the condition that Arendt 
                                                 
13 Within the logic of the film, the EU passport, by providing the illegal immigrant with the rights to 
reside in Europe, seems to contribute to the discourse of transformation and beautification that 
underpins Sr. Juan’s advice to Okwe early in the film. Like the labour of those who clean up after the 
guests in the Baltic, the forged passport cleans Britain of its illegal immigrants, rendering the nation 
into a beautiful space that welcomes and trumpets its multiculturalism. The fact that the passports are 
acquired in exchange for a kidney makes for an interesting parallel with the role of the kidney in the 
human body: the kidney filters waste (read: undesirable elements?) from the blood (read: nation?) in 
order to excrete (read: deport?) them from the body. 
14 Arendt’s terminology here shows that she had yet to develop her distinction between labour and 
work. “The Decline of the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man” was written in 1951, seven 
years prior to the publication of The Human Condition. 
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defines as “mere existence,” can now become an exchangeable commodity. Dirty 
Pretty Things invites us to examine a disturbing paradox: namely, that the rightless 
people thrown back into a peculiar state of nature, use this very state of nature as the 
ultimate collateral with which to regain their rights. Reduced to mere existence, the 
rightless part with an object that is not the outcome of the human capacity to create 
artificial objects but rather with the object that is required to mobilise this capacity, an 
object they have learnt to see as a naturally occurring ‘surplus’: the spare organ that 
will endow them with all the rights pertaining to European Union citizenship.   
But Dirty Pretty Things raises equally, if not more troubling questions about 
the commodity that illegal immigrants receive for their organ: a forged EU passport. It 
is the question that I have hitherto being postponing: what kind of rights have the 
rightless exchanged their organs for when the passports they receive are not only 
forgeries but those “very queer things”, commodities, acquirable in exchange for a 
kidney? I contend that we can only begin to answer this question by focusing on the 
discourse of rights that both Agamben and Arendt introduce in their respective 
arguments. The language of human rights brings us directly back to questions of 
hospitality, a hospitality understood, that is, as the rules of conduct governing the 
arrival of a guest or stranger into one’s home. In a lecture delivered in Istanbul in 
1997, Jacques Derrida rereads Kant’s oft-quoted essay “Perpetual Peace” in order to 
glean what insights this text might have to offer for debates on hospitality. In this 
lecture, Derrida describes hospitality as a human right (Derrida 1997a 4). In the 
context of human rights, Derrida continues, “hospitality means the right of a stranger 
not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory.” 
The gesture of linking hospitality to the concept of human rights, serves to link 
Derrida’s understanding of hospitality to Hannah Arendt’s. While Agamben speaks of 
the sphere of rights only to remind us that we all live as citizens of a given political 
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community, Arendt and Derrida pick up where Agamben leaves off in order to explore 
what happens to a person’s human rights once they become strangers, that is, once 
they are displaced from their countries of origin and arrive in another.  
 Once this happens, says Derrida, the ethical imperative, “the law of 
hospitality” requires that we offer the new arrival “an unconditional welcome” by: 
 
say[ing] yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before 
any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do 
with a foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected 
visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, 
a human, animal, or divine creature, a living or dead thing, male or 
female (2000 77). 
I read Arendt as appealing to this same unconditional hospitality in her analysis of 
how the peoples displaced by World War I were received by other nation-states. 
However, as she and Derrida are well aware, this human right to be unconditionally 
welcomed, a right emerging from the ethical imperative that is unconditional 
hospitality, can hardly be put into practice in a world that is governed by sovereign 
nation-states. For this human right clashes – let us not forget Mr. Kenneth Baker here 
– with the primary right of the sovereign nation to decide upon whom it admits within 
its confines. Thus, says Derrida: 
 
A cultural or linguistic community, a family, a nation, cannot not 
suspend, at the least, even betray this principle of absolute hospitality: 
to protect a ‘home’, without doubt, by guaranteeing property and what 
is ‘proper’ to itself against the unlimited arrival of the other; but also to 
render the welcome effective, determined, concrete, to put it into 
practice. Whence the ‘conditions’ which transform the gift into a 
contract, the opening into a policed pact; whence the rights and the 
duties, the borders, passports and doors, whence the immigration laws, 
since immigration must, it is said, be ‘controlled’(1997b 6).15 
                                                 
15 In his Istambul lecture, Derrida explains the difference between unconditional (or absolute) 
hospitality and conditional hospitality using slightly different terms. The difference between the two, he 
says, “is the difference, the gap, between the hospitality of invitation and the hospitality of visitation. In 
visitation there is no door. Anyone can come at any time and can come in without needing a key for the 
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Sr. Juan’s role in Dirty Pretty Things is thus to provide illegal immigrants with 
the thing, the document, that will permit them to reside in the EU as if they had been 
the recipients of EU hospitality. To the perturbing possibility that one can regain one’s 
rights by commoditizing the only thing that one is left with, one’s body part, Dirty 
Pretty Things presents us with the horrifying vision of a world in which there is no 
such thing as the ethical imperative of unconditional hospitality. In Dirty Pretty 
Things, Mr. Baker’s distinction between hotels and sovereign nation-states collapses. 
Here, all hospitality is made conditional, not through the right of the nation-state to 
deny hospitality, but through commodification: the right to hospitality conferred by 
the passport, like the right to hospitality conferred by the hotel room, is for sale.16 
 
VI. “If you were just some African, the deal would be simple.” 
In Dirty Pretty Things, the kidney-as-commodity seems to be that which lends truth to 
Agamben’s sweeping if sobering claim that “today’s democratico-capitalist project 
[…] transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare-life” (180). If we 
recall that by bare life Agamben means “that zone of indistinction and continuous 
transition between man and beast, nature and culture” (109), then the film is indeed 
littered with illegal Third World immigrants who might justify an allegorical reading 
that substantiates Agamben’s claim. But this neat interpretation is upset by the film’s 
determined attempt to ensure that its two main immigrant characters, Senay and 
                                                                                                                                            
door. There are no custom checks with a visitation. But there are customs and police checks with an 
invitation” (1997a 14). 
16 As Derrida points out, the realm of unconditional hospitality is the realm of the gift. Where the 
conditional hospitality of nation-states transforms the gift of hospitality into a contract, hospitality as it 
is figured in Dirty Pretty Things belongs in the realm of the commodity. The dichotomy between 
hospitality-as-gift and hospitality-as-commodity aptly mirrors contemporary debates on the ethics of 
organ transplanting: should organ donation remain within the altruistic domain of the gift, or should we 
legalise a market in human organs and thereby commodify them? 
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Okwe, transcend the predicament envisaged by Agamben’s apocalyptic claim. What 
solution, then, does Dirty Pretty Things propose for our two immigrant characters? 
Let us first turn to the film’s protagonist, Okwe. Upon making inquiries of his 
colleagues in the organ trafficking ring, Sr. Juan discovers that Okwe is a trained 
doctor from Nigeria. He then seeks out Okwe putting a proposal before him.“If you 
were just some African,” he says, “the deal would be simple.” Sr. Juan’s wily 
observation thus recognises what Agamben’s ominous assertion about the third world 
ignores: class. Though forced by his illegal status to work as a night-time receptionist 
and a cab-driver, Okwe is in fact a doctor. Okwe’s professional training does not 
exempt him from the contempt that Sr. Juan reserves for all the undocumented 
immigrants who rely on him to “swap their insides for a passport.” But it does place 
him in a privileged position: he has more to offer than his bare-life. For Okwe is not 
just some African. For these, the deal is simple: “You give me your kidney, and I give 
you a new identity” (DPT, Sr. Juan).  For Dr. Okwe, however, Sr. Juan has a better 
idea. He proposes that they become business partners, Okwe handling the surgical 
extraction of the kidney, and Sr. Juan its safe delivery and the procurement of 
passports. If Okwe agrees to this deal, he will get much more out of it than “some 
African.” Sr. Juan promises him not just a passport for himself, but one for Senay, the 
woman he loves. In addition, given that unlike his fellow undocumented immigrants, 
Okwe will be expending his labour-power, Sr. Juan offers him ₤3000 for every 
operation he performs.   
 But Okwe insists that he does not want to get involved. Throughout the film, 
he remains an exceptional figure in the ruthless London that he inhabits, exceptional 
because he insists upon upholding his moral principles.17 Where Sr. Juan sees the 
                                                 
17 Okwe is also exceptional in that he is the only character who is given a history. We know his story, 
his reasons for leaving Nigeria. Perhaps this history is what allows his character to overcome the 
somewhat clichéd representation that the film reserves for all its other immigrant characters. Okwe’s 
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promise of happiness, Okwe sees “the age of unhappiness, an age of nervous 
exhaustion, greediness and desire, in which no one is proof against foolishness; [an 
age in which] farce cohabits with buffoonery, caprice with brutality, […] [where] 
death itself is repulsive” (Mbembe 238, emphasis added).  And in this age of 
unhappiness, Okwe is the doctor-cum-working-class-hero, whose self-appointed role 
becomes, as he himself announces to us in the film’s opening scene, to “rescue those 
who have been let down by the system.”    
 And rescue them he does. We first meet Okwe loitering in one of London’s 
airports. Two recently arrived men look around, bemused, searching out the person 
who was meant to pick them up. The person has failed to show up, but Okwe, in his 
cab-driver’s guise, takes them to their destination. Okwe the night-time receptionist at 
the Baltic, rescues Juliette, the prostitute who frequently meets her clients at the hotel, 
from being physically attacked by an aggressive customer. Knowing that Senay will 
get into trouble if the immigration authorities find out she is working illegally, he 
stops her from clocking in along with the other maids at the Baltic as the two law-
enforcement agents scrutinise the faces of every other maid, eager to find Senay 
among them. And, of course, there are the rescue-missions of Okwe the doctor, who 
helps his fellow cab-drivers by illegally procuring antibiotics for their gonorrhoea, and 
saves a Somali man from the potentially lethal operation wound caused by the 
extraction of his kidney under Sr. Juan’s supervision. And true to the gallant nature of 
any hero worthy of the epithet, Okwe refuses to charge for his many services. 
                                                                                                                                            
friend, the Chinese refugee Guo-Yi, for example, is represented as being a cynical Buddhist and a keen 
chess player. One scene of the film shows us a distressed Senay who plays loud Middle Eastern music 
as she whirls around her apartment like a dervish. Perhaps the most clichéd portrayal of all, however, is 
that of Sr. Juan, the evil Spaniard. In “Why Spaniards Make Good Bad Guys: Sergi Lopez and the 
Persistence of the Black Legend in Contemporary European Cinema”, Samuel Amago asks the very 
pertinent question: why does Dirty Pretty Things continually point to the bad guy’s Spanishness? I take 
up Amago’s question, and the interesting response he offers, below. 
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 Okwe’s exceptionality is signalled to not only because of the stark contrast he 
poses to Sr. Juan, but because he emerges as the only figure who vehemently refuses 
to be seduced by the brand of happiness that Sr. Juan proffers to his clients. Thus, 
Okwe’s close friend Guo Yi, who works in a mortuary, attempts to talk him out of his 
moral illusions. When a kidney is worth ₤10,000, he argues, it is understandable that 
people should want to sell their kidneys. “For ten grand people take risks. If I had the 
courage, I’d sell my kidney, just so I could get out of here” (DPT, Guo Yi).  
Ultimately, and despite Okwe’s disapproval, even Senay turns to Sr. Juan to sell her 
kidney. But it is not only Okwe’s unflinching refusal to participate in Sr. Juan’s occult 
economy that sets him apart. Okwe is also one of the few men in the film whose 
relationship to women is not predicated upon some form of sexual exchange. 
 
VII. “I can’t believe Okwe didn’t fuck you!” 
A disappointed British viewer of the film might well agree with Sr. Juan’s remark to 
Senay upon finding out that she was a virgin before he raped her. The UK edition of 
the film’s release on DVD shows a close-up photograph of the black man and the 
white woman who play the film’s main characters, Chiwetel Ejiofor and Audrey 
Tatou. On the left, Ejiofor stares defiantly into the camera, his arm wrapped 
protectively, possessively, around Tatou’s neck. Tatou looks up into the distance, her 
hand resting on his arm. Above them, we read the words of the film’s title in clean, 
white font: Dirty Pretty Things. The image occurs nowhere in the film, and is probably 
a promotional photograph taken to cash in on the rather problematic sexual 
innuendoes that the title lends itself to.    
But any possible expectations about dirty pretty sex between the black man 
and the white woman that the consumer might expect from this photograph will be 
met with disappointment. Okwe and Senay’s relationship remains strictly platonic. 
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They share an apartment, but Okwe sleeps on the couch even when Senay is away and 
her bed empty. Courteous and caring, Okwe cooks for her, protects her, even enlists 
the help of Juliette, the damsel-whore whom he once rescued from an aggressive 
client, to supply Senay with a morning-after pill when he finds out that Sr. Juan has 
raped her. Yet rape, as we shall see, becomes a problematic term to use in the web of 
interpersonal relationships between men and women that the film depicts.   
With the exception of Okwe and Guo Yi, all men’s encounters with women are 
shown to be not only sexual but contractual in nature. Okwe’s male co-workers all 
visit prostitutes. It is from one such “popular lady” (DPT, Okwe) that Okwe’s fellow 
cabbies contract gonorrhoea. Ivan, the Russian doorman at the Baltic, reserves a slot in 
the busy schedule of prostitute Juliette on every payday. And when not directly related 
to prostitution, the film presents sex as a service performed not for money but for 
some alternative form of compensation. This is the case of Senay, whose informal 
contract with her Asian boss entails that she not only labour in his sweatshop, but 
regularly “suck” him so that he does not inform the immigration authorities that she is 
working there illegally, (DPT, Senay).   
By portraying sex in such a light Dirty Pretty Things juxtaposes what is known 
as “the oldest profession” with a decidedly new economy: the trade in human organs. 
Nowhere is this more clearly evidenced that in the scene where Senay loses her 
virginity to Sr. Juan.  Room 510. Senay gets ready for the kidney-extraction operation. 
She is freshly bathed and enveloped in an appropriately white, virginal bathrobe when 
Sr. Juan comes in with the paperwork for her soon-to-be-issued fake Italian passport. 
Having established what her new Italian name will be, Sr. Juan moves closer to Senay 
and attempts to undo her robe. When Senay refuses to submit to his sexual advances 
Sr. Juan laughs at what he sees as their unwitting parody of horny husband and 
disinterested wife arguing over their fraught sexual rights under a marriage contract. 
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“Listen to me,” he says. “I am arguing with you like you are my fucking wife!” (DPT, 
Sr. Juan). His point, of course, is that theirs is a different kind of contract, subject to 
different rules. Under this contract, Senay’s robe becomes “what the Americans call a 
‘deal-breaker’” (ibid). The deal Sr. Juan proposes to her consists of not one, but two 
causally linked deals. In order to be coded as a seller of her commodity-kidney, Senay 
must in fact agree to the prior sale/surrender of a second commodity she intrinsically 
yet accidentally possesses: the possibility her body holds of satisfying Sr. Juan’s 
sexual desire.18 Those are the terms, says Sr. Juan. “Take it or leave it” (ibid). Senay 
chooses: she takes it. If rape is defined as sexual intercourse into which one is forced 
against one’s will, what name do we give to what Sr. Juan does to Senay? The 
unlikely pairing of Senay the (no-longer) virgin and Juliette the whore, who later bond 
in the bathroom over a morning-after pill and a joint, thus serves to underscore this 
very question. Are this virgin’s actions any different from the whore’s? 
 Senay’s personal tragedy, in fact, resembles the clichéd and unfortunate irony 
of the prostitute’s lot in love: the man she is in love with is the one man she does not 
sleep with. If we fast forward to the film’s conclusion, which takes us back to the 
airport in which it began, we see the only romantic moment that Senay and Okwe 
share. Senay is about to go through customs. Before leaving Okwe’s sight, possibly 
never to see him again, she mouths, “I love you” (DPT, Senay). Okwe responds by 
mouthing “I love you” back. But is there any room for love in this world of rampant 
commodification that Dirty Pretty Things lays before us, where the promise of sexual 
gratification is a commodity like any other, where sex is a “dirty thing” that occurs in 
sweatshops, hotel rooms and basements, infecting men and women with STDs? How 
                                                 
18 I deliberately use the somewhat contradictory formulation “sale/surrender” here because the terms of 
Sr. Juan’s deal validate the usage of both terms. Senay surrenders her body to Sr. Juan because in one 
sense she gets no extra form of compensation for it, economic or otherwise. Yet in another sense, she in 
fact sells it, for she thereby ensures the completion of the second transaction, that of her kidney, for 
which she will be compensated.   
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to factor love into a film that portrays the age of millennial capitalism, where sexuality 
harbours the spectre of AIDS and stands, “metonymically, for the inchoate forces that 
threaten the world” (Comaroff and Comaroff 305), where sexual intercourse is figured 
as a transaction in which affect is reduced to a singular, ironic signifier – a prostitute 
named Juliette?   
The film’s solution, I contend, is to transform love. Love here is pretty and 
pristine insofar as it is an emotion that transcends an economy of transactions; in this 
world rife with dirty pretty things, love can be pretty only when it leads to no physical 
consummation, hence no gratification. To be defined as such, it seems, love must 
exceed the circuit of transactions to which all else is subjected. And to do so, it must 
remain platonic. “I can’t believe Okwe didn’t fuck you,” we might say along with Sr. 
Juan and our hypothetical dissatisfied consumer, albeit for substantially different 
reasons. Yet, as we shall see, the film counters this potential disappointment with 
another, more satisfying plot twist. 
 
VIII. “So…You are human, Okwe?” 
Rewind back to room 510. Now that she has fulfilled all the terms of her contract with 
Sr Juan, Senay’s operation awaits. And it is an operation to be performed by none 
other than the man who loves her, the man who will not allow Sr. Juan to “butcher 
her”: Okwe. Sr. Juan’s gleeful reaction upon hearing the news is to proclaim that 
Okwe is human, after all. His love for Senay reveals a weakness, a human weakness, 
for which he is willing put his moral scruples on hold. An act of love his decision may 
indeed be. But, if he is going to get involved in Sr. Juan’s business, albeit to protect 
Senay, why let his rescue mission go unrewarded? Operating on Senay requires his 
skills as a doctor. And so, Okwe demands compensation for his labour. In return for 
his services, Okwe too wants a passport, “a new identity” (DPT, Okwe). Yes, the 
104 
 
hitherto morally upright hero is human after all. As human as Sr. Juan, as human as Sr. 
Juan’s clients, buyers and sellers both. Human because he, too, feels the sense of 
despair “that comes from being left out of the promise of prosperity, from having to 
look in on the global economy of desire from its immiserated exteriors” (Comaroff 
and Comaroff 315). Human, in short, because he can no longer afford to play the hero. 
 Or can he? We soon realise that it is not Senay’s kidney, but Sr. Juan’s that 
Okwe plans to extract. Once again, Okwe emerges as a heroic figure who, though not 
able to save his distressed damsel from sexual exploitation, can at least save her from 
nephrectomy. And he can afford to do this precisely because of his social class. He can 
afford, in other words, to love Senay.19 Being a doctor endows him with the power to 
bargain with his skilled labour rather than his bare-life; it allows him to negotiate 
himself into a position from which he can set up a ‘kidney-swap.’ And, most 
importantly, it allows him to save Senay. 
 A hero, yes. But now a more human one, whose deeds require of him that he 
play the villain’s game. A compromised hero who stands to gain from his acts of 
heroism. A hero who saves his beloved by engaging in the very act that he has hitherto 
looked down upon as immoral. It is to the acts of just such a hero that we must turn to 
in order to expose the film’s most seductive and satisfying proposition, the one which 
promises us that Senay and Okwe have successfully avoided being reduced to a bank 
of spare body-parts.   
 
 
                                                 
19 In his article “The Other Kidney,” Lawrence Cohen argues that thanks to immunosuppression drugs 
such as cyclosporine, the kidney-purchaser is able to frame his decision to buy a kidney in terms of love 
for her family, from whom she need no longer ask for a kidney donation. Thanks to cyclosporine, “love, 
if one can afford it, means never having to ask for or to sacrifice family flesh” (Cohen 19). I contend 
that in Dirty Pretty Things love also emerges as an emotion which one can afford, if not in strictly 
economic terms, then, as Okwe’s case shows, in terms of one’s social status and upward mobility. 
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IX. “We are the people you do not see.” 
After Okwe has extracted Sr. Juan’s kidney, he heads down to the hotel’s parking lot. 
In his hands, a styrofoam box containing the organ. On either side of him, the virgin 
and the whore. A well-dressed, white Englishman emerges from a black car to greet 
them. He takes the box, and gives them a suitcase containing, we presume, a 
substantial amount of cash. But he is curious. Who are these people? How come he 
has never seen then before?  It is Okwe’s cue. “Because we are the people you do not 
see,” he retorts. “We are the ones who drive your cabs. We clean your rooms. And 
suck your cocks” (DPT, Okwe).   
 It is a seemingly beautiful moment, the culmination of the thriller-fable that is 
Dirty Pretty Things. It is the instant in which the revenge of the invisible people is 
crystallized, the instant in which an insalubrious trinity comprised of recently-virgin-
maids, doctor-cabbies and cock-sucking-whores delivers justice upon the people 
whom they serve, the people who never see them. It is an instant rendered all the more 
beautiful because this justice, delivered in the form of Sr. Juan’s kidney, is itself, like 
its deliverers, invisible. For unlike us, the audience, our bemused Englishman is not 
privy to the full meaning behind Okwe’s words.   
 Spoken in the name of all the invisible people, Okwe’s words proclaim justice, 
the ultimate triumph of the downtrodden people who have successfully directed their 
“communal action […] against those who ply the immoral economy” (Comaroff and 
Comaroff 326). But this is no ordinary proclamation of justice, no legally declared 
punishment on Sr. Juan’s vile actions. This is the triumph of “informal justice,” where 
state institutions are completely by-passed; it is a justice meted out by the 
compromised hero who takes justice into his own hands “in the millennial hope of 
restoring coherence and control in a world run amok” (Comaroff and Comaroff 326). 
Justice, because this community plies the immoral economy for ultimately moral ends. 
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And by so doing it succeeds in using the dirty means of the exploiter for infinitely 
prettier things than economic profit. Prettier things, more human(e) things: a passport 
with which to travel to New York and pursue the American dream, a much needed 
new identity with which to go back to one’s motherless daughter, and, of course, the 
sweet taste of revenge that comes from knowing that one has given the villain a taste 
of his own medicine.   
 But who is this villain? A closer look at him, I want to suggest, reveals that it 
is not only Okwe’s actions that are morally compromised, but the film’s narrative too. 
Frears’s film squarely blames the “historically cruel, licentious, rapacious Spaniard”, 
himself an immigrant, for the exploitation of the film’s non-Western immigrants 
(Amago, 58).  The film takes explicit care to point out that the primary exploiter of 
undocumented immigrants is not English. Thus, as Amago points out, the supposed 
solidarity of the “invisible people” that this scene portrays is undercut by the 
“symbolic equation” latent in the fact that the organ that Okwe, Senay and Juliette sell 
belongs not only to the film’s villain but to someone who is himself an immigrant 
(Amago 59). In a narrative where there are no English exploiters to blame, British 
reviewers’ attempts to read the film as a critique of the British exploitation of illegal 
immigrants emerge at best as ironic, and at worst, as profoundly narcissistic. 
 
X. Who wants to be a millionaire? 
Capitalism in its millennial manifestations finds a succinct representation in Dirty 
Pretty Things. It is, as we have seen, a horrific capitalism, in which bare life itself is 
susceptible to consumption and hence commodification. Yet it is simultaneously a 
seductive capitalism, a capitalism whose immoral and dirty means of generating 
wealth can, if rightly harnessed, transform the bleak universe of the disenfranchised 
into a place that is infinitely prettier: a place where one can aspire to happiness, a 
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happiness definable, of course, both according to Sr. Juan’s dubious parameters, and 
to the more poignant concerns of Okwe and Senay. Indeed, one can read Dirty Pretty 
Things as a narrative which shows that the promise of millennial capitalism lies 
precisely in the possibility of transforming our definition of happiness from that of Sr. 
Juan to that of his once-victims. And herein, precisely, lies the key to the narrative 
pleasure that the film is able to provide. For it is by depicting this transformative 
process, wherein happiness derives its meaning not from plying the immoral economy, 
but from that most fundamental of hopes, the aspiration to “a meaningful social 
existence,” that the film is able to make its own brand of seductive, and perhaps 
horrific, promises. 
I want to suggest that in the space of its 97 minute running time, the film 
unravels a narrative in which the fantasy of those of us on the political left is realized. 
This narrative weaves a world in which there are no human-rights lawyers, no 
committed sympathizers to the cause of the disenfranchised, no believers, in other 
words, in the ethical imperative of unconditional hospitality. But we do not need them. 
For in this world, the invisible people take it upon themselves to act; they form an 
ephemeral, briefly visible political alliance in which differences of gender, nationality 
and class are forgotten in the interests of a common goal. Senay, Juliette, Guo Yi and 
Okwe form a tiny multitude-in-singularity, a parallel non-civil society which succeeds 
in revealing the failings of global capitalism. It does so, however, by plying the 
seductive facet of capitalism, its promise that a wily wielding of its mechanisms can 
lead to overnight transformation. And it is precisely this seductive facet of capitalism 
that the film itself harnesses in order to provide a short-cut to our fantasies of an end to 
exploitation. A scathing critique of millennial capitalism Dirty Pretty Things may 
indeed be, yet in affording us the enchanting, seductive and fantastic pleasure of 
witnessing the fulfillment of our own aspirations to see a ‘revolution’ of the kind that 
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will put an end to the grotesque injustices of global capitalism, the film is a cultural 
product of this very millennial capitalism. And we, the audience who derive pleasure 
from the fantasy, complicit victims of that same seductive capitalism that we seek to 
critique.   
  A final word on the making of Dirty Pretty Things is perhaps in order here. 
Stephen Knight, the screenplay writer of the film, is known, among other things, for 
having scripted a game-show into whose name are condensed all the seductive 
promises that millennial capitalism makes to those of us who live under its reign: Who 
wants to be a millionaire? After watching Dirty Pretty Things, a more fitting question 
to ask, it seems, is: who doesn’t? 
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Chapter 4 
UNDEFERRABLE DONATIONS: KAZUO ISHIGURO’S NEVER LET ME GO 
I. Departures and Exceptions 
Volo ut sis (I want you to be). 
 
Saint Augustine, cited in Hannah Arendt’s “The Decline of the Nation-State and the 
End of the Rights of Man.” 
 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s 2005 novel Never Let Me Go is a departure. A departure, firstly, 
from Ishiguro’s own thematic concerns. For Never Let Me Go invites, not 
unproblematically, as we shall shortly see, the label of science fiction, which sits 
somewhat jarringly with Ishiguro’s reputation as a master depicter of human 
psychology. Narrated in the first person by thirty-one year old Kathy H, the novel 
consists of Kathy’s reminiscences about her youth and the love triangle that develops 
between her two closest friends, Ruth and Tommy, and herself. It is a story shaped by 
the training process they all undergo as young students, and Kathy fastidiously recalls 
their teachers, or “guardians,” as she refers to them, who provided an education 
consisting primarily of classes that urged them to create works of art, poetry and 
literary critical essays. She explains how, with Ruth and Tommy’s help, she 
unravelled the mystery behind this puzzling emphasis on creativity, and wonders just 
when she and her fellow students first became aware of “how [they] were brought into 
the world and why” (36). When was it, she muses, that she and her fellow students 
first realised that they were clones? When did they finally come to accept that their 
sole reason for existing was to supply organs for the rest of society, until, their bodies 
being exhausted of useful parts, they were left to “complete”? 
111 
 
But the novel is also a departure, secondly, from the texts I have discussed in 
both my previous chapters, not only because this text – a novel – lacks a visual 
dimension to it, but because, equally importantly, we are dealing here with a world in 
which the choice to part with one’s organs, much as this concept is problematised in 
Harvest and Dirty Pretty Things, is, in this novel, not an issue. This is deliberately so, 
for Never Let Me Go asks us to think through a different set of questions. These 
questions come from a text that uses the conventions of science-fiction only to warp 
them, creating an idiosyncratic genre not absolutely without relation to the rules of 
science-fiction. To the extent, however, that science-fiction, as Hannah Arendt has 
noted, articulates and interrogates the “the mass sentiments and mass desires” to which 
scientific achievements give rise, we can tentatively place Never Let Me Go within 
this category (2). We can assert also that the organ providers in the novel are best 
described with this non-committal term: “providers.” Unlike the two other texts I 
consider in previous chapters, the organ here is not a commodity to be exchanged. 
Neither is it a gifted object of altruistic donation. Special citizens whose role in society 
is to provide vital organs for the ill and dying, the protagonists of this novel exist, 
quite simply and horrifically, only for this purpose.  
This chapter seeks to make sense of this double departure by exploring three 
salient markers of exceptionality that occur in Never Let Me Go. Admittedly, I use the 
term ‘exceptionality’ somewhat flexibly. While I hope my usage of the term will 
become clearer shortly, if pressed for a definition, I would describe it as an unsettling 
quality that repeatedly interrupts and complicates a given object’s relationship to an 
otherwise fixed and identity-conferring category. I contend there are three such figures 
of exceptionality at work in this novel: its genre, its primary setting and its 
protagonists. 
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Upon opening the novel, and prior to any narration, we are greeted with a page 
that is blank save for three words that provide the spatio-temporal coordinates for the 
narrative we are about to encounter: “England, late 1990s.” Yet, as we quickly realise 
in the very first paragraph of Kathy’s tale, this is an alternate, unfamiliar universe, one 
comprised of “carers” and “donors.”1 Lest we should be tempted to equate these 
donors to those we might think we are familiar with from news reports of successful 
transplants or heroic organ donations, the novel’s donors are immediately singled out 
as being different, for we are told that hardly any of Kathy’s donors have been 
“classified as ‘agitated,’ even before fourth donation” (3, emphasis added). An 
alternative England thus emerges, involving the defamiliarised use of familiar terms 
and medical feats we know to be impossible. On cue, we call forth the label “science-
fiction.” The problem, however, as the reader will go on to learn, is that there is no 
mention of medical procedures in the novel, no allusion to specific organs, no 
explanation of how donors who are not yet ready for “completion” are kept alive after 
their first organs have been extracted. Or, to put it another way: no science.  
Together with making sense of the novel’s exceptional genre, there is the 
problem of classifying the exceptional place that is Hailsham. Only the first of the 
novel’s three parts transpires in there, and yet Hailsham remains a reference point for 
Kathy throughout her narrative. Kathy first mentions Hailsham in the novel’s second 
paragraph, but the word occurs together with a qualifying remark that immediately 
signals to its exceptional status: “I’m a Hailsham student – which is enough by itself 
 
1 Before becoming donors, Kathy and her fellow clones spend a period of time acting as “carers”, or 
nurses, for other donors. Kathy’s first words reveal that she is even more exceptional than her peers, 
having been a carer for eleven years, when the average length of time spent as a carer is two or three 
years (3). 
113 
 
                                                           
sometimes to get people’s backs up” (4). If it is a place with “students,” we might 
initially think, Hailsham is probably a school or college. We later learn that Hailsham 
is located in an unnamed region of rural England, and is really a cultivation centre, a 
sinister institution designed to rear future donors. And yet most of Kathy’s memories 
of Hailsham are far from morbid. Indeed they often verge on the trivial, focussing on 
the petty teenage dramas and predictable anxieties that we might expect from any 
young adult. Yet this banality is often interrupted by inconsistencies that sit 
uncomfortably with a typical boarding school narrative, not least because Hailsham is 
all but an average boarding school. Furthermore, its status as clone-rearing-institution 
notwithstanding, part of what makes Hailsham “so special” is that most of the time it 
resembles an arts and crafts school, and its students seem perpetually to sit in classes 
on poetry, art and art appreciation (17). What, then, are we to make of the bizarre 
status of Hailsham, a place that unsettles those who do not belong to it, and which 
sounds like such an improbable place in which to find a clone?2   
As for Hailsham’s pupils, they can only be as special as the institution.  
Hailsham students are constantly referred to as being somehow exceptional. The 
students’ guardians voice this sentiment in largely cautionary terms designed to police 
the students’ health habits, but are always careful to insert a positive, flattering tone 
into their language. Thus, Hailsham’s headmistress, Miss Emily, treats the students to 
weekly lectures in which she reminds them that “[they] [are] all very special, being 
Hailsham students, and so it [is] all the more disappointing when [they] behave badly” 
(43, emphasis added). Miss Lucy, one of their guardians, gives them a lesson on the 
 
2 Hailsham operates in a linguistically unconventional way too. Mostly used as a proper noun, Kathy 
sometimes uses it as an adjective, as when she refers, for instance, to the possibility of having intimate 
relationships with people who “weren’t Hailsham” (189). 
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perils of smoking: “You’re students. You’re...special. So keeping yourselves well, 
keeping yourselves very healthy inside, that’s much more important for each of you 
than it is for me” (68).3 Yet these comments by the guardians are interrupted with 
darker thoughts from Kathy, who realises, in retrospect, that throughout her young age 
there were moments when she fearfully anticipated a confrontation with her 
exceptionality that would not be quite as heartening as her guardians would have her 
believe: 
 Because it doesn’t really matter how well your guardians try to prepare 
you: all the talks, videos, discussions, warnings, none of that can really 
bring it home. [...] All the same, some of it must go in somewhere. It 
must go in, because by the time a moment like that comes along, 
there’s a part of you that’s been waiting. Maybe from as early as when 
you are five or six, there’s been a whisper going at the back of your 
head, saying: ‘One day, maybe not so long from now, you’ll get to 
know how it feels.’ So you’re waiting, even if you don’t quite know it, 
waiting for the moment when you realise that you really are different to 
them; that there are people out there [...] who don’t hate you or wish 
you any harm, but who nevertheless shudder at the very thought of you 
[...] and who dread the idea of your hand brushing against theirs (36, 
emphasis added).  
I have chosen to begin my discussion of Never Let Me Go signalling to its 
various modes of departure because exceptionality and category-defying figures and 
institutions, permeate the novel’s plot, its genre and, not least, my own reading of the 
novel. The remainder of this chapter will explore at length what I have suggested are 
three of the primary figures of exceptionality at work in the novel, thus revealing why 
I propose to read the novel as I do: that is, as a meditation on the relationship between 
 
3 Despite obvious parallels here to the kind of supervision that Ginny submits Om and his family to in 
Harvest, I want to resist equating the donors of Never Let Me Go to those of Harvest. In the play, 
concern with health is represented as a corollary of Ginny’s predatory goals and manifested through the 
surveillance device that is the Contact Module; Never Let Me Go not only articulates this concern in the 
pedagogical discourse of education but does so to repeatedly underscore the students’ difference from 
non-donors. I explore this point at length below.   
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the human and the artifices it creates. Thus, the novel’s very protagonists are artifices, 
man-made clones, products of biotechnological advances who add yet more artifices 
to the world through their constant production of works of art. And yet their artificially 
engineered lives, as we shall see, are characterised by repeated and always 
unsuccessful attempts to seek out their commonality with humans. Indeed, I would go 
as far as to say that the novel’s plot is structured around these failed attempts. It is 
through them that the novel’s questions to the reader emerge, questions all, I contend, 
that stem from the epigraph with which I open this introduction: “I want you to be.” 
This assertion, an ethical imperative of sorts, is one we should be able to make of our 
fellow beings, says Hannah Arendt, “without being able to give any particular reason 
for such supreme and unsurpassable affirmation” (181, emphasis added). Which 
brings us to the artificially created protagonists of Never Let Me Go. For how can we 
say this of Hailsham’s clones, created only to enable the use that will be made of 
them?  
 
II. Students and clones 
[The]future man, whom scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred 
years, seems to be possessed by a rebelliousness against human existence as it has 
been given, a free gift from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he wishes to 
exchange, as it were, for something he has produced himself. 
 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
The rebellious man of the future, according to Hannah Arendt, is the man that science 
aspires one day to produce, the man whose life span will easily exceed the hundred-
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year limit.4 That we have not yet reached this stage fifty years after Arendt’s 
observation, and the question of whether or not we ever will, matters little here. Of 
crucial importance, rather, is what Arendt characterises as “rebelliousness”: that is, the 
desire to counter the “free gift from nowhere” that is human existence with something 
that man has himself produced.5 This, I contend, is precisely the parallel universe that 
Never Let Me Go transports us to. We are in an alternate 1990s England, where 
medical science has progressed to the point of “cur[ing] so many previously incurable 
conditions [that] [t]his is what the world notice[s] the most, want[s] the most” (262). It 
is a world in which humans depend on the likes of artificial humans such as Kathy and 
her fellow students for prolonging their existence. And they have the right to do so, it 
seems, because Hailsham students have been produced by human ingenuity, created, 
unlike the rest of us, to fulfil a very definite purpose. Radically outside the realm of 
the given, outside of that which Arendt has elsewhere described as the sphere of 
“everything that we have not produced, [of] everything that is merely and 
mysteriously given to us” (181), Hailsham students belong, unlike the rest of us, to the 
realm of the “human artifice,” the place where inexplicable mysteries cease, and are 
replaced with functionality, utility, instrumentality.6  
 
4 This, too, is a goal achieved only when we begin to “act into nature.” See Chapter 2 for a discussion of 
what Arendt means by this. 
5 To the question of whence this rebellious desire to act into nature arises, Arendt replies that it is part 
of a wish, fed by scientific achievements, to escape our human condition as earth-bound creatures tied 
to certain natural laws. Her prime example is the Sputnik, launched in 1957, one year prior to the 
publication of The Human Condition. Arendt observes that the satellite sparked not so much pride and 
awe at the achievements of man’s scientific knowledge, but rather relief at the fact that the Sputnik 
represented “the first step towards man’s escape from imprisonment to the earth” (1, emphasis added). 
Significantly enough, given the concerns of Never Let Me Go, Arendt aligns “the attempt to create life 
in the test tube” to this same desire to escape imprisonment to the confines of the earth (2). 
6 See Hannah Arendt’s “The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man”: “The more 
highly developed a civilisation, the more accomplished the world it has produced, the more at home 
men feel within the human artifice – the more they will resent everything they have not produced, 
everything that is merely and mysteriously given to them (181). 
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Miss Lucy attempts to bring home just this point to her students when she 
overhears two of them imagining what kind of life they would lead if they became 
actors when they grew up: 
 The problem, as I see it, is that you’ve been told and not told. [...] If 
you’re going to have decent lives, then you’ve got to know and know 
properly. None of you will go to America, none of you will be film 
stars. And none of you will be working in supermarkets as I heard some 
of you planning the other day. Your lives are set out for you. You’ll 
become adults, then before you’re old, before you’re even middle-aged, 
you’ll start to donate your vital organs. That’s what each of you was 
created to do. You’re not like the actors you watch on your videos, 
you’re not even like me. You were brought into this world for a 
purpose, and your futures, all of them, have been decided. So you’re 
not to talk that way any more (81, emphasis added). 
Not only have Hailsham students been brought into the world as man-made, 
fabricated creatures; they are further distinguished from their creators in that, unlike 
them, they need not be philosophically burdened with questions as to their origins and 
destinies. They were brought into the world for a purpose; they need not search for an 
answer as to what their existence means, need not trouble themselves even with 
speculations as to how they will make a living. They exist, in other words, as 
exceptions to the Kantian formulation that exhorts us to see man as an end in himself, 
as a being, that is, who is exempt from becoming a link in the chain of ends and 
means. If they are to lead “decent lives” the students must remember what 
distinguishes them from all non-donors: as donors, they exist only as a means to fulfil 
the ends of their users-creators. 
Or so it would seem. Yet contrary to what we might expect upon reading Miss 
Lucy’s words out of context, as they occur here, Hailsham students are more often 
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encouraged to forget that they exist as a means to postpone the death of “normal 
people” (139). Miss Lucy’s frustration, we must note, lies in the fact that the students 
have been “told and not told” about who or what they are (81). It is a wily observation 
on Miss Lucy’s part, one I propose that we read in the light of Giorgio Agamben’s 
salutary observation that exclusion does not entirely serve its intended purpose of 
severing all ties to the norm: “the exception is a kind of inclusion. What is excluded 
from the general rule is an individual case. But the most proper characteristic of the 
exception is that what is excluded in it is not, on account of being excluded, absolutely 
without relation to the rule” (17). Agamben’s reminder, I contend, is one that 
Hailsham educators do not need: their entire pedagogical system is based upon it.  
As we eventually realise through Kathy’s recollections, the training that 
students receive at Hailsham is as artfully designed as they are. Told repeatedly that 
they are special, exceptional, and unlike all non-donors, they are also not told these 
very same things. And it is by virtue of being told and not told, I contend, that the 
knowledge of the donations that await them does not incite the students to lose their 
will to live, or even to rebel against their predetermined fates. What they are told and 
not told invites them, rather, to delight in life, to whole-heartedly embrace what they 
share with the non-donors they are otherwise, as exceptions, set apart from. At 
Hailsham, the guardians make sure that the students are told that what they share with 
non-donors, besides, of course, their compatible vital organs, is an appreciation for the 
carnal and aesthetic pleasures of life. For, throughout their time in Hailsham, in fact, 
the students enthusiastically engage in creative projects that are so important to all of 
them that they think of little else, aware that “how you were regarded at Hailsham, 
how much you were liked and respected, had to do with how good you were at 
creating” (16). Later, in their post-puberty years, this interest in creativity is somewhat 
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thwarted by their curiosity about sex, which becomes what “‘being creative’ had been 
a few years earlier” (98). 
Large portions of the novel explicitly discourage us from the temptation, given 
the instrumental world we are dealing with, to read Hailsham’s emphasis on creativity 
and openness about sex as a convenient way to both contain and sublimate the 
students’ potential rebellious desires to revolt against their makers. Until the novel’s 
climax, we are instead urged to view creativity and sex as the very things which make 
it so difficult to categorically differentiate the donors from the normal people who 
dwell outside the confines of Hailsham. Until the confrontation that occurs in the 
novel’s final moments, creativity and sex signal to a liminal zone through which the 
students try to establish their commonality with non-donors. I dedicate the entirety of 
my next section to the question of creativity. For now, I shall discuss the students’ 
relationship to sex and its corollary: procreation. 
The topic of sex is first broached in an anatomy lesson conducted by Miss 
Emily, the headmistress. Unsurprisingly, she takes care to remind them that they have 
to be careful whom they have sex with, because of the sexually transmitted diseases 
they can contract through intercourse. But she also warns them that they are different 
from other people “out there,” to whom sex “meant all sorts of things” because unlike 
students, people out there “could have babies from sex” (84). Hailsham students, 
however, cannot reproduce.  
The students’ inability to procreate evidences the extent to which their lives 
have been carefully engineered to ensure that their (re)production lies solely within the 
control of their creators. The cloners of Never Let Me Go, it would seem, have learnt 
their lesson from their fictional predecessor, Victor Frankenstein. Frankenstein, we 
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recall, incurs the wrath of the creature he has manufactured by refusing to provide him 
with the female companion the creature requests, precisely because of his fear that: 
 Even if they were to leave Europe and inhabit the deserts of the new 
world, yet one of the first results of those sympathies for which the 
daemon thirsted would be children, and a race of devils would be 
propagated upon the earth who might make the very existence of the 
species of man a condition precarious and full of terror (165, emphasis 
added).7 
Although they are never specifically mentioned, the engineers responsible for 
designing the donors have put right the glitch that Frankenstein overlooked. There is 
no fear, now, almost two hundred years after Frankenstein’s cautionary tale, that more 
undesirable students will be brought, unbidden, into the world. 
While they are explicitly told that their sterility is what sets them apart, the 
students are never told about the implications of this. Will they, as Victor Frankenstein 
so readily assumes of his own creation, “thirst” for children? On the one hand, Kathy 
states that none of them are “particularly bothered” about their sterility, “being 
pleased,” rather, that they “could have sex without worrying about all of that” (73). On 
the other hand, there is the incident that serves to give the novel its title, and strongly 
suggests otherwise. The episode sees Kathy listening to a song she is particularly 
fascinated by. Sung by one Judy Bridgewater, the song is titled “Never Let Me Go.” 
As Kathy listens to the chorus she imagines that the song is about a woman who had 
been told that she could never have babies. “Then there’s a sort of miracle and she has 
a baby, and she holds this baby very close to her and walks around singing: ‘Baby, 
 
7 It is worth noting that towards the end of Never Let Me Go, the students are referred to by one 
character as “poor creatures” (254, emphasis added) thereby eliciting a further comparison with Mary 
Shelley’s novel, in which Victor Frankenstein produces a nameless being referred to alternately as 
“creature,” “monster” and “daemon.” Indeed, Keith McDonald, in his article on Ishiguro’s novel, 
argues that Never Let Me Go “recurrently finds parallels” with Frankenstein (75).   
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never let me go...’ partly because she’s so happy but also because she is afraid 
something will happen” (70, emphasis added). One particular time, Kathy is privately 
listening to the song, acting out her fantasy by clutching a pillow-cum-baby to her 
breast, when she is observed by an outside visitor, a non-donor, and Kathy is 
mortified, not least because she notices that the eavesdropper is crying. 
Kathy’s fantasy, much like her observer’s reaction, hardly needs decoding. I 
mention it because it serves to highlight that by virtue of being “ told and not told,” 
Hailsham students readily accept and welcome their difference – in this case, their 
ability to have sex without ever worrying about pregnancy – and yet continue to aspire 
to “miracles” through which they will somehow transcend this same exceptionality. It 
is, to be sure, a peculiar state to live in. Yet examples of it abound in the novel, even 
after the Kathy and her friends cease to be students, and leave Hailsham to live in The 
Cottages, waiting to be called upon to become carers, and, eventually, donors. 
 It is while they are living in The Cottages, in fact, that Ruth, Kathy and 
Tommy embark on a search for Ruth’s “possible.” Possibles, as Kathy explains, are 
based on the simple idea that since each donor is at some point copied from “a normal 
person,” then a donor might be able to find the person that she is modelled from (139). 
Ruth and Kathy claim to be pragmatic and sensible about the theory of possibles: “Our 
models were an irrelevance, a technical necessity for bringing us into the world, 
nothing more than that” (140). And yet, says Kathy, “we all of us, to varying degrees, 
believed that when you saw the person you were copied from, you’d get some insight 
into who you were deep down” (ibid). We see here, again, that the donors, fully 
cognisant of what they have been told, accept their bizarre origins only to voice almost 
in the same breath and in a manner somehow reminiscent of adoptive children in 
search of their biological parents, their belief that tracking down one’s model can lead 
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to a form of revelation about who they really are.8 It is, perhaps, a way of imagining 
who they might have been should things have been different, should they have been 
biologically engendered rather than technologically engineered.  
This time, however, as befits their fast-approaching initiation into the brutal 
realities of caring and donating, their fantasies are short-lived. It is Ruth who shatters 
all their illusions when the search for her possible ends badly. The woman they have 
come to check on, tipped off by fellow-students, is a middle-class office worker who 
turns out neither to resemble Ruth or have her mannerisms. Pretending not to be 
surprised or disappointed, Ruth articulates what they have all long suspected, but 
never been told:  
 But look, it was never on. They don’t ever, ever, use people like that 
woman. Think about it. Why would she want to? We all know it, so 
why don’t we face it? We’re not modelled from that sort... [...] We’re 
modelled from trash. Junkies, prostitutes, winos, tramps. Convicts 
maybe, just so long as they aren’t psychos. That’s what we come from. 
We all know it, so why don’t we say it? A woman like that? Come on. 
(166) 
Though no explicit mention of either economic compensation or scientific procedures 
occurs here, carefully implied in Ruth’s outburst is the extent to which technological 
prowess pervades the economic structures of the fictional world that we are dealing 
with here. A middle-class office-worker would never need to sell her genetic material 
to clone engineers in the way that the outcastes of society would. In this society where 
the human artifice reigns, a productive use has finally been found for the unproductive 
 
8 I realise, of course, that the claim I endorse here, together with the students – namely that one’s 
biological parents might well reveal something about oneself – is not unproblematic, having doubtless 
been complicated by biologists and psychologists alike. Nonetheless, I believe that my larger point 
regarding the donors’ complex relationship to their own exceptionality still stands: the cloned donors 
look for something that will tie them to the affective, non-technologically-permeated aspects of the non-
donors’ world despite knowing that their models are not parents but technical necessities for bringing 
them into the world. 
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“indefinite, disintegrated  mass” of vagabonds, discharged jailbirds, pickpockets, 
tricksters, gamblers and other undesirables that make up the lumpenproletariat as Karl 
Marx defined it in his Eighteenth Brumaire (section V). 
I close this section with a third and final example of the students’ poignant 
attempts to continually seek a miraculous occurrence that will provide them with a 
link to the world of non-donors. If the desire for a child and for an encounter with a 
potential parent figure characterises these searches in Hailsham and in The Cottages, 
respectively, then what the students seek in the third and final section of the novel, 
when they have all embarked on their “careers” as donors and carers, is “a deferral.” 
Bluntly speaking, a deferral is a way for Kathy and Tommy to “buy time.” Interesting 
as this reversal is, given that Kathy and Tommy exist in order to allow non-donors to 
buy time in the form of death-postponing vital organs, what is relevant for our 
purposes is that Tommy and Kathy seek to buy time using the human emotion of love 
as a currency. They have heard, intermittently throughout their lives, the rumour that 
as students of Hailsham they can claim special treatment. “If you were a boy and a 
girl, and you were in love with each other, really, properly in love, and if you could 
show it, then the people who run Hailsham, they sorted it out for you. They sorted it 
out so you could have a few years together before you began your donations” (153). 
We cannot talk about deferrals, however, without dwelling at length on the 
issue of creativity. It is to the proliferation of poetry, sketches, sculptures and crafts 
that the students endlessly create while at Hailsham that I will now turn. 
 
 
 
III. Works of art and souls 
 [T]he proper intercourse with a work of art is certainly not ‘using’ it; on the contrary, 
it must be removed carefully from the whole context of ordinary used objects to attain 
124 
 
its proper place in the world. By the same token, it must be removed from the 
exigencies and wants of daily life, with which it has less contact than any other thing. 
 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
 
I will discuss Never Let Me Go’s deferrals after a brief deferral of my own. This is 
more than a neat contrivance on my part; I wish to reflect at length on one aspect of 
Hannah Arendt’s observations in The Human Condition that I withheld from 
discussing in my introduction: the value of the work of art. Arendt’s comments on the 
work of art seem, somewhat deceptively, to occur almost in passing, but I bring them 
to the foreground here in order to read creativity as it operates in the novel. Two things 
are worth restating here. Firstly, its pedagogical emphasis on creativity is just what 
makes Hailsham such a special institution. Secondly, if the students are constantly 
encouraged to be creative, this is because creativity plays a crucial role in forging a 
complex tie of commonality between the exceptional students and their normal 
counterparts.  
Before mentioning the work of art, Hannah Arendt embarks on a discussion of 
work that will already be familiar to my readers from Chapter 2. To briefly recap: 
work produces the human artifice, objects that are durable and stable; it is for this 
reason that work can create a world that can “be relied upon to house the unstable and 
mortal creature which is man” (136). The work of art, as the term itself implies, not 
only pertains to the realm of work. For Arendt, the work of art is the culmination of 
work as an activity.  
Her chapter on work, however, is also where Arendt embarks upon a 
discussion of value. This is the fitting place in which to do so because, says Arendt, 
homo faber exists primarily in the public realm that is the exchange market. The 
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animal laborans can neither build nor inhabit this public, worldly realm because his 
“social life is worldless and herdlike,” engaged as he is in privately meeting the 
biological necessities his life-process requires.9 The homo faber, by contrast, needs a 
public space where he can “show the products of his hand and receive the esteem 
which is due to him. [...] The point is that homo faber, the builder of the world and 
producer of things, can find his proper relationship to other people only by exchanging 
his product with theirs” (160). And it is the exchange market that best allows him to 
do this (ibid).  
Arendt’s discussion of value is suggestive because of what it allows us to glean 
about the role of the work of art in Never Let Me Go. Arendt begins by reminding us 
that value is always, first and foremost, “value in exchange” (163). Thus, “value is the 
quality a thing can never possess in privacy but acquires automatically the moment it 
appears in public” (164). Her next move, however, takes us into thornier territory, for 
she proceeds to distinguish between “intrinsic worth” and “marketable value.” 
Intrinsic worth, Arendt says, citing Locke, “is an objective quality of the thing itself; 
[...] something attached to the thing itself” which exists “outside the will of the 
individual purchaser or seller” (ibid). Marketable value, on the other hand, has nothing 
to do with intrinsic worth, for the marketable value of something is altered only 
through “the alteration of some proportion which that commodity bears to something 
else” (ibid).  
Initially, the categories of intrinsic worth and marketable value seem to map 
quite neatly onto Marx’s distinction between use-value and exchange-value 
 
9 We recall, however, that Arendt argues that all work has now been subsumed to the labouring process. 
This is shown, she claims, in the fact that the objects produced by work are increasingly perceived as 
products for consumption rather than for use. 
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respectively, especially when, to illustrate her definition of intrinsic worth, Arendt 
states that the intrinsic worth of, say, a table can only be ruined if we deprive it of one 
of its legs.10 So why confuse us with this Lockean terminology? Because, Arendt 
holds, while Marx correctly saw in the prioritisation of exchange-value over use-value 
the root cause of capitalist exploitation, he understood use-value not as referring to the 
intrinsic worth of something, but as alluding only to its functionality. Here, then, is 
another critique that Arendt reserves for Marx’s analysis of political economy.   
Substituting the instrumentality-infused term “use-value” for that of “intrinsic 
worth” leaves us, however, with a series of difficult questions. What is intrinsic 
worth? How might we measure it? Precisely, replies Arendt. We cannot. For it no 
longer exists: 
 [T]he loss of [the] intrinsic worth [of all things] begins with their 
transformation into values or commodities, for from this moment on 
they exist only in relation to some other thing which can be acquired in 
its stead. Universal relativity, that a thing exists only in relation to 
other things, and loss of intrinsic worth, that nothing any longer 
possesses an ‘objective’ value independent of the ever-changing 
estimations of supply and demand, are inherent in the very concept of 
value itself (166, emphasis added). 
Difficult as it may be to accept, Arendt argues, the advent of the exchange market 
means that there is no longer such a thing as “absolute value” (165). Or is there? And 
here we must embark on a symptomatic reading of the form of Arendt’s argument. For 
having categorically established, in the remark I cite above, that the universal 
relativity brought on by the exchange market annihilates all possibility of thinking 
 
10 To compare with Marx: “The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value.  But this usefulness does not 
dangle in mid-air.  It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence 
apart from the latter.  […] (Capital I, 126, emphasis added).  As opposed to the qualitative aspect of a 
commodity that use-value describes, exchange-value refers to the quantitative dimension of the 
commodity. Exchange-value, then, is “the proportion in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-
values of another kind” (ibid, emphasis added). 
127 
 
                                                           
about intrinsic worth, she inserts a footnote in which she poses the question anew, thus 
inviting us to interrogate the validity of her initial argument: 
  In the absence of an exchange market, it was inconceivable that the 
value of one thing should consist solely in its relationship or proportion 
to another thing. The question, therefore, is not so much whether value 
is objective or subjective, but whether it can be absolute or indicates 
only the relationship between things (166, fn 38, emphasis added). 
Why reformulate the question, displacing it to the margins of her argument, 
when she has seemingly already dispensed with it? The answer, I contend, lies in the 
subsequent section of this chapter of The Human Condition. Separated from this 
footnote by a mere paragraph, this section deals, significantly, with the case of the 
value of the work of art.  
“The immediate source of the art work,” Arendt tells us in this next section, “is 
the human capacity for thought” (168). Thought is distinguished by the fact that it “has 
neither an end nor an aim outside itself” and, consequently, “men of action and the 
lovers of results in the sciences have never tired of pointing out how entirely ‘useless’ 
thought is – as useless indeed as the works of art it inspires” (170).11 The work of art 
belongs to that special series of objects, which exist within the realm of the human 
artifice, and yet “are strictly without any utility whatsoever and which, moreover, 
because they are unique, are not exchangeable and therefore defy equalisation 
through a common denominator such as money” (167, emphasis added).  
 
11 To the possible objection that a work of art is an end product, the object resulting from thought, 
Arendt responds, “And not even to these useless products can thought lay claim, for they as well as the 
great philosophical systems can hardly be called the results of pure thinking, strictly speaking, since it is 
precisely the thought process which the artist or writing philosopher must interrupt and transform for 
the materialising reification of his work” (170). A further response can also be gleaned from the 
epigraph that opens this section of my chapter, in which Arendt makes clear that the work of art is in a 
sense useless, precisely because it is removed from the sphere of all other use-objects.  
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We can diagnose Arendt’s resistance to the foreclosure of the possibility that 
absolute value may yet exist, then, as a desire to make sense of the exception that is 
the art work, for its uniqueness defies the logic of the exchange market and all 
attempts to measure its value in proportion to another thing.12 Arendt is hardly alone 
in musing over the relationship between the work of art and other objects that me
produce. In 1955, only three years prior to the publication of The Human Condition, 
Maurice Blanchot observed that “art has as its goal something real: an object. But a 
beautiful object. Which is to say, an object of contemplation, not of use, which 
moreover, will be sufficient to itself, will rest in itself, refer to nothing else, and be its 
own end (in the two senses of the term)” (212, emphasis added).13 “Within the overall 
human undertaking,” he adds, “where the tasks conforming to the universal will for 
production and emancipation are necessarily the most immediately important, art can 
only follow” (212-3). 
To reiterate: “[T]he work – the work of art, the literary work – is neither 
finished nor unfinished: it is. What it says is exclusively this: that it is – and nothing 
more. Beyond that it is nothing. Whoever wants to make it express more finds nothing, 
finds that it expresses nothing” (Blanchot, 22, emphasis added). I belabour the point, 
perhaps. But I do so only to underscore the paradox that seems to structure the lives of 
Hailsham students: namely, that although they themselves exist solely as useful 
products of the human artifice, as means to a specific end, they are perpetually 
engaged in the creation of works of art which, unlike the students who produce them, 
 
12 Marx himself was aware of this. Witness his observation in Capital III, which I cite in chapter 2: 
“[T]he prices of things that have no value in and of themselves – either not being products of labour, 
like land, or which cannot be reproduced by labour, such as antiques, works of art by certain masters, 
etc. – may be determined by quite fortuitous combinations of circumstances” (772). 
13 I cite only half of Blanchot’s remarks here in order to preserve the flow of my own argument. Suffice 
it to say here that Blanchot adds an important caveat to this observation, to which I return below. 
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exist only as objects of contemplation. These works of art, moreover, will survive the 
“completion” of the artists who produced them, will continue in the world despite 
having no functional utility whatsoever.14  
It is hardly surprising, then, that the students, aware as they are of their own 
useful purposes, cannot help but wonder what happens to the objects that they create 
in Hailsham’s classrooms. They speculate with the few facts they have: every so often, 
about three or four times per year, a mysterious woman known to all as Madame visits 
Hailsham. She operates as the chief evaluator of the students’ art work, and “the lead-
up to her arrival,” Kathy informs us, “began weeks before, with the guardians sifting 
through all our work – our paintings, sketches, pottery, all our essays and poems” (33). 
Once the art work is on display, Madame tours the exhibition and promptly leaves 
with a selection of the students’ finest creations. If the students believe that Madame 
consistently picks their best work, this is because the guardians have impressed upon 
them that “it was a great honour to have something taken by Madame” (39).  
Mystified as to what she could possibly do with their creations, the students 
imagine that Madame has a Gallery, a private collection of Hailsham students’ 
artworks. Not that this explains much. “[W]hat is her Gallery?” Kathy asks of Tommy 
at one point. “She keeps coming here and taking away our best work. She must have 
stacks of it by now. [...] Why should she have a gallery of things done by us?” (30). 
Neither Kathy nor Tommy appear satisfied with the explanation that Madame is a 
collector of sorts, albeit a rather morbid one, given the fate that awaits the artists in 
 
14 It is true that the students trade their own works of art during events known at Hailsham as 
Exchanges. But these Exchanges do not confer any utility to the students’ creations. As Kathy explains, 
Exchanges are the only way students can acquire a “collection” of aesthetically pleasing objects in order 
to “decorate the walls around [their] bed” or “place on [their] desk from room to room” (16). Within 
Hailsham, then, the work of art remains strictly an object of contemplation. 
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question. In fact, even as the youngsters they are when this conversation takes place, 
they seem to intuit that, as far as the outside world is concerned, everything that relates 
to them is somehow circumscribed within the field of utility. Thus, Kathy voices her 
conviction that Madame’s Gallery is related to their own future donations: “I don’t 
know why, but I’ve had this feeling for some time now, that it’s all linked in, though I 
can’t figure out how” (31).  
Years later, Tommy and Kathy return to this question. Things are different 
now. They have left Hailsham; they live in The Cottages; Tommy and Ruth are in a 
relationship, although the intimate conversations between Kathy and Tommy, and the 
mutual emotional support that they provide for each other constantly alert the reader to 
a love triangle in which not Kathy but Ruth is the true intruder. In this particular 
conversation, Tommy and Kathy discuss the rumour of deferrals that they have heard 
from other, non-Hailsham donors who are envious of this exception, granted only to 
Hailsham students. Obtaining a deferral, we recall, will postpone donations in order to 
grant two Hailsham students some extra years to spend together. As long as they are 
truly in love. But: how do you prove to someone that you are truly and properly in 
love? A timeless, even hackneyed question, to be sure, but one that is removed here 
from the dilemmas and passions aroused by requited and unrequited love familiar to us 
from high and popular culture alike. The question as it is formulated by Tommy and 
Kathy demands to be read as they read it: that is, with straight-faced and naive 
literality. How do you prove to someone that you are truly and properly in love?  How 
do you prove to someone – someone else, someone outside the love relationship – that 
you are truly and properly in love? Read thus, the question demands a response that 
resembles more a mathematical proof than it does a discursive treatise. And it is just 
such a response that our two characters arrive at. 
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Convinced that he has finally arrived at a solution as to how Madame’s Gallery 
may be related to their future donations, Tommy lays out his theory for Kathy. He 
reminds her of an incident at Hailsham, when a fellow student had asked their 
headmistress, Miss Emily, why Madame took their art away. Miss Emily, Tommy 
recalls, had first avoided the question by emphasising what a privilege this was for any 
student. Then, whether intentionally or not, Miss Emily had added “that things like 
pictures, poetry, all that kind of stuff, [...] revealed what you were like inside. […] 
[T]hey revealed your soul” (175).15 From this, Tommy concludes that Madame’s 
Gallery is not a collection of artwork, but a collection of evidence: 
 Suppose two people say they’re truly in love, and they want extra time 
to be together. Then, you see, Kath, there has to be a way to judge if 
they’re really telling the truth. That they aren’t just saying they’re in 
love, just to defer their donations. You see how difficult it would be to 
decide? [...] But the point is, whoever decides, Madame or whoever it 
is, they need something to go on. [...] Suppose two people come up and 
say they’re in love. She can find the art they’ve done over years and 
years. She can see if they go. If they match. Don’t forget, Kath, what 
she’s got reveals our souls (175-6). 
Ironically, this novel about organ donors would transport us, through Tommy’s 
theory, into a world where “matching” refers not to tissue-typing and other 
immunological procedures designed to match a transplant patient to a compatible 
organ donor, but to an art depot harbouring evidence of heterosexual compatibility. If 
such a match-sanctioning place does exist, muse Kathy and Tommy, then it would also 
explain Hailsham’s special status, its resemblance to an arts and crafts school, the 
importance that all the guardians attached to the students’ creativity, the reason for the 
 
15 Upon hearing this remark from Tommy, Kathy’s first reaction is to suppress laughter as she 
remembers a drawing one of her Hailsham friends had done of her own intestines. Again, the narrative 
encourages us to see – and this time to laugh, along with Kathy, the narrator – at how literally the 
students interpret certain statements. 
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envy they have always sensed in non-Hailsham students: “The thing about being from 
Hailsham was that you had this special chance. And if you didn’t get stuff into 
Madame’s gallery then you were as good as throwing that chance away” (176). 
In this final “miracle” that the students aspire to, we see, once again, how the 
students reconcile the facts about which they have “been told and not told” in order to 
weave together a narrative in which they both accept their impending completion, and 
yet seek to defer death through a time-gaining gesture that assimilates them to their 
human counterparts. Created by non-donors in order to keep death at bay, these donors 
now hope to turn to their creators to ask for reciprocal treatment, if only for a few 
precious years. But the hope for a deferral, much like the hope for an illuminating 
encounter with a “possible” or the secret desire for a child alluded to in the earlier 
sections of the novel, is never fulfilled. And how could it be otherwise? Never Let Me 
Go is not driven by the motif that so often recurs in science-fiction: that of the 
unpredictable glitches and surprises that the carefully designed objects of human 
ingenuity and artifice spring upon its over-confident creators.16 In this text, the clones 
do not rebel; in this text, I contend, every hope nourished by the donors is included not 
to raise the possibility of its fulfilment, but only to allow us to better picture the 
alternative universe that the novel imagines for us. And what the idea of deferrals 
allows us to understand is the role of the work of art in this artifice-permeated 
universe. 
 
16 I have in mind such canonical science-fiction narratives as Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, 
where the spaceship computer, Hal, turns evil, and rebels against the astronauts on board, or Marge 
Piercy’s He, She and It, in which the female protagonist falls in love, despite all her initial qualms, with 
a robot. In The Island, a film which also deals with clones designed for organ harvesting, the clones 
discover the fate that awaits them and rebel against the human world. 
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Only at the climax of the novel is the issue of deferrals unravelled. By this 
time, Ruth has completed, but not before apologising to Kathy and Tommy for having 
kept them apart for all these years. Her final reconciliatory gesture is to extract a 
promise from them that they will visit Madame, whose address she has tracked down, 
in order to seek a deferral. When Kathy and Tommy finally arrive at Madame’s, they 
find that she lives with Miss Emily, their former headmistress. Miss Emily herself 
reveals to them that deferrals are no more than an unfounded rumour, one that has 
continued to resurface no matter how hard she has tried to stamp it out. Why then? 
Kathy asks. “Why did we do all of that work in the first place? Why train us, 
encourage us, make us produce all of that? If we’re just going to give donations 
anyway, then die, why all of those lessons? Why all those books and discussions?” 
(259)  
It is appropriate, at this point, to recall Blanchot’s claim that the work of art 
can express no more than the fact, simply, that it is. Beyond that, he insists, it 
expresses nothing. Knowing as we now do that there is no such thing as a deferral, we 
might expect Miss Emily to impart a final art lesson to her former students: that art 
can claim to express nothing beyond its own existence; that it can certainly not express 
the soul of its creator.17 And even less can it act as a yardstick with which to 
determine whether or not two people are in love. But Miss Emily says no such thing. 
Instead, she tells them that Madame took away their art precisely because it would 
 
17 I realise, of course, that Blanchot’s view is hardly the view that hermeneutics has always held about 
art and what it can and cannot reveal. Figures of German Romanticism, such as Wilhelm Dilthey, as 
Paul Ricoeur has discussed, saw the task of interpretation as one that would allow the reader to better 
understand the mind of the artist. Paul Ricoeur in fact characterises this aim of Romantic hermeneutics, 
in terms that mirror those of Never Let Me Go, as the “the attempt to grasp the soul of an author” (140, 
emphasis added).  
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reveal their souls. “Or to put it more finely,” as she tells them, “we did it to prove you 
had souls at
The loaded implications of the word “soul” are troubling here, and as such the 
term merits close consideration. I suggest that we begin by reading it as a linguistic 
relic, a left-over signifier.18 “Soul,” as I see it, operates as a remnant from what, in the 
novel’s time-frame, is a distantly remembered past, a past less permeated by the 
achievements of medical science. A past, in short, with no clones. A past in which “the 
great breakthroughs in science followed one after another so rapidly [that] there 
wasn’t time to take stock, to ask the sensible questions” (262). Read thus, “soul” is a 
term that Miss Emily hopes will return her contemporaries to these questions, and 
challenge the way the donations program is run in this alternate 1990s England. All 
around them, Miss Emily tells the students, future donors are reared in “deplorable 
conditions” that Hailsham students can hardly imagine, being, as they are, part of an 
experiment designed by Miss Emily to show that if donors are “reared in humane, 
cultivated environments, it [is] possible for them to grow up as sensitive and 
intelligent as any ordinary human being” (261). With the students’ art, Miss Emily and 
Madame have put on “special exhibitions” which they have displayed to those who 
would rather not think about donors and how they are raised, preferring to believe 
instead that they were “less than human, so it didn’t matter” (263). The exhibitions, 
Miss Emily had hoped, would defy this denial of the donors’ humanity, thus 
confronting viewers with difficult ethical questions about the responsibilities that 
human creators might have towards their artificially-created beings: “‘There look!’ we 
 
18 Language, says Hannah Arendt, stubbornly preserves the distinctions that theory would obstinately 
neglect. “It is language, and the fundamental human experiences underlying it, rather than theory,” says 
Hannah Arendt, “that teaches us that the things of the world [...] are of a very different nature” (94). 
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could say. ‘Look at this art! How dare you claim these children are anything less than 
fully human?’” (262). 
Miss Emily’s injunction to her contemporaries that they look at her students’ 
art suggests yet a further reading of the term “soul.” I view her efforts as an appeal to 
what Blanchot calls “the other side” of thinking about art. This alternative stance, he 
suggests, unsettles the attempt to see in the work of art only an object of 
contemplation, an object whose sufficiency unto itself proclaims that it is of no use in 
the world. I cite Blanchot again, in full this time: 
 Granted, art has as its goal something real: an object. But a beautiful 
object. Which is to say, an object of contemplation, not of use, which 
moreover, will be sufficient to itself, will rest in itself, refer to nothing 
else, and be its own end (in the two senses of the term). True. And yet, 
points out the other side of this thinking, the goal of art is an object – a 
real, that is, an effective one. Not a momentary dream, a pure inner 
smile, but a realized action which is itself activating, which informs or 
deforms others, appeals to them, affects them, moves them – toward 
other actions which, most often, do not return to art but belong to the 
course of the world. They contribute to history and thus are lost, 
perhaps, in history (212, emphasis added). 
Hailsham, Miss Emily’s pet project, is founded on the hope that her contemporaries 
will look at her students’ art and glimpse in it something – “soul” –  that will compel 
them to move out of their indifference towards donors. Might not the students’ art 
push all non-donors towards a series of actions that will alter the course of their world, 
revolutionise the way donations are conducted? 
An answer to this question is provided by the fact that by the end of the novel, 
Hailsham, along with all the other special institutions like it, has been shut down.19 
                                                            
19 Miss Emily explains that people’s attitude towards Hailsham had changed since a scandal involving 
James Morningdale, who worked in seclusion in a remote part of Scotland. Morningdale engages in 
genetic engineering projects whose purpose is to create children who are “demonstrably superior” to 
humans as they now exist. Horrified at the prospect that this will result in a “generation of children who 
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But it is not sufficient merely to read Miss Emily’s unsuccessful project in her own 
terms, that is, as a failure that should be attributed to an unforeseeable change in “the 
climate” of the times (264). In order to fully grasp the brave new world to which 
Never Let Me Go transports us, we must see Miss Emily’s experiment, Hailsham, and 
the work of art which plays such a crucial role in it, as signalling, yet again, to the 
radical way in which this alternate world reduces every artifice to the sphere of utility. 
And unlike the special treatment that Blanchot and Arendt reserve for it, the world 
imagined in Never Let Me Go does not spare even the work of art of this treatment. 
For, her good intentions not withstanding, indeed, perhaps because of these same 
intentions, Miss Emily cannot allow the students’ artwork to exist on account of its 
functionless “intrinsic worth.” Rather, this art, as she herself states, must be made to 
express proof. Proof that the students’ artwork is equivalent to that of non-donors in 
that it, too, expresses “soul.” 
I propose that we read “soul” ultimately, then, not as the problematic, vague-
yet-essential human quality that Miss Emily’s use of it might suggest, but rather as a 
sort of currency. For, if Miss Emily’s exhibitions are to succeed, they will do so only 
insofar as “soul” functions as the yardstick, the measure of equivalence in a system 
designed to determine in what proportion a clone’s work of art can be considered 
exchangeable for a human’s. Ironically, in fact, Tommy and Kathy seem to grasp this 
from the outset: do they not visit Miss Emily with the conviction that the “souls” 
 
would take their place in society,” people put a stop to Morningdale. The ensuing climate becomes one 
of such fear, that people opt to dismantle Hailsham and its sister institutions too. We note yet another 
allusion to Frankenstein here: not only does Victor Frankenstein set out to create his creature’s female 
counterpart on a remote Scottish island; he also destroys his work before it is finished, fearing, as 
mentioned above, the breed of fearful beings that might ensue from their sexual union. 
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revealed in their works of art will function as a measure of their compatibility, as a 
currency with which they will be able to buy time to spend together? 
Tommy and Kathy finally leave, knowing that they have finally been told 
everything. Miss Emily can offer them no deferral, no extra time. She can only remind 
them that she looked after them during all those years, and gave them, if nothing else, 
their childhoods, their ability to lose themselves in their art and their writing (268). 
And yet as readers, I contend, we leave this scene with no option but to face the main 
literary conceit that Ishiguro weaves into the novel. The meta-fictional discussion 
about the work of art that occurs in this episode confronts us readers with the work of 
art that we ourselves are reading, a novel devoid of all mediators, all Miss Emilys who 
might ask that we probe the narrative in search of its so-called “soul.” Ishiguro’s novel 
is one in which he erases himself from the writing process: it is not an omniscient 
narrator but Kathy herself who addresses us directly in this first person narrative that 
repeatedly draws attention to itself as such. It is to the interrogation of this special 
genre that I now turn in order to conclude this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Science-fiction and autobiography 
[T]he intended meaning of the text is not essentially the presumed intention of the 
author, the lived experience of the writer, but rather what the text means for whoever 
complies with its injunction. 
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Paul Ricoeur, “What is a text? Explanation and Understanding”, emphasis added 
 
Keith McDonald has suggested that the unruly genre of Never Let Me Go is best 
described as “speculative memoir.” Speculative, because, as we have already noted, 
the novel operates within an alternate world akin to those imagined by science-fiction. 
And memoir, argues McDonald, because a salient characteristic of Never Let Me Go is 
that the novel employs a series of tropes which recur in autobiographical texts. 
Perhaps the most obvious of these tropes, he notes, is that of schooling. The accounts 
of schooling and education that feature so prominently in this novel, observes 
McDonald, are often equally dominating episodes in autobiography, a factor he 
explains by suggesting that the “complex power structure” that is the educational 
institution is often the backdrop against which a narrator can question, understand and 
frame her agency (77). In other words, education and schooling form a crucial factor 
in the coming of age narrative that often accompanies the autobiographical account. 
Kathy’s retrospective viewpoint throughout most of this narrative, also in keeping 
with the temporal structure of most autobiographical accounts, is indeed littered with 
remarks that confirm McDonald’s observations: “Certainly,” she says, reflecting on 
when exactly Hailsham guardians made it clear to them that they would grow up to be 
donors, “it feels like I always knew about donations in some vague way, even as early 
as six or seven” (83). Or, reflecting on her feelings as she grew older: “In my memory 
my life at Hailsham falls into two distinct chunks. [...] The earlier years [...] tend to 
blur into each other as a kind of golden time. [...] But those last years feel different. 
[...] They were more serious, and in some ways darker” (77).    
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McDonald further observes that Never Let Me Go repeatedly deploys narrative 
devices that allow Ishiguro to present the novel as an autobiographical account in 
which Kathy emerges as the authorial voice (79). Thus, Kathy’s descriptions of life at 
Hailsham are often prefaced by comments such as: “I don’t know if you had 
‘collections’ where you were” (38). Or, “I don’t know how it was where you were, but 
at Hailsham we had to have some form of medical every week” (13). I agree, up to a 
point, with McDonald’s reading of such meta-referencing, thanks to which “the reader 
receives the tale as if inhabiting [Kathy’s] world of cloning and organ harvesting” 
(80). Yes, these comments “[stamp] her authentic authorial voice” upon the narrative 
and draw our attention to Kathy’s awareness of “the reader/writer exchange” as 
McDonald says (79). But I do not believe, as does McDonald, that they “ask us to bear 
witness to [this] dystopian world and the treatment of its victims” (80, emphasis 
added). A different interpretation is in order if we are to make sense of what 
McDonald’s reading overlooks: namely, that if Kathy’s comments enjoin the reader to 
inhabit the world of cloning, this is because they not only address the reader directly, 
but do so as if this reader were herself a fellow clone.  
“When the fictive author of the preface of Werther addresses us, ‘and you, 
good soul...’ this ‘you’ is not the prosaic man who knows that Werther did not exist, 
but is the ‘me’ who believes in fiction” says Paul Ricoeur (“Appropriation” 189). This 
person who believes in the fiction and responds to the injunction of the pronoun ‘you’ 
is, of course, none other than the reader. And it is to this reader that Never Let Me Go, 
a novel whose very title harbours an injunction to the ‘you,’ consistently appeals. 
What Kathy wants from us readers is not that we witness her victimhood, but that we, 
through our readership, assume the role of donors if only for the duration of her 
narrative. Unlike other “speculative memoirs” such as Frankenstein or The 
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Handmaid’s Tale, with which it might initially elicit comparison, Never Let Me Go 
does not inscribe a fellow-reader into the text.20 The effect is that we are proscribed 
from all other forms of identification; no meta-reader arises here to replace us in our 
role as the receivers of the ‘you’ with which Kathy addresses us.  
What I am suggesting is that Never Let Me Go introduces us into an alternative 
world only to hold it at bay through a narrative style couched in autobiographical 
tropes and a prose which, as many reviewers have noted, is studiedly banal, stripped of 
all elements of what Stevens, the butler from Ishiguro’s most famous novel, might call 
“unseemly demonstrativeness.”21 The conspicuous lack of medical or scientific 
explanations in the text further contributes to conjuring a world that, if alternate, 
remains strikingly similar to our own. More importantly, however, the relative absence 
of allusions to technology means that several questions remain doggedly unanswered: 
who are the organs for? How are the clones kept alive once they begin donating? What 
organs do they donate? Kathy does not tell us. And she does not, I contend, because 
this too is part of the narrative strategy with which we are enjoined to identify with the 
students. On the one level, the withholding of this information is in keeping with the 
narrative conceit of the novel: Kathy does not need to go into explanations if her 
addressees are fellow-clones who, like her, know all of this information. But on 
another level, this lack of information plunges into the experience of the clones, who, 
 
20 Frankenstein, for instance, unravels through a series of letters and testimonies in which each narrator 
asks of his listener-reader only that he receive the tale. No reader – be she the reader of the textual 
fiction or a reader within it – is ever asked to identify with any of the narrators. Thus, unlike in Never 
Let Me Go, even the tale of the artificially created creature with whom the clones otherwise show so 
many parallels, reaches us only through the mediation of his maker, Victor Frankenstein. The 
Handmaid’s Tale, on the other hand, inserts a meta-reader into its conclusion, when we learn that the 
tale we have just read has actually just been recounted as a case-study in a history/anthropology lesson 
of the future. 
21 Theo Tait, reviewer for the The Daily Telegraph, makes this point in his article on Never Let Me Go 
dated March 5, 2005. 
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throughout their lives, we recall, have been “told and not told” of what their lives hold 
in store. “[W]e had only the haziest notions of the world outside and about what was 
and wasn’t possible there” (66). Once we inhabit the readerly role that Kathy carves 
out for us, this sentence all but erases the distinction between Kathy’s experience and 
our own. 
Stripped of practically all scientific explanations and permeated with 
autobiographical tropes, Never Let Me Go belongs to the genre of science-fiction in an 
unconventional way. Paradoxically, however, this displacement of the conventions of 
science-fiction is just what moves the novel into complying all the more forcefully 
with what Aaron Rosenfield, together with several other critics of science-fiction, has 
observed about the genre: namely, that it “offer[s] a critique of how we live and who 
we are now... [it] speak[s] in and to the present, if not of it” (40).22 Indeed, the generic 
peculiarities of this novel can be productively read together with Istvan Csicsery-
Ronay’s pronouncement that “science fiction has ceased to be a genre per se, [and 
become] instead, a mode of awareness about the world.”   
Csicsery-Ronay’s comments, of course, pertain, at some level, to all fictional 
texts. This is precisely the point that Ricoeur makes when he observes that, “In playful 
representation, ‘what is emerges.’  But ‘what is’ is no longer what we call everyday 
reality; or rather, reality truly becomes reality, that is, something which comprises a 
future horizon of undecided possibilities, something to fear or hope for, something 
unsettled” (“Appropriation” 187) Science fiction, however, takes us even further away 
from everyday reality than do other fictional genres, not by allowing a future horizon 
 
22 In his book on science-fiction, Robert Adams cites several critics who hold this same view. 
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of undecided possibilities to emerge through the reading process, but by placing the 
reader decidedly within such a future.   
I propose, then, that we read Never Let Me Go as a “mode of awareness about the 
world”  in which we are enjoined to think about a future world which, given the rapid 
developments in biotechnology and biomedical science, might not be so far removed 
from everyday reality. What, the novel asks, is the relationship of the artificially 
created clone to the human being who produced it? What kind of life is the clone 
entitled to? Indeed, is it entitled to anything? Let us hang on to these questions of a 
possible future horizon as we travel back in time. Our stop? The year 1951, which 
witnessed two events of crucial relevance to the concerns of this chapter. January of 
1951 saw Frenchman René Küss perform the first transplant of an unrelated living 
donor kidney.23 Although his patient died one month later, his pioneering method 
remains, to this day, the standard kidney transplantation procedure (Cinqualbre and 
Kahan, 3020). In this same year, Hannah Arendt published an essay in which she 
wrote about the plight of refugees in a manner that resonates remarkably with the 
dilemma posed by Never Let Me Go: “This new situation,” she warned, “[...] would 
mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to 
belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself” (“Decline of the Nation-
State” 178).  
In conclusion, I want to re-quote Kathy’s question: “if we’re just going to give 
donations anyway, then die, why all those lessons?” Die, we note, not “complete.” 
After her fantasy of holding a child, her search for possibles, and her request for a 
 
23 I emphasise “unrelated” as the operative word here because, given their artificial origins, the donors 
of Never Let Me Go are unrelated to the recipients of their organs in a much more radical sense. The 
issue of unrelatedness, moreover, is just what the novel asks us to interrogate. 
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deferral, this change of terminology constitutes Kathy’s final appeal to non-donors for 
the right to have rights. The response she receives finds echo, yet again, in Hannah 
Arendt: “It is by no means certain whether this is possible” (ibid).  
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Conclusion 
 
IMAGINING THE FUTURE 
 
Politically correct metropolitan multiculturalists want the world’s others to be 
identitarians: nationalist (Jameson) or class (Ahmad). To undo this binary demand is 
to suggest that peripheral literature may stage more surprising and unexpected 
maneuvers toward collectivity. 
 
Gayatri Spivak, Death of a Discipline 
 
I 
 
In these concluding remarks, I should like to tease out the implications of the 
constellation of texts and readings that I have thus far laid out in my project. What 
lessons, I want to ask, do my chosen texts contain for the specific disciplinary field 
which I inhabit: postcolonial literary studies? The statement in my epigraph, taken 
from Gayatri Spivak’s Death of a Discipline, itself a reflection on disciplinarity, 
serves my purpose well here, for it invokes all three of the issues I shall be addressing 
in this final chapter.  
Spivak’s first sentence gestures towards postcolonial studies, a field explicitly 
concerned with “the world’s others” and the processes that led to them becoming so. 
That Spivak does not explicitly name postcolonial studies, however, is significant: 
indeed, I wish to read her silence as indicative of a certain suspicion of the term 
‘postcolonial’ that is increasingly characteristic of critics both sympathetic and 
skeptical of the methodologies and claims of postcolonial studies.1 The sentence is 
                                                 
1 Admittedly, it is hard to imagine a time, especially since its consolidation, that postcolonial studies has 
not been subject to intense critical scrutiny from both its practitioners and its detractors. However, I am 
not referring to the familiar objections to the ‘post’ in postcolonial or the privileging of ‘colonial’ in 
order to understand the past. I have in mind a particular set of objections to postcolonial studies, 
articulated in the last decade, where postcolonial critics themselves have asked whether the field has 
outlived its critical or political usefulness. This, for example, is the motivating impulse behind the 
anthology Postcolonial Studies and Beyond (2005). 
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equally striking for its provocative pairing of Jameson and Ahmad as like-minded 
identitarians, a ground-clearing gesture that allows Spivak, in the second sentence of 
my epigraph, to make claims for the other two issues this conclusion will address: the 
specific qualities of literature, and its corollary ability to stage non-identitarian models 
of collectivity. 
We note that Spivak’s chosen adjective to describe the literature that is best 
able to stage this collectivity is, in keeping with her aversion to the term 
‘postcolonial’, “peripheral.” And yet, in her essay, she goes on to discuss this staging 
of collectivity in the novels of two writers whose status in the canon of postcolonial 
studies is, if not overly extolled, hardly peripheral: Tayeb Salih and Mahasweta Devi. 
We must, however, interpret this second deliberate gesture as alluding to the dangers 
that lurk behind the desire of the “politically correct metropolitan multiculturalist” to 
see postcolonial studies academically consolidated in the form of optional modules 
that a humanities student can choose to take as part of her degree.  
Such a desire, as Neil Lazarus and many others have pointed out, has meant 
that “literary scholars working in the field have tended to write with reference to a 
woefully restricted and attenuated corpus of works” usually written in a European 
language (English or French), and allowing only “a certain, very specific and very 
restricted kind of reading to be staged through reference to them” (424). Readings, 
Lazarus goes on to explain, that endlessly invoke discussions of nationalism as 
imagined community and tirelessly reveal history to be a master narrative that only 
produces domination (ibid). On the one hand, then, Spivak’s choice of Salih and Devi, 
who write in Arabic and Bengali, respectively, works to undercut the bias towards 
Anglo- and Francophone texts that reduces the ethical potential of postcolonial studies 
to little more than “putting some black in the Union Jack” (9). To choose to read Salih 
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and Devi is to foreground, instead, the need to “take the languages of the Southern 
Hemisphere as active cultural media rather than as objects of cultural study by the 
sanctioned ignorance of the metropolitan migrant” (ibid). 
Despite what my corpus of decidedly Anglophone texts might suggest, I 
sympathise entirely with Spivak’s proposal. I nevertheless want to stand by my 
Anglophone texts, in the conviction that although (because?) they too are peripheral to 
the canon of postcolonial studies, they have many insights to offer those of us working 
in the field, especially if we do so, at least partly, in/with European languages. If I 
open myself up to the charge of defensiveness by justifying myself thus, perhaps a 
closer look at the additional reason behind Spivak’s choice of texts will serve to clear 
me.“Salih’s narrator,” says Spivak only a few paragraphs after my epigraphic 
sentences, “will remain a vehicle of the undecidable. I am suggesting that we should 
allow peripheral literature this prerogative, not read it with some foregone 
conclusions that deny it literariness” (58, emphasis added). 
Here, again, we are made aware of the conspicuous substitution of the term 
“peripheral” for ‘postcolonial.’ This time, however, the implied charge against 
postcolonial literary studies seems to be its lack of attention to literariness, a charge 
which Spivak is by no means unjustified, or alone, in making. Consider, for instance, 
the inaugural issue of the postcolonial studies journal Interventions, published in 1999. 
Its general editor, Robert Young, makes in it the following remarks: “Postcolonial 
writing, together with minority writing in the west and feminist writing generally, has 
achieved a revolution in aesthetics and aesthetic criteria of the literary. […] Writing is 
now valued as much for its depiction of representative minority experience as for its 
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aesthetic qualities” (4, emphasis added).2 I will return to the question of value, one of 
the chief preoccupations of this project, shortly. For now, I will simply reproduce the 
critique that an unsympathetic, even scathing reading of this comment might 
engender: namely, that it seems to offer an apology for postcolonial literature’s lack of 
aesthetic qualities by offering as consolation the claim that its importance lies, rather, 
in its ability to reflect the experiences of national or global minorities. Young’s 
remarks certainly show that “postcolonial criticism is largely grounded in mimetic 
presuppositions about literature” (Ramazani, 2). Yet, more problematically, Young 
also risks offering us a prescriptive notion of what postcolonial literature should be. 
As Harrison puts it:  
 [Young] seems to suggest that the contemporary reader (/student) will 
be turning to the text for a view of and information about a ‘minority’ 
culture (most often, presumably, someone else’s) and that the text’s 
‘depiction’ of experience will be taken to be reliable and authoritative; 
and this in turn may suggest that the author has a responsibility to write 
reliably in this way (4). 
Harrison concludes his article, which refers extensively and sympathetically to 
Spivak’s Death of a Discipline, by stating that “[t]he critic or theorist, even in a field 
such as postcolonial studies, needs to go beyond the search for depictions of 
representative minority experience, if she or he wishes to deal with the literary at all” 
(15, emphasis added). The italicised phrase is of interest to me because it is 
symptomatic of a telling hesitation. A hesitation to be expected, perhaps, from a critic 
sympathetic to the ethical and political project of postcolonial studies. A hesitation 
that stems from the desire to make literature and its study a political endeavour, from 
 
2 Nick Harrison and Deepika Bahri draw on this same example in their respective exploration of the 
vexed issue of the role of the aesthetic in postcolonial literature. See Harrison’s “Who Needs an Idea of 
the Literary?” and Bahri’s introduction to Native Intelligence.  
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the conviction that any responsible writer from a formerly colonised region of the 
globe should want to explore the injustices of colonialism and the suffering and/or 
displacement it engendered.  
Significantly, it is just this hesitation that Spivak wants to do away with. For 
the literary critic, she suggests, justice is first and foremost a reading strategy, an 
ethical imperative to do justice to the text and to the qualities of literariness that give it 
its specificity. And this injunction applies equally, if not more, to the critic of 
postcolonial (peripheral) literature. For, perhaps more than any other subfield of 
literary studies, postcolonial studies expresses an unquestioned faith in the political 
efficacy of literature. More than any other discipline, therefore, it reads in search of 
the minority experience, values a text on the grounds that it provides examples from 
what would otherwise remain an unfamiliar culture or history and combs a work for 
signs of a pre-established set of criteria symptomatic of postcoloniality.  
Spivak’s argument for literariness finds echoes, most audibly, in the work of 
her contemporary, Derek Attridge. Attridge’s  J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading 
(2004a) takes on a writer whose work has been read extensively by postcolonial 
critics. Like Spivak, Attridge warns of the dangers of literary interpretations that 
“mov[e] too quickly beyond the [text] to find its significance elsewhere, of treating it 
not as inventive literary work drawing us into unfamiliar emotional and cognitive 
territory but as a reminder of what we already know too well” (Attridge 2004a, 43). 
Unlike Spivak, Attridge articulates his argument for literariness in terms that resonate 
suggestively with the body of texts that this dissertation deals with, and it is to his 
work that I will briefly turn before revisiting, in the second half of this chapter, a 
further aspect of Spivak’s argument. 
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Attridge’s main quarrel is with an approach to literature that he terms 
“instrumental.” An instrumental reading “could be crudely summarised as the treating 
of a text (or other cultural artefact) as a means to a predetermined end: coming to the 
object with the hope or the assumption that it can be instrumental in furthering an 
existing project, and responding to it in such a way as to test, or even produce that 
usefulness” (Attridge 2004b, 7). Instrumental attitudes in literary studies, says 
Attridge, “have been highly productive” (ibid), not least because they have allowed 
the literary critic to find a place for literature in political struggles. Attridge is highly 
aware, in other words, of the counter-accusations that might be levelled against his 
critique of instrumentalism by postcolonial critics who, like Harrison, might hesitate in 
the face of being labelled apolitical. Attridge’s response to such apprehensiveness, like 
Spivak’s, is categorical: there simply is no room for this kind of hesitation. 
“[L]iterature, understood in its difference from other kinds of writing (and other kinds 
of reading), solves no problems and saves no souls […] [I]ts effects are not predictable 
enough to serve a political or moral program” (Attridge 2004b, 4).3 
Postcolonial studies today, Spivak and Attridge suggest, needs to come to 
terms with the fact that its principal object of study, the literary, “is not a blueprint to 
be followed in unmediated social action” (Spivak, 23).4 Indeed, “as soon as art 
 
3 In the context of my discussion of Never Let Me Go it is highly significant that Attridge uses the word 
‘soul’ here. It allows for a reading of Ishiguro’s novel as a meditation on instrumentality and the human 
artifice. The coming-of-age narrative traces how Tommy and Kathy H learn that they embody the 
epitome of instrumentality, where the difference between two sorts of human artifices – clones such as 
themselves, and art works such as the ones they produce – has been all but erased. Clones are used 
instrumentally, to save or prolong lives. Their art work, as they learn from Miss Emily, is used 
instrumentally, as evidence for the fact that the ‘students’ have souls. 
4 I realise that Spivak’s book deals with the discipline of comparative literature, and that The Singularity 
of Literature, the book by Attridge that I move on to discuss, deals with a general notion of the literary. 
I have chosen, however, to focus only on what their arguments allow us to say about postcolonial 
studies, a move that finds support in the fact that  postcolonial critics such as Deepika Bahri, Nicholas 
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measures itself against action, immediate and pressing action can only put it in the 
wrong” (Blanchot, 213). The first task of the postcolonial literary critic is to recognise 
that this admission can be enabling. Only then will she be able to approach the literary 
text as a creation that demands to be read for its literariness, rather than as a product 
to be instrumentally combed for its usefulness in “furthering an existing project.” To 
approach a text as a creation is to be open to the “coming-into-being of the hitherto 
unexampled,” to be willing to be drawn into the unknown and the unfamiliar (Attridge 
2004b, 149). It is to understand, in other words, that art is the practice “that can never 
be justified yet upon which justice can be founded” (Blanchot, 215). 
The issue of instrumentality, of attempting to do justice to the text, has proved 
especially difficult in a project such as this one, whose very choice of texts obeys a 
somewhat instrumental logic. My claim, however, is that in order to explore the 
commodification of the human body that biotechnology now facilitates, literature 
plays a role as crucial as that of anthropology and medical ethics precisely because it 
does not solve any problems. Like anthropological and bioethical studies, my chosen 
texts highlight the difficult moral issues that surround the possibility of organ transfer, 
although they do so by staging fictional situations which project us into possibly 
unfamiliar emotional territory without offering a set of possible alternatives. To accept 
this is not to suggest that literature is irrevocably disassociated from the ethico-
political. Rather, it is to claim that the role of literature in a project such as this is to 
constantly signal to its own logic, a logic upon which justice might be founded. If the 
literary work, as Attridge reminds us, always “puts us under a certain obligation […] 
to translate the work into our own terms while remaining aware of the necessary 
Harrison, Graham Huggan, Neil Lazarus, and Robert Young engage with the issues raised by Attridge 
and Spivak, and, at times, refer directly to them. 
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betrayal that this invokes,” in the specific case of this project, the literary works I 
discuss also act as a constant ethical reminder of the dangers of the very 
instrumentality they thematise (Attridge 2004b, 120). The place of the literary work, 
then, is to stand as a constant counterpoint to the coveted, transplantable organ: the 
literary work is the human artifice whose existence can defy instrumentality. It signals, 
in a quasi-utopian gesture, to its ability to remain outside the instrumental logic which 
has even made the human organ – a thing naturally given and constantly, if 
incidentally, reproduced by human labour – into an alienable object pressed into the 
service of commodified life prolongment. To value literature for its ability to signal to 
a space beyond instrumentality, then, is to understand value non-instrumentally, that 
is, as an experience that exists “beyond rationality and measured productivity” 
(Attridge 2000, 109). 
To learn this lesson from my chosen corpus of texts, is to learn how to re-read 
certain episodes in them as signaling to just this sort of non-instrumental logic. It is to 
see Jaya’s call for “real weight on top of her” and her definition of “winning by 
losing” at Harvest’s conclusion as a defiant demand that flies in the face of 
premeditated risk assessment and rational calculations. It is to read the 
unconsummated love affair of Senay and Okwe in Dirty Pretty Things as a willed 
proscription of love from the plane of calculated exchange, and to find in the tragedy 
of Kathy and Tommy’s realization that their love will not buy them time, a similar 
gesture of proscription from the sphere of rational exchange. It is to offer, in short, a 
response to global capitalism, to its “imposition of the same system of exchange 
everywhere” (Spivak, 72).  
I have more to say for what my texts can teach us, however. For it is not just 
the instrumental logic of capital that they counter in these gestures. They also respond 
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directly to Spivak, and her call for the kind of non-identitarian models of collectivity 
which postcolonial studies has not, as yet, been able to imagine.  
  
II 
 
I propose the planet to overwrite the globe. […] The globe is on our computers. No 
one lives there. It allows us to think that we can aim to control it. The planet is in the 
species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan. 
 
Gayatri Spivak, Death of a Discipline 
 
I began this chapter with an epigraph from Spivak that suited my purposes because it 
foregrounded all the issues I wanted to evoke. I choose this second citation, however, 
to highlight a notable omission on her part. Spivak’s invocation of Planetarity, a term 
that can accommodate alterity in a way that globality cannot, is particularly striking to 
me because the departure from globality is advocated in terms of information 
technology. Spivak goes on to spell out and clarify this invocation of IT for us: “It is 
often pointed out,” she says, “that globalisation, in the form of ancient world systems, 
has a long history. This historical reckoning remains crucial to our task. In the 
relatively autonomous economic sphere, however, information technology has also 
created a rupture – hence my invocation of the computerised globe” (73). My own 
concern in this project has been to interrogate the role of biotechnology in the 
processes of globalisation. To me, then, Spivak’s description of the planet as the space 
which we inhabit, immediately evokes environmental and ecological concerns and 
“ruptures” that fall within the purview not of information technology but of 
biotechnology.  
In response to this omission, I propose a return to Paul Gilroy, whose Against 
Race was published in the year 2000, the very same year in which Spivak gave the 
Wellek Library Lectures in Critical Theory that she later revised for publication in 
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2003’s Death of a Discipline. Gilroy’s text is instructive to read alongside Spivak’s: if 
the final chapter of his book invokes, as does the final chapter of Spivak’s book, a 
notion of the planetary, his argument, unlike Spivak’s, unfolds with constant reference 
to the biological sciences.5 What is more: Gilroy turns to developments in 
biotechnology and the biological sciences in order to advocate his own vision of a 
non-identitarian collectivity.  
Gilroy’s move against race is a ground-clearing gesture, in fact, that operates 
in a similar fashion to Spivak’s gesture of reading Ahmad and Jameson as like-minded 
identitarians.6 From the outset of Against Race, Gilroy is at pains to point out that “the 
demise of ‘race’ is nothing to be feared” (12). It is imperative, instead, to forego 
raciological thinking, not only because of the political injustices that have been carried 
out in its name, but, equally importantly, in spite of the reappropriation of raciological 
thinking to turn it into an “important source of solidarity, joy, and collective strength” 
(ibid). Recognising that “[w]hen ideas of racial particularity are inverted in this 
defensive manner they become difficult to relinquish,” Gilroy, too, is categorical in 
claiming that there can be no hesitation on this matter. To let go of raciological 
thinking, even in its defensive, empowering versions, is to open oneself up to other, 
more inclusive models of collectivity: 
 The recurrence of pain, disease, humiliation and loss of dignity, grief, 
and care for those one loves can all contribute to an abstract sense of 
human similarity powerful enough to make solidarities based on 
cultural particularities appear suddenly trivial (17). 
 
5 The last chapter of Against Race is entitled “‘Third Stone from the Sun’: Planetary Humanism and 
Strategic Universalism”; the last chapter of Death of a Discipline is “Planetarity.” 
6 Spivak finds similar faults in ethnic studies and postcolonial studies: the former clings to “the 
authority of experience”(76); the latter has moved from being concerned with “mere nationalism over 
against colonialism” to “metropolitan multiculturalism,” concerned mainly with “political settlements 
that took place after the decolonisation of former European colonies” (81-2). 
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I must point to a final important similarity between Gilroy and Spivak before 
moving on to a consideration of how the literary texts I have considered in this project 
respond to both thinkers. The similarity concerns what we might call the temporality, 
the grammatical tense, in which Gilroy and Spivak envision such collectivities. If it is 
to respond to the most ethical of calls contained in literature, namely, the possibility 
literature harbours of imagining alternative collectivities, then, argues Spivak, the 
discipline of literary studies needs “to acknowledge a definitive future anteriority, a ‘to 
come’-ness, a ‘will have happened’ quality” (6). Consider, now, the following 
statement, taken from Gilroy’s concluding chapter, in which he reflects on the aims of 
his argument against race. Thus decontextualised, it almost reads as a direct address to 
Spivak: 
 
My own desire to see the end of raciology means that I, too, have 
invoked the unknowable future against the unforgiving present. In 
doing this, I urge a fundamental change of mood upon what used to be 
called anti-racism. It has been asked in an explicitly utopian spirit to 
terminate its ambivalent relationship to the idea of race in the interest 
of a heterocultural, postanthropological and cosmopolitan yet-to-come 
(334). 
If we want to respond to raciological thinking in a way that moves beyond the 
identitarian call for a “corrective or compensatory inclusion in modernity,” Gilroy 
adds, “we need self-consciously to become more future-oriented” (335, emphasis 
added). 
Spivak and Gilroy map out postcolonial studies as a discipline that has always 
been at pains to grapple with the problem of collectivity. Initially concerned with the 
reappropriation of raciological thinking and the countering of colonialism with 
nationalism, today, however, the field needs to see itself as a project concerned with 
imagining a form of collectivity which is impossible to predict, a task for which 
Spivak turns to the literary, and Gilroy, to science. Considered collectively, it is just to 
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human?7 
this injunction to embrace the unknowable future that Harvest, Dirty Pretty Things and 
Never Let me Go respond. They do so, on the one hand, by tracing the problem of 
collectivity in postcolonial studies along a similar path to the one traced by Gilroy and 
Spivak. Consider the sequential order in which the texts occur in this project: Harvest 
responds well to an understanding of postcoloniality as based on identitarian, racial 
thinking. Not only do the play’s stage directions specify that “[i]t matters only that 
there be a highly recognisable distinction between the two groups [Donors and 
Receivers], reflected in clothing and appearance” (Padmanabhan, 217); this difference 
is conceived of at the level of developmental progress, evidenced by the constant 
references to the lack of hygiene and amenities in the Donor world. That this lack is 
remedied by the constant imposition of high-tech gadgets by the Receivers recalls, of 
course, the bringing of trains, telegraphs and modern infrastructure to the Indian 
subcontinent by the British during the Raj. Dirty Pretty Things shifts the focus to the 
former metropole and the immigrant communities residing there. There is a 
concomitant shift towards questions of citizenship and to issues of mobility and the 
lack thereof, signaled to, as we have seen, by juxtaposing the hospitality industry 
catering to freely moving tourists, and the hospitality that a sovereign nation might 
extend to its immigrants. Never Let me Go places us in a sort of future that never 
happened, in a parallel present that transpires in a contemporary rural England in 
which we recognise nothing and in which all familiar markers of identity (race, class, 
nationality) are erased in order to foreground the very issue of future collectivities that 
Spivak and Gilroy diagnose as the most urgent question for postcolonial studies today: 
what, all three of them ask, constitutes that which is specifically and uniquely 
                                                 
7 Spivak’s version of this question, given her concern with the literary humanities, is “who crawls into 
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On the other hand, however, the texts offer a much more critical response to 
both thinkers. They do so by signaling to a very different set of concerns that emerge 
from the “‘will have happened’ quality” of the future and the call for a more “future-
oriented” approach to community that Spivak and Gilroy respectively invoke. The call 
for future-orientedness, after all, acquires altogether different resonances when 
understood in the context in which all three texts operate, that of commodified 
transplantation and life prolongment technologies. What else drives the life stories of 
Om, Jaya, Okwe, Senay, Kathy H and Tommy if not their orientation towards a better 
future? The poignancy of their stories, however, lies in the fact that the future appears 
increasingly as a domain of decidedly unequal access. What these texts teach us, then, 
is how the capitalism that Spivak, to her credit, never loses sight of, and the 
biotechnological developments that Gilroy, to his credit, pays close attention to, 
actually work together to profit from the hopes towards a better future that we all 
have. Their thematisation of organ transplantation signals towards a collectivity, in 
effect, predicated upon newly recognised similarities that are used to replicate the old 
patterns of exploitation. If the old patterns of exploitation were legitimised by a series 
of discourses evoking difference, not least the discourse of raciological thinking, then 
this exploitation is enabled, ironically, by discourses evoking equivalence: medical 
drugs, as Lawrence Cohen reminds us, suppress immunological difference, and global 
capitalism rests on the firm belief in the voluntary exchange of economically 
quantifiable equivalences.  
                                                                                                                                    
the place of the ‘human’ in’ humanism’?” (23) Gilroy, as we saw in the introduction, asks this question 
after a consideration of biotechnology and science, which informs, we note, his choice of terminology: 
We […] are now obliged to ask on what scale human sameness and human diversity are to be 
calibrated (47, emphasis added). 
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These texts never cease to remind us that the hubris inspired by biotechno
is a fundamental consideration for us if we are to retain the humility aspired to
Spivak’s salutary reminder that we inhabit the planet, on loan. They caution us, 
therefore, to be alert to that which Spivak omits from her discussion, albeit a 
discussion whose claims for the literary are ultimately very suggestive for this project, 
as I have indicated in the first section of this chapter. More importantly, perhaps, they 
introduce a level of caution into Gilroy’s joyous embracing of biotechnology’s role in 
tracial future to come. It is this same cautionary note that I have found to be so 
prescient in the work of Hannah Arendt, to which I refer so extensively in this project. 
Significantly, Gilroy himself draws on Arendt’s work in his Against Race. For
a project like Gilroy’s, which both highlights the antinomies of modernity and
us, “its custodians, [to] fulfill the promises made in the luminous rhetoric that helped 
constitute it”, Arendt’s prescience lies in her ability to respond to the “moral 
obligation to consider the connections that might exist between the genocidal terrors 
perpetrated inside Europe and the patterns of colonial and imperial slaughter that
preceded them under Europe’s colours” (75-76). For a project like my own, however, 
Arendt’s work, most particularly The Human Condition, is invaluable precisely 
because she is at pains to grapple with the thorny question of just what it mig
man, a question she approaches by interrogating the hubristic tendency
science to overcome our embodied, “merely given” existence on this planet. 
Gilroy is undoubtedly justified in signaling to the potential for human 
collectivity contained in the “international and therefore necessarily ‘transracial’ t
in internal organs and other body parts for transplant” (20). I read him as aski
shift our focus away from Cohen’s argument that immunosuppressant drugs like 
cyclosporine globalise by suppressing difference. Gilroy asks us, instead, to 
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differentiation recedes when it confronts more substantive varieties of 
concentrate on the fact that the event of accepting a transracial organ into one’s body 
is a significant transformation in our social imaginaries, and hence an impo
towards a postracial future. It is in this decidedly utopian spirit that he chooses to r
not just scientific developments, but the fiction that thematises these same 
developments. Twice in the conclusion to Against Race, Gilroy examines scien
fiction. The first reference is to 1931’s Black No More, the first sci-fi novel 
ed  Black Atlantic writer. The story, Gilroy tells us, centres on the 
machine for turning black people into whites. He continues: 
It is especially significant for our ethical purposes that the protagonist’s 
first major action after undergoing his change of race is to enlist in the 
ranks of a vicious w
Nordica. Once again, science, technology, and progress expand the 
wrong thing (349). 
Gilroy is clearly impatient with this neo-Luddite, dystopian view of scienc
and eager to reclaim science for his argument against race. Thus, his second referenc
to sci-fi mentions more recent films such as Independence Day or Men in Black
Recognising that the transethnic bonding that occurs in these films is made 
only because of the greater dangers represented by aliens and other threatened 
planetary conquests, he argues that such a view points only to “the radical 
powerlessness produced by a chronic inabili
l, omic and cultural life” (354). Accordingly, he then goes on to put forth 
re “hopeful” reading (ibid): 
[I]t is impossible to overlook the fact that this crop of movies expresses
real and widespread hunger for a world that is undivided by the petty 
differences we retain and inflate by calling them racial. These 
seek to celebrate how the desire to retain those outmoded principles 
otherness and forms of life that are truly other-worldly (355). 
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True, my entire corpus of texts might be read as a series of fables whose messa
unfold along similar lines to that of Gilroy’s reading of Black No More. All of them, in 
other words, might be read as alerting us to the ways in which science increases th
potential for unethical actions and Gilroy might well see in them only tired re-
articulations of pessimism and fear. My own view, however, is that this sort of readin
fails to do justice to the texts, primarily because these texts, despite initial 
appearances, do not try to preserve raciological thinking in the ways that Gilroy, with 
science as his model, wants to move beyond. By an explicit visual marking of racial 
difference, Harvest and Dirty Pretty Things remind us, rather, that the transcendence 
of race, ideologically speaking, does not entail a raceless future, practically speaking. 
To acknowledge this is to recognise that the social realities created by a long tradition 
of raciological thinking are very much with us in the present.8 It is for th
abhan feels the need to retain a sense of racial difference between the donors 
and receivers of her play, and for this reason too, that Sr Juan is able to confiden
to Okwe that if he were just “some African, the deal would be simple.” 
More importantly, however, we must remember that all three texts focus on a 
particular process enabled by a specific form of existing scientific technology: 
 
8 Gilroy is by no means oblivious to this problem. Witness his reference to the following comments by 
Martin Luther King:  
Without denying the value of scientific endeavour, there is a striking absurdity in 
committing billions to reach the moon where no people live, while only a fraction of 
that amount is appropriated to service the densely populated slums. If these strange 
views persist, in a few years we can be assured that when we set a man on the moon, 
with an adequate telescope he will be able to see the slums on earth with their 
intensified congestion, decay and turbulence. On what scale of values is this a 
program of progress? 
To this sense that “the gap between social and technological progress was now so deep that it called the 
very idea of social and economic progress into question”, however, Gilroy responds with the 
observation that this awareness, too, is belied by a simultaneous interest in futurology and 
extraterrestiality, even on the part of Dr King, who was a faithful follower of Star Trek and an admirer 
of Uhura, the black female character played by Nichelle Nichols (346). 
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immunologically unrestricted, hence inter-racial and inter-familial, transplant. As 
such, the plots of all texts are in some sense predicated on the notion of postraciality.
Harvest’s villain, Virgil, obviously cares little about race if he is happy to incorpo
all of Jeetu’s organs into himself. Dirty Pretty Things understands the postracia
of organ transfer to the point of centering the film’s climactic revenge upon Sr. Juan 
on the commodified organ’s very racelessness. And Never Let Me Go, as I have 
already mentioned, situates us in a parallel postracial present, signaling to the 
insignificance of race by its complete lack of acknowledgement of the issue. In fac
these texts are explicitly concerned with the fact that political inequality is, effectively, 
no longer raciologically justified. Their concern with transplant technology shows us
too, that we can no longer say with the confidence of Hannah Arendt in 1958 that 
“political equality is the very opposite of our equality before death.” Rather, they teach
us that political inequality, as well as inequality before death, is legitimized with an 
appeal to the instrumental logic whose workings are mapped out so compellingly by 
Hannah Arendt. It is an instrumental logic that creates donors-sellers, as Harvest and 
Dirty Pretty Things show us, in the form of willing or unwilling commodifiers of the 
organ mysteriously given to them, an organ which their labour incidentally reproduces
and for which there is an increasing, predatory demand. It is an instrumental logic that 
culminates, as Never Let Me Go shows us, in having to manufacture an artificial other, 
a clone, whose organs can be taken because it exists solely to fulfill this purpose. We 
would do well here to recall Paul Gilroy’s reading of the aliens of contemporary films 
who, because they constitute “more substantive varieties of otherness and forms of l
that are truly other-worldly” allow for the surfacing of postracial collectivities. Nev
Let Me Go forecloses this escape route enabled by the possibility of an absolute other,
the “truly other-worldly.” Kathy H and Tommy, we recall, exist because they have 
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 Surely, they ask, the issue of racelessness 
only returns us all the more urgently to G ’s own question: in order to imagine a 
o
 
been made by us: they are a decidedly human artifice. Collectively, then, the three 
texts pose a difficult question of Gilroy: is there really so much cause for celebration 
in biotechnology’s creation of racelessness?
ilroy
n n-identitarian collective future, how are human sameness and diversity to be 
calibrated?  
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I have already referred, above, to an essay by Neil Lazarus published in 2005. 
Significantly entitled “The Politics of Postcolonial Modernism,” the essay laments,
we saw, the restricted, predictable set of texts and interpretations that characterise 
postcolonial studies in its current incarnation. In order to try and envisage a critical 
alternative to a postcolonial studies that does not do justice to its ethical potential, 
Lazarus turns to debates on literary modernism, whose politics have also been the 
subject of much debate. Embarking on a critical reading of both Raymond Williams
The Politics of Modernism and Frederic Jameson’s Postmodernism; Or the Cultu
Logic of Late Capitalism, Lazarus claims to be equally unpersuaded by William
argument that modernism addressed only a “highly selected version of the mode
which then offer[ed] to appropriate the whole of modernity” (Williams, cited
Lazarus 429) and Jameson’s argument that “modernism’s criticality 
neutralized” (Lazarus, 430). Neither critic, says Lazarus, seems to allow for the 
possibility that “there might be a certain kind of modernist writing after the 
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canonisation of modernism – a writing that is to say, that resists the 
accommodationism of what has been canonised as modernism a
me modernist work has done from the outset: namely, says ‘no’; re
integration, resolution, consolation, comfort; protests and criticises” (431). This, 
however, is what postcolonial writing, at its best, is able to do. 
Next, Lazarus proposes a term for understanding “the conceptual 
underpinnings of [this] particular kind of writing, [this] particular mode of literary 
practice” that says ‘no’ (432). “Disconsolation,” he says, “is the project of this 
its deepest aesthetic (hence indirectly social) aspiration” (ibid).9 I want to claim this
term – disconsolation – for all three texts which I have considered in this project, te
whose Anglophone-ness banishes them from Spivak’s category of “peripheral 
literature” and whose critical stance towards technology leaves them vulnerab
Gilroy’s charge of pessimism and 
and, allows us to read Harvest, Dirty Pretty Things and Never Let Me Go as 
critiques motivated by disconsolation’s chief characteristic: its “yearning for 
fellowship or collectivity” (ibid). 
We might well object to Lazarus’s desire to see postcolonial literature as the 
custodian of literary modernism. I leave a detailed critique of this move to those who
are more qualified to articulate it. I offer only a final thought in conclusion. It refers 
back to the dictionary definition that is my epigraph for this section, and pertains on
to the three texts that have been my concern in this project: rather than modernis
want to suggest, all texts I consider here are proleptic. This adjective, of course, can 
applied to all works of art insofar as art is able to gesture towards what is to-come 
 
9 Significantly, Lazarus’s chief example of the aesthetic of disconsolation is none other than Kazuo 
Ishiguro (432). 
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s not (yet) been put. Prolepsis, as it occurs in these texts, asks us to do more 
than imagine what is to-come. Rather, it puts forward a not-yet whose message is two-
fold: to imagine what is yet to come and to anticipate in this the kind of world we do 
not want.  
(Schlemon, 217). Harvest, Dirty Pretty Things and Never Let Me Go, however, 
literalise the rhetorical figure that is prolepsis: the entire narrative and plot of these 
texts centres on representing an existing technology in order to anticipate the uses to 
which it ha
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